Addressing Violent Intergroup Conflict from the Bottom Up?

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How might interventions that engage ordinary citizens in settings of violent conflict affect broader conflict dynamics? Given the volume of resources committed every year to citizen-oriented programs that attempt to promote peace, this is an important question. We develop a framework to analyze processes through which individual-level interventions could mitigate violent conflict escalation more broadly. Individual-level interventions may increase positive feelings toward the outgroup, as well as psychological, social, and material resources among participants. These have the potential to influence behaviors such as policing of the ingroup, public advocacy, and political action that can contribute to peace. Yet, the effectiveness of interventions to influence the conflict is moderated by contextual factors like groups’ access to material resources, their positions in society, and political institutions. We use this analytical framework to assess evidence from recent intervention studies. We find that the current evidence base is quite small, does not cover the diversity of relevant contexts, and gives too little attention to resources and capacities that enable people to engage in conflict mitigation behaviors. Researchers and policy makers should go beyond thinking only about

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improving attitudes to thinking about behavior, resources, and capacities for such behaviors, and contextual conditions that constrain behavior.

Each year substantial resources are committed to interventions engaging citizens with aspirations to “build peace” in contexts affected by violent conflict between members of ethnic groups. The tremendous toll of violent intergroup conflict—including upward of 2 million deaths since 1989 (Melander, 2015), and the pronounced gap in quality of life between countries affected by violent conflict versus those not affected (World Bank, 2011)—motivates these interventions. The problem that we address is whether such interventions can mitigate the extent to which intergroup conflicts escalate to violence. These peace-building interventions combine various activities, including peace messaging, intergroup contact, intergroup dialogue and discussion processes, self-reflection tasks, provision of material incentives, or training on conflict resolution. The goal for these interventions is to mitigate societal-level conflicts. A best practices guide by the U.S. Agency for International Development motivates investments in “people-to-people peace-building” interventions with the promise that they can help to “mitigate against the forces of dehumanization, stereotyping, and distancing that facilitate violence,” thereby “enabling elite negotiators to reach a strong commitment [and] (re-) weaving the social fabric at the grassroots level in support of long-lasting peace” (USAID, 2011). Given the amount of resources and attention applied to individual-level peace-building interventions, it is important to address the following questions: through what mechanisms could they work, and what evidence do we have regarding their effectiveness?

We assess the potential for individual-level interventions to affect societal-level conflict dynamics. We focus on contexts where interethnic violence is a present threat and where intervention participants are ordinary citizens who are also members of ethnic groups implicated in the conflict. We synthesize current empirical and theoretical work in social psychology and political science to develop a framework for analyzing the potential effects of such “citizen-oriented” interventions. The framework ties together three levels of analysis: (1) participants’ own appraisals about threats to peace between groups and of their personal resources to take action (micro-level); (2) peace-building behaviors that have the possibility to de-escalate conflict in the broader communities (meso-level); and (3) contextual factors that moderate the effects of peace-building behaviors (macro-level). This framework yields hypotheses about how citizen-oriented interventions might affect societal-level conflict dynamics. It also outlines what kinds of outcomes researchers should evaluate in assessing contributions to conflict mitigation.

We then discuss current intervention studies in light of our framework. We review studies that take place in countries where organized and politically motivated violence between two or more ethnic groups is a present threat. In all the studies,
intervention participants were also members of ethnic groups implicated in the violent conflict. The interventions all had the goal to contribute to the de-escalation or prevention of interethnic violence. We focused on interventions that were either fielded by a programmatic agency or tested in more controlled circumstances, for example, in a survey experiment, but designed so as to be fielded with minimal, if any, changes to the intervention. This excludes experiments that treat subjects with information in survey or laboratory settings, where scalability is unclear.\footnote{Laboratory and survey experiments were only included if they declared their manipulation as an intervention and it seemed plausible to the authors that the laboratory manipulation could be implemented in the field with minimal or no changes. And, of course, participants had to be implicated in violent conflict based on our second criterion.}

We place such importance on real-life interventions and samples because we are interested in evidence with which “one does want to predict real-life behavior from research findings” (Mook, 1983, p. 386). Finally, we focused on studies that used some kind of controlled comparison, whether via randomization or robust observational methods, to estimate causal effects of the intervention. We applied stringent methodological criteria to circumvent selection bias that arises when those who are already “pro-peace” enroll in peace-building programs. Furthermore, because of the many unanticipated social and political events in countries with ongoing ethnic violence, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of an intervention in pre–post designs without a control condition. The scope of this article is limited to interventions that focus on ordinary citizens and tries to promote their ability as individuals to contribute to peace. Not all peace-building interventions have such aims. For example, some interventions target political leaders or armed combatants, which we distinguish from ordinary citizens. This article does not focus on these other types of peace-building interventions. It also excludes interventions that primarily aim to build the capacity of communities and improve institutions in the aftermath of war (King & Samii, 2014).

Based on these criteria, a search of relevant social science databases yielded 19 studies. We assess the empirical evidence narratively, rather than conducting a formal meta-analysis. Our primary goal is what Baumeister and Leary (1997) call “problem identification”—that is, assessing the conflict mitigation literature to identify areas for improvement and further research. There is a large amount of variation in the set of studies that met our selection criteria, including the intervention types, and outcome measurement strategies. This undermines the value of a quantitative meta-analysis: if we accept such differences as meaningful, we would have multitudes of intervention–outcome combinations and too few studies for a meaningful statistical analysis of any of the different combinations. Further, if we ignore such heterogeneity and try to pool interventions and outcomes, the results of the analysis would be difficult to interpret. Moreover, the primary goal in reviewing the intervention studies was not to judge “what works,” but rather
to examine the extent to which the studies even looked at processes that connect micro level effects to broader conflict dynamics, the ways in which they did so, and where future research might focus.

Our review of studies reveals a number of limitations in the current literature and therefore priorities for further research and program development. Most of the interventions examined participants’ appraisals of threats to peace between groups using various measures of outgroup regard\(^2\) and attitudes toward conflict. Fewer studies assessed peace-building behaviors. This is a major shortcoming because the goal of most of these interventions is to mobilize individuals to take actions that influence other individuals or groups in a peace-promoting manner. Almost none of our reviewed studies examined participants’ resources to engage in peace-promoting behavior, even though many interventions have “capacity building” as an explicit goal.

We begin this article with some descriptive background on the ways that citizen-oriented peace-building programs are applied around the world. Following that is a presentation of our analytical framework. We then turn to the evidence from intervention studies that met our inclusion criteria. A concluding section draws out implications both for those designing and those evaluating peace-building interventions. The implications focus on specifying theories of change that speak to the potential for an intervention to contribute to society-level conflict mitigation.

**Citizen-Targeted Peace-Building Programs**

We begin by characterizing the scale and variation in citizen-targeted peace-building programs around the world. Governments, donors, and international organizations view peace-building programs as crucial to advancing human rights, as stated in multilateral initiatives such as the report of the United Nations Advisory Group of Experts (2015). Moreover, conflict mitigation is crucial to the promotion of human material well-being, a point that drove the World Bank to focus on conflict mitigation in its 2011 World Development Report (World Bank, 2011). Data from the OECD indicates that its member governments made combined commitments amounting to $390 million per year between 2000 and 2013 to citizen-targeted peace-building programs in 140 countries around the world (AidData, 2016). These include programs run by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Search for Common Ground (https://www.sfcg.org/) or Seeds of Peace (http://www.seedsofpeace.org/),\(^3\) as well as national government initiatives such as the Community Relations initiative in Northern Ireland (Potter &

\(^2\) By outgroup regard we mean attitudes and feelings toward the outgroup that might range from empathy or tolerance down to intolerance, prejudice, or even hatred.

\(^3\) Similar programs include Ultimate Peace—building peace through ultimate frisbee http://www.ultimatepeace.org/about/, and the Hand in Hand school mixed Jewish–Arab schools https://www.handinhandk12.org/.
Fig. 1. Timing of funding commitments to citizen-oriented peace-building interventions relative to conflict events in the country where the project takes place. Conflict events are incidents of armed violence resulting in at least 25 deaths. Negative values on the x-axis refer to funding commitments in years prior to violence, positive values refer to funding commitments in years after violence, and 0 refers to funding commitments occurring in the same year of violence. Sources: AidData 3.0 database (http://aiddata.org/country-level-research-datasets), Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute of Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset Version 4–2015 (http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/), and authors’ calculations.

Campbell, 2014). Table 1 displays program descriptions for a sample of conflict mitigation programs that we selected to display various dimensions of variation. The programs vary in their activities, including radio or television shows, social media groups, peace education, conflict resolution training, and the use of local economic development grants. As such, programs vary in the way they combine messaging, opportunities for personal reflection, discussion with other ingroup members, contact and dialogue with outgroup members, training, or incentives. The theme that consistently unites these programs is that the interventions engage ordinary citizens rather than political leaders or combatants.

Figure 1 shows the timing of OECD funding commitments to such programs from 2000 to 2013 relative to incidents of armed violence in countries where the programs take place. In the vast majority of cases, the country experiences armed violence in the same year that a funding commitment is made. Programs often take a year or two to roll out. Moreover, according to the data from the Uppsala Conflict Data program on armed conflicts since 1945, the average duration of an armed conflict is 13 years (Melander, Pettersson, & Themner, 2016). These facts
### Table 1. Examples of Citizen-Targeted Peace-Building Programs Around the World

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU)</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Creating a sustainable culture of peace in Afghanistan through active peace-building and peace education programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Inter-Religious Council for Peace and Justice</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Founded by a group of Muslims and Christians committed to promoting a peace-building agenda, the council holds monthly meetings to discuss issues of justice and peace and operates projects for youth and children to encourage them to think conscientiously about peace and harmony.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School-Based Programme for Psychosocial Healing</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Training of teacher trainers, psychologists, and teachers in psychosocial rehabilitation, problem solving, and activities to help bring about healing and promote conflict resolution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport for Peace</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>“Jeux de la Paix” (Peace Games), which included a variety of sports competitions and brought together youth from all parts of the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilization and Community Reintegration Project</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>Community-led development and conflict resolution project, bringing communities together to prioritize their development projects and decide how to allocate block grants, elect community development committees who receive training and technical assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building and Conflict Resolution in Guatemala</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Strengthen capacity of grassroots groups to defend the human rights of their communities; enable the members of the new human rights groups to develop the capacities and knowledge necessary to sustain their groups; increase awareness of groups of women, students, and community mayors about nonviolent conflict resolution and human rights; and support community mayors in the nonviolent resolution of conflicts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salam Shabab</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>TV show and online community for Iraqi youth. Aimed at empowering Iraqi youth and build foundations of peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Israeli Movement for the Equal Representation of Women</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>The “Young Women’s Parliament” project brings together 150 high school female students of different religious background from 10 communities to work on issues of common concern, build bridges, learn advocacy skills, and improve leadership skills enabling the participants to work on conflict resolution issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yala Young Leaders</td>
<td>Israel/Palestine</td>
<td>Facebook-based youth movement/network with the goal of promoting peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion and Peacebuilding Initiative</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Working with key religious leaders and institutions to strengthen interfaith dialogue and collaboration, develop Buddhist peace education, address escalating religious tensions, and provide peace training to religious actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countering Extremist Messages in Pakistani Media</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Project on the role of the media in promoting extremist messaging and developing actionable steps to counter extremism in local media.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1. Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mindanao Peace Building Institute Annual Training</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Courses that tackled contemporary issues and crucial discourses on peace benefits, active nonviolence, and community-based restorative justice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kigali Genocide Memorial Center</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Informative memorial site with a mass grave outside, a peace garden for reflection, and a comprehensive exhibition on the Rwandan genocide and other genocides of the twentieth century.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Awareness Campaign on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and Bill of Rights in Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Building public awareness of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) Bill of Rights to generate a broad base of support for full implementation of the CPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Memory and Peace Documentation Centre</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Provides information as a tool to facilitate dialogue and coexistence among communities and supports national reconciliation through dissemination of national records and memory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* The table gives descriptions of a sample of programs from the AidData database. The descriptions paraphrase program documentation posted on the Internet by either the implementing organizations or donors. Sources: implementing organization and donor Web sites.

imply that the vast majority of programs occur in the shadow of recent, and often ongoing, armed violence. This indicates a potential gap between policy concerns and research. For example, Wagner and Hewstone (2012) note that research on intergroup contact in conflict-affected countries is often fielded in years that are quite distant from periods of substantial violence. Wagner and Hewstone are referring to quantitative, qualitative, as well as laboratory- and field-based research on contact. As discussed below, when searching for citizen-focused peace-building programs including but not limited to intergroup contact, we found at least some that met our criterion of ongoing ethnic violence or immediate threat of ethnic violence. Nevertheless, the potential for mismatch between the timing of research and timing of programs suggests caution in applying general conclusions from the contact literature to understanding how peace-building programs may work. Researchers should give consideration to how time since that last episode of violence moderates the effects of interventions, and they should privilege research that is conducted as close as possible to the onset of conflict, given that this when most programs are initiated.

**Analytical Framework**

How might interventions targeting ordinary citizens affect such citizens’ willingness to engage in peace-building behaviors? In what follows, we will present
an analytical framework based on the stress and coping literature, which emphasizes the importance of promoting intergroup harmony as a goal and developing resources for addressing threats to this goal. Before presenting this analytical framework in detail, we will describe a few examples that show what kinds of behaviors we believe micro-level peace-building interventions can and should promote. We present examples from Israel for two reasons: First, as will become clear in the literature review section, most of the existing intervention studies on micro-level interventions were conducted there. Second, Israel’s democratic political opportunity structure allows for citizen engagement in ways that circumstances in more authoritarian regimes do not.

We consider examples since the end of the Second Palestinian Intifada (2000–2005) and the ensuing Israeli withdrawal of military forces and Jewish settlements from Gaza. The Second Intifada was characterized by numerous Palestinian suicide bombings against Israeli targets, and Israeli military incursions and targeted assassinations of Palestinian militants that led to more than 3,000 Palestinian and 1,000 Israeli fatalities (“Intifada Toll,” 2005). The disengagement from Gaza led to widespread anger amongst Israeli settlers and right-wing Jews, who felt it was a betrayal of “Greater Israel” that included Gaza and the West Bank, leading them to formulate a “price tag policy.” The price tag policy meant that any actions taken against the settlement movement would be met with reprisals against Arabs, Palestinians, and in some cases left-wing Jews or Israeli security forces (Harel, 2008). Most of these price tag attacks occurred in the West Bank, but occasionally occur in Israel as well (B’Tselem, 2011). These attacks have included roadblocks in the West Bank, the destruction of Palestinian olive groves, defacement of Palestinian houses, Arab churches, and mosques, and sometimes murder (Graham, 2015). Scholars suggest that the goals of the attacks are threefold: (1) imposing a cost on the Israeli government when they seek to challenge the settlement enterprise; (2) radicalizing the Palestinian population and inciting attacks against Jewish settlers; and (3) forcing Jews who do not support the settler movement to pick a side—either supporting the Palestinians and opposing the settlers, or (tacitly) endorsing the Jewish settlers (Eiran & Krause, 2016). Ordinary citizens could play various roles in trying to prevent such escalation, by intervening to block the attacks, working to temper Palestinian or Jewish reactions to such attacks, or in supporting leaders who aim to stem the attacks’ potential to cause escalation. Consider the events following the Duma arson attack by Jewish settlers in the West Bank in July of 2015, which killed three Palestinians in their homes, and the Jerusalem Gay Pride parade attack. After these attacks, thousands of ordinary Israelis gathered across the country to protest against growing incitement and violence and to renew calls for peace (Hasson, Lior, & Shpigel, 2015).

On the Palestinian side, the recent outbreak of the “Stabbing Intifada” highlights how loosely organized individuals can exacerbate polarization that prevents peaceful conflict resolution. The Stabbing Intifada refers to the ongoing,
uncoordinated knife and firearm attacks by Palestinians on Jews in the Jerusalem area beginning in October 2015 (Eglash, Booth, & Cameron, 2016; Goldberg, 2015). Unlike the First Intifada (1987–1993) and Second Intifada (2000–2005), there is no mass political movement or orchestrated uprising. Most of the attacks have been perpetrated by lone individuals or small groups. The attacks have had political reverberations, including domestic criticism of Israeli Prime Minster Benyamin Netanyahu’s perceived ineffective response, international criticism of a heavy-handed Israeli security response, and criticism among Palestinians about weakness and unpopularity of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Kershner & Rudoren, 2015). Yet, ordinary citizens also have the capacity to blunt the potential for escalation. For example, in July 2016, a Palestinian doctor treated wounded Jewish settlers when their car came under fire on a West Bank road. The doctor was lauded by individuals on both side of the conflict (Hadid, 2015). In principle, interventions targeting ordinary citizens aim to promote the behaviors exemplified by the protesting Israelis and Palestinian doctor, and, in turn, to prevent either the behaviors exemplified by the price tag attacks and stabbings or to limit the ability of such attacks to contribute to further escalation.

Figure 2 displays an analytical framework that links micro-level interventions to broader conflict dynamics. We define the micro-level as individual, ordinary citizens and the psychological processes affecting them as individuals (e.g., prejudice is a micro-level process because it afflicts individual citizens, even if it is concerned with groups). The following sections go through the steps in the framework. The idea is to go beyond focusing on how interventions affect attitudes and beliefs, and to think through potential effects on peace-building behavioral strategies.

When situations such as price tag attacks or stabbings arise, they threaten the possibility of peace between members of one’s ingroup and an outgroup. One’s
impulse to act to address the threat will depend on the appraisal of the situation. We apply the stress and coping model of Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, and Gruen (1986) and Lazarus and DeLongis (1983) to this situation. On the basis of this model, we consider two types of appraisals: (1) “primary” appraisal of whether for an individual who is confronted with such events, the goal of intergroup harmony is accessible, the perceived consequences of the encounter are seen as in conflict with this goal, and, consequently, the event is seen as a threat to one’s own well-being and (2) “secondary” appraisal of whether one’s personal resources and capacities suffice to act to address threats to one’s intergroup harmony goals. Relevant resources include psychological (cognitive and affective endowments that allow people to translate intentions into actions), social (helpful connections with other people), and material (funds or infrastructure) resources. Based on this framework, a social situation of relevance to the ethnic conflict, for example, observing someone spray price-tag graffiti or being the direct target of an insult by a member of the outgroup, should trigger primary and secondary appraisal in the observing or target individual. Consequently, the individual should take action to de-escalate the situation only if she evaluates it as threatening an interest that she holds in intergroup harmony (primary appraisal) and also deems her resources to be sufficient for addressing the threat (secondary appraisal).

Interventions that introduce new ideas, promote contact, or introduce incentives can strengthen intergroup harmony goals, which, in turn, should affect primary appraisals in relevant situations. Messaging, contact, discussion, and dialogue interventions can improve participants’ regard for the outgroup, which has been shown to strengthen intergroup harmony goals (Allport, 1979). Program documents for conflict mitigation and peace-building interventions frequently refer to such effects on outgroup regard (USAID, 2011), and empirical studies regularly focus on such effects, as we show below in our review of field studies. Self-reflection interventions can strengthen individuals’ intergroup harmony goals by altering how these goals are construed (as win–win rather than zero sum outcomes). Interventions that provide incentives can also strengthen intergroup harmony goals. For example, programs may condition access to valuable goods (e.g., scholarships or recreational activities) on behavior that exhibits commitment to intergroup harmony.4

Interventions may affect secondary appraisals by providing trainings that build capacity and personal resources. Participants can draw on these new personal resources in considering actions in situations that constitute threats to their intergroup harmony goals. Possible resources that programs can build include developing leadership skills or knowledge about the political system. Such program components can increase participants’ perceived self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997; Uga

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4 In our review of field studies below, we show that such incentives are even present in programs that ostensibly focus on outgroup regard.
and improve their resilience (Seligman, Ernst, Gillham, Reivich, & Linkins, 2009). Another type of personal resource that many different types of programs introduce is access to new trust networks that participants can rely upon for information or as collaborators in a mobilization effort (Tilly, 2001). Finally, peace-building interventions can provide \textit{material and structural resources}, such as access to further education or venues for mobilization events. While most empirical studies assess and find evidence that peace-building interventions affect intergroup contact harmony goals (generally in the form of attitudes that reflect increased outgroup regard), fewer studies assess resources (relevant for secondary appraisals), and if they do, they often fail to connect the resource outcomes to the intergroup harmony goals (e.g., Darnell, 2012).

Whether or not interventions strengthen intergroup harmony goals and resources depends on moderating factors at the micro- and macro-levels. Pre-existing evaluations of the outgroup and resources that participants possess are micro-level moderators. Based on how positive a person’s attitudes toward the outgroup are and how many resources she possesses, there is more or less room for her to grow as a function of the intervention. In extreme cases, when an individual already has a strong intergroup harmony goal and well-developed resources, the intervention may not be able to do anything further for this individual. Typically, one would expect that pro-harmony and contact interventions should increase outgroup regard, and consequently shift participants’ primary appraisals toward seeing threats to intergroup harmony as threats to their interests in relevant situations. But participants with pre-existing antipathy toward the outgroup may have perversely negative reactions to such “positive contact” interventions (Gubler, 2011; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Yablon, 2012). Research into the effects of contact interventions should anticipate such possibilities.

Interventions engage individuals who are embedded in a context defined by political institutions as well as group-level endowments and associated status asymmetries. These are macro moderators because they are concerned with the social structures that surround, enable, or constrain individuals. Political institutions shape opportunities and risks for various types of action. Important factors that determine how easy or difficult it will be for individuals to contribute to peace movements include the capacity a state has for repression, how open a political system is, how stable elite arguments are that typically undergird a polity, and if influential and powerful allies exist (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; Tarrow, 1998). Such “political opportunity structures” affect what resources are needed in taking action to mitigate conflict. To engage in peace-building behaviors when opportunities are limited by repression, citizens need to either have an extremely strong goal of intergroup harmony or evaluate a situation as extremely threatening to their goal of intergroup harmony (primary appraisal), they must possess an extraordinary amount of resources (secondary appraisal), or both. In extreme cases, they have to be willing to risk their lives.
Given that threat appraisals are always a function of both persons and their environment (Lazarus & Folkman, 1987), the status or social role of an individuals’ ethnic group can affect her appraisals. First, to overcome intergroup conflict, perpetrator groups often require the satisfaction of their need for acceptance, whereas members of victim groups require the satisfaction of their need for agency (Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 1983). Consequently, members of groups who see themselves as perpetrators may have more pronounced intergroup harmony goals in many situations. Second, for members of low status, minority, or oppressed groups, intergroup harmony goals may depend on their perceived dependence on the outgroup and a fear for one’s personal safety. In such instances, individuals’ resources maybe a stronger predictor of peace-building behaviors than their regard for the outgroup.

From Appraisals to Peace-Building Behaviors

Micro-targeted interventions affect appraisals. Yet, to then affect broader conflict dynamics they must also affect behaviors with the potential to create more peaceful relations at the level of their community or society (i.e., peace-building behaviors). Because these behaviors extend beyond individuals to affect other individuals and groups, we situate them at the meso-level.

We draw on the current literature to examine three classes of peace-building behavior: (1) policing ingroup members to stop or prevent them from acting aggressively toward the outgroup, (2) public advocacy for de-escalation that can persuade or spread pro-peace norms by allowing peace-seekers to recognize that others share their point of view, and (3) political action to put those who support intergroup peace into positions of power or pressure those currently in positions of power to change their stance. Each behavior defines its own set of relevant appraisals and moderating factors. They each also represent possible mechanisms through which interventions that target small numbers of individuals can nonetheless change dynamics in the broader community.

The following sections discuss these peace-building behaviors in turn. Our hope is that this may stimulate more reflection among those studying and designing citizen-targeted peace-building programs to more clearly articulate causal pathways to societal change via behaviors targeting group dynamics and collective processes. This would allow for more compelling research into whether such programs can contribute to conflict mitigation in ways that go beyond changes in participants’ attitudes or personal values.

Ingroup policing. “Ingroup policing” refers to individuals having a proclivity to prevent their ingroup members from engaging in aggressive acts toward the outgroup (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998; Ditlmann & Samii, 2016; Fearon & Laitin, 1996). Ingroup policing behaviors include admonishing ingroup members for their
aggressions in public settings, whether in person, via the media, or on social media. Ingroup policing can also operate in more private settings, such as contradicting peers or family members who are aggressive in their actions or speech toward the outgroup. In an analysis of historic cases, Fearon and Laitin (1996) conclude that ingroup policing has been a fundamental mechanism through which ethnic groups have maintained cooperative relations with each other. Peace programs that promote ingroup policing function like bystander interventions (Darley & Latané, 1968) in that they encourage individuals to act based on what they perceive as right even if others fail to act.

Ingroup policing can operate at various levels, as the following examples from the Israeli–Palestinian conflict show. When an Arab resident of the city of Akko (Akka in Arabic) provocatively blasted loud music from his car during 2008 Yom Kippur observances, resulting tensions escalated to violence. The tensions were resolved after local Arab leaders publicly condemned the actions of the provocateur (Al Jazeera, 2008, October 13; see also Zeitzoff, 2016, for a study based on this incident). Such public condemnation signals to outgroup members one’s intention to keep ingroup members in check. If deemed as credible, such signals can reassure outgroup members that they have no need to mobilize or even act preemptively. The absence of such efforts to contain ingroup members can undermine cooperation. Kydd and Walter (2002) use time series and process tracing analyses to conclude that the collapse of the Israeli–Palestinian peace processes in 1996 and 2000 was due to the failure of moderates to stand up to extremists’ violent provocations.

Ingroup policing promotes intergroup cooperation through intragroup confrontation and dissent (Cikara & Paluck, 2013). This makes it a behavior that many individuals would perceive as risky and therefore would require high degrees of perceived self-efficacy and resilience. Some interventions attempt to improve attitudes toward the outgroup but do not attempt to endow participants with greater self-efficacy. For those cases, we should expect pre-existing efficacy and resilience to moderate the extent to which the intervention actually changes inclinations to contribute to behaviors like ingroup policing. In terms of macro moderators, research suggests that self-perceived risks of dissent are especially high among members of low status or oppressed groups (Austen-Smith & Fryer, 2005). Group status is thus likely to moderate the extent to which interventions affect participants’ willingness to challenge ingroup members. Furthermore, in extremely repressive states when severe concerns for personal safety drive people’s behaviors, policing in-group members is probably fruitless.

Public advocacy. Public advocacy is a behavior in which participants demonstrate their pro-peace attitude in a manner that is visible for large numbers of people. It includes signing petitions, participating in public demonstrations, or posting advocacy material on social media. It also includes less public behaviors
such as merely expressing among peers a point of view that endorses amicable resolution of conflicts with the outgroup, or asking people to consider an outgroup members’ points of view. One process through which public advocacy can transform communities is by changing social norms. Social norms are individuals’ perceptions of what other members of their ingroup see as normal or as desirable behaviors (Tankard & Paluck, 2016). Because people often have reason to conform along with members of their ingroup, altering an individual’s perception of what ingroup members see as normal or desirable can change that individual’s behavior (Prentice & Miller, 2012). Advocacy for the pursuit of peace can help to break “spirals of silence” by demonstrating to peace-seekers that there are others who share and act in accordance with their point of view and that it is therefore okay to also express such sentiments (Kuran, 1995; Noelle-Neumann, 1974).

An example of contestation over norms comes from the events that followed the highly publicized August 2014 Arab–Jewish wedding of Mahmud Mansur and Morel Malka in Rishon LeTzion. The marriage led to hostile protests by right-wing Jews, including threats to the couple’s safety as well as calls for “death to Arabs.” Other Jewish Israelis countered by protesting in for the rights of Jews and Arabs in Israel to marry each other (Rousseau, 2014). Such mobilization was essential to promote a norm that marriage and personal relations across ethnic lines were acceptable, at least for a sizable section of the Israeli public.

As with ingroup policing, publicly advocating pro-peace views and promoting norms of tolerance can be a risky undertaking. Advocates face social isolation and even worse, threats of violence. Therefore, the points raised above about the role of self-efficacy and group status would apply here as well. Other moderators based on individuals’ identities and social networks are more specific to processes of persuasion and norm diffusion (Rogers, 1962). Individuals typically seek to conform to norms that they associate with their identity group (Prentice and Miller, 1993). An intervention may seek to stimulate broad norms change by inducing program participants to publicly advocate for peace. The breadth of its success will depend on the identity group linkages of participants. Paluck, Shepherd, and Aronow (2016) demonstrate that interventions can be most effective if they target so-called social referents, individuals who either have far reaching networks or are influential leaders of small, tight groups. The network position of participants is thus a key moderator for norms diffusion effects. Political institutions will also determine just how risky different types of public advocacy are. For example, where the laws protecting people’s personal safety are not routinely enforced, individuals may face direct risks to their security by publicly advocating positions that run contrary to the interests of armed groups.

**Political action.** Political action to promote intergroup peace seeks to put those who support peace into positions of power. This includes a variety of behaviors, including things that can be done on an individual and private basis
like voting, as well as public behaviors such as participating in collective action or directly seeking leadership positions. The potential effects on conflict dynamics are quite direct. For example, groups such as the OneVoice Movement (https://www.onevoicemovement.org/) provide an alternative to traditional peace-building groups that try to bring Israelis and Palestinians together. Instead they support “parallel dialogue” within the Israeli and Palestinian communities. They do this by supporting politicians and putting pressure on leaders (on both sides of the conflict) to support a viable two-state solution.

The more public and risky the behaviors, the more important will be the roles of self-efficacy and social networks as moderating factors. Along these lines, canonical theories of collective action propose that participation is strongly affected by individual risk tolerance and access to information about protest dynamics (Granovetter, 1978; Medina, 2009; Schelling, 1978).

At the macro-level, political regimes clearly moderate the effects of micro-level interventions on forms of political action. Stable democratic systems provide representation across the policy spectrum and allow for citizens to take political action via the ballot box. In the Israeli–Palestinian context, Israel’s proportional representation system allows, in principle, for a wide array of candidate positions and therefore offers rather direct voice on issues of war and peace. Of course, this implies representation for more extreme views on both sides of the spectrum, including those promoting violence (Pedahzur & McCarthy, 2015; Schofield & Sened, 2005). This is in contrast to majoritarian systems such as the United States, which tends to be dominated by two parties that represent a wide diversity of views and tend to be more centrist (Cox, 1990). And of course each of these is quite different from more authoritarian contexts, where ordinary citizens are more constrained in their ability to voice dissatisfaction or influence policy.

Overview of Existing Intervention Studies

We now turn to existing studies on citizen-targeted interventions and their potential effects on broader conflict dynamics. Table 2 displays 19 intervention studies that passed our inclusion criteria. We used rigorous selection criteria to establish an evidence base that is as directly relevant as possible for assessing the potential of citizen-targeted interventions to mitigate conflict. The studies must have taken place in contexts where interethnic violence was a present threat, intervention participants were ordinary citizens who were also members of ethnic groups implicated in the violent conflict, and the intervention had an intention to contribute to de-escalation or prevention of interethnic violence. The interventions were either fielded by a programmatic agency or were designed so that they could be fielded in that manner. Applying this criterion led us to exclude studies, such as McDonald et al. (2015), for which the experimental treatment relied fundamentally on a laboratory manipulation. Methodologically, we accepted studies
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bilali, Vollhardt, and Rarick (2015)</td>
<td>NGO radio drama series with content about roots of interethnic violence and encouragement to prevent prejudice and violence</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Observational, propensity score matching</td>
<td>12 communities across five provinces in Burundi (Gitega, Makamba, Ngozi, Bujumbura Mairie)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Tolerance, in-group superiority, social distance, intergroup trust, responsibility attributions, trauma disclosure, competitive victimhood, historical perspective taking</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blattman et al. (2014)</td>
<td>Training by NGOs in alternative dispute resolution practices and norms</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Randomized field experiment</td>
<td>5,500 people in 246 towns in rural, conflict affected areas</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<th>Outcomes for conflict mitigation behavior, or levels of conflict</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bruneau and Saxe (2012, Study 2)</td>
<td>Researcher administered written interaction with outgroup member, with one giving their perspective and the other summarizing the perspective that was shared.</td>
<td>Israel and Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>Randomized laboratory experiment</td>
<td>124 Israeli and Palestinian adults</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Weighted average of empathy, perceptions of bias, and trust.</td>
<td>~</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Čehajić-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, and Ross (2011)</td>
<td>Researcher administered self- and group-affirmation writing tasks.</td>
<td>Israel, Bosnia</td>
<td>Randomized laboratory experiment</td>
<td>Student samples for three studies (251 Israeli students, 139 Israeli studies, and 137 Bosnian Serb students, respectively).</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Agreement or disagreement with statements that implicate ingroup members as aggressors in the conflict, support for reparations to the outgroup</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NA</td>
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(Continued)
| Reference | Intervention | Countries | Design | Sample | Messaging | Discussion | Contact | Dialogue | Training | Self-reflection | Incentives | Outcomes for | Outcomes for | Outcomes for |
|-----------|--------------|------------|--------|--------|-----------|------------|---------|----------|----------|---------------|-----------| appraisals of | personal resources and | conflict mitigation |
| (Continued) | | | | | | | | | | | | the outgroup and value of | ability to act effectively | behavior, or |
| Collier and Vicente (2014) | NGO campaign rallying and instructing people to resist electoral violence, distribution of shirts, leaflets, and other material promoting this message | Nigeria | Randomized field experiment | 1,200 adults in 24 communities across the country | X | X | X | | | | | + | Mailing postcards to NGOs to express support for anti-violence measures, voting, self-reports of standing up to violence, perception of threat |
| Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, and Dweck (2011) | Having participants read an article about aggressive groups having either a malleable (treatment) or fixed (control) nature. | Israel and Palestinian Authority | Randomized laboratory experiment | Adult samples for three studies (76 Jewish Israelis, 59 Palestinian citizens of Israel, and 53 Palestinian adults in Ramallah, respectively) | X | | | | | | Attitudes toward outgroup, willingness to compromise for peace | + | NA | NA |

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<tr>
<td>Halperin, Porat, Tamir, and Gross (2013)</td>
<td>Training on cognitive reappraisal techniques, to reassess an anger-inducing situation so as to change your emotional response to it; text message reminders to use the techniques</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Randomized laboratory and field experiments</td>
<td>39 Jewish Israeli university studies for Study 1, 60 Jewish Israeli adults for Study 2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Support for policies conciliatory or peaceful toward the outgroup</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>Ability to control one's level of anger or rage after being exposed to inciting scenes implicating members of the outgroup</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hameiri, Porat, Bar-Tal, Bieler, and Halperin (2014)</td>
<td>30-second video spots that ironically portray identity themes and values in their relation to the conflict</td>
<td>Jewish Israels</td>
<td>Randomized field experiment</td>
<td>161 Jewish Israeli adults</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Reevaluation of position on conflict (unfreezing), outgroup responsibility, support for compromises with outgroup</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Self-reported voting for dovish parties</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jha and Shayo</td>
<td>Giving stocks of companies operating from both ingroup and outgroup</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Randomized field experiment</td>
<td>1,345 Israeli subjects from an internet survey panel</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X Willingness to support compromise solutions</td>
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<td>(2016)</td>
<td>administered territories (i.e., from Israel and Palestinian Authority areas)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NA Self-reported voting for pro-peace parties versus for more hawkish</td>
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<td>parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lazovsky</td>
<td>School based peace education program that develops individuals' personal</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Observational, difference-in-differences</td>
<td>117 Jewish Israeli and Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel (students)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Awareness of complexity of identity, stereotypes and prejudices</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2007)</td>
<td>understanding, outgroup understanding, and tolerance, followed by inter-group</td>
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<td>toward outgroup, trust of outgroup</td>
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<td>encounters every two weeks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malhotra and Liyanage (2005)</td>
<td>Peace workshops for youth nominated as leaders, with workshops involving lectures and training on conflict resolution, cultural activities, visits to different ethnicities' communities, and socializing</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Observational, matching controls on the basis of demographics and location</td>
<td>89 Sinhalese and Tamil students</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Empathy for the outgroup</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Donation to charity for children from other ethnicity</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paluck (2009); Paluck and Green (2009a, 2009b);</td>
<td>NGO radio drama series with content about roots of interethnic violence and encouragement to prevent prejudice and violence</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Randomized field experiment</td>
<td>480 adults in 12 communities across the country</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Beliefs about violence and intergroup relations</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Dissent over deferring to authorities in group deliberations about a resource allocation</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paluck (2010)</td>
<td>Radio soap opera about interethnic relations and friendships and talk show that promoted listener discussion about intergroup conflict</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Randomized field experiment</td>
<td>842 adults in 6 regions in conflict-affected eastern part of the country</td>
<td>X X X</td>
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<td>Tolerance and regard for outgroup, willingness to entertain outgroup perspectives</td>
<td>~/-</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salomon (2004), reviewing unpublished thesis studies, three of which were quasi-experimental intervention studies</td>
<td>School-based curriculum on a foreign conflict, studying conflict narratives of the two sides (Study 1, Lustig, 2002)</td>
<td>Israel and Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>Observational, difference-in-differences (Studies 1, 2, and 3)</td>
<td>68 Jewish Israeli students (Study 1)</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attitudes toward the outgroup (Study 1)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Understanding of external conflict, understanding of outgroup perspective (Study 1)</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>School based peace education curriculum stressing equality, tolerance, and common civil values (Study 2, Biton, 2002)</td>
<td>800+ Jewish Israeli and Arab Palestinian students (Study 2)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Free associations to positive peace concepts, advocating peaceful means of resolution (Study 2)</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visits to death camps where ingroup members suffered (viz., Jewish death camps in Poland) (Study 3, Shechter, 2002)</td>
<td>309 Jewish Israeli students (Study 3)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Empathy toward the outgroup (Study 3)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Svensson and Brounëus (2013)</td>
<td>Program that brings youth from different ethnic groups together to discuss and diagnose intergroup issue and develop approaches to resolve them</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Randomized field experiment</td>
<td>716 university students of different ethnicities</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Perceived intergroup trust, ethnic salience, and perception of ethnic discrimination</td>
<td>~</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walther et al. (2015)</td>
<td>Online course on digital education platforms in which 6-person multiethnic online study groups were created and worked together collaborative course assignments</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Observational, matching controls on the basis of school and religion</td>
<td>71 Jewish Israeli and Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel</td>
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<td>Prejudice toward the outgroup, ingroup social identification, levels of interpersonal attraction to outgroup</td>
<td>+</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yablon (2012)</td>
<td>Monthly face to face encounters between different group members (viz., Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians), with discussion of conflict, other social issues, and personal backgrounds; training in conflict resolution; and social activities.</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Randomized field experiment</td>
<td>330 Jewish Israeli and Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emotions toward the outgroup, perceptions of traits of outgroup members, and social distance to outgroup, all as moderated by pre-intervention motivation to participate</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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Note: For the “Findings” columns, the “+” marker indicates that findings were clearly in the direction of promoting peace, “−” indicates that findings in the direction of being contrary to promoting peace, “〜” indicates mixed results, and “.” indicates no clear findings.
that used some kind of controlled comparison, whether via random assignment of intervention conditions or robust observational methods, to estimate causal effects of the intervention. As a result, we exclude before–after studies with no control group, such as Bar-Natan et al. (2010), Maoz (2000), or Schroeder and Risen (2014), given that such studies may be confounded by general trends or effects of repeated exposure to measurement. The primary source was a database of peace-building intervention studies constructed as part of an “evidence gap map” study by the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (Cameron et al., 2015). The database was constructed as the result of an exhaustive search of electronic research databases for behavioral science, political science, economics, health science, and public policy. We also conducted our own search of social psychology journals, as these were not searched as part of the gap map study. This included consulting bibliographies of review studies such as Paluck and Green (2009b) and Lemmer and Wagner (2015) and conducting a PsychInfo search using keywords “peace” and “intervention.” We assessed if a study met our search criteria by screening abstracts.

Columns 1–3 of Table 2 indicate the study authors, provide a brief description of the intervention, and indicate the countries in which the interventions took place. Above we noted that citizen-oriented conflict mitigation programs have been implemented in 140 countries all over the world. The set of rigorous intervention studies in Table 2 does not come close to capturing all of that variety. Indeed, 11 of the 19 studies work exclusively with samples from Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Three out of these 11 studies included Palestinian citizens of Israel. While, pragmatically, access to this population may be easier than to Palestinians in the Palestinian Authority, it is not entirely clear if effects from Palestinian Citizens of Israel generalize to Palestinians residing elsewhere. Of the remaining studies, three are in the Great Lakes region of central Africa (Burundi, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Rwanda) and then Bosnia Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka round out the list. Columns 4 and 5 indicate the study design and the type of sample included. We see a fairly even distribution across observational studies, randomized experiments in laboratory settings, and randomized field experiments. Study samples include a variety of participant types, ranging from elementary school students to random samples of adults.

Columns 6–12 distill the types of activities involved in the different programs. Messaging refers to the transmission of messages and information directly intended to promote an interest in peace. Contact refers to facilitating direct interaction between members of different groups. Discussion refers to facilitating discussion about the conflict among ingroup members. This is different from dialogue, which refers to facilitating intergroup discussions about the conflict. It is possible for an intervention to involve dialogue, but no direct contact. An example is Bruneau and Saxe (2012), who study an intervention in Israel that involved
passing written texts between Jewish Israelis and Arab Palestinians. Another is Paluck (2010), who studies a radio talk show in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that took in calls from members of different ethnic groups. Similarly, some contact programs do not involve dialogue, as with Walther, Hoter, Ganayem, and Shonfeld (2015), who study an intervention that created mixed Jewish and Arab study groups for a class that did not cover issues related to the conflict. Self-reflection refers to activities that facilitate personal reflection on topics related to the conflict. The incentives category refers to the provision of material resources that change the material costs and benefits associated either with conflict escalation in general or with participants’ behavior as it concerns the outgroup. Finally, training refers to activities meant to build participants’ skills and capacities in taking action to mitigate conflict. Most of the interventions (i.e., 13 out of 19) are “bundled” in that they include multiple activities. This is especially true for cases where the study was based on an intervention designed by a programmatic agency rather than by the researchers themselves. This limits our ability to distinguish the effects of specific activities. It reflects the tension between researchers’ desire to pin down causal mechanisms and programmatic organizations’ desire to do as much as they can with their resources.

The remaining columns indicate the types of outcome variables included in each studied and give a summary indication of the findings. The “+” marker indicates that findings were clearly in the direction of promoting peace, “-“ shows that findings in the direction of being contrary to promoting peace, “~” indicates mixed results, and “.” indicates no clear findings. We indicate “NA” if the respective outcome was not assessed. All but one of the studies reported effects on outcomes related to outgroup regard and the value of peace. However, only three studies reported effects on resources and one’s ability to act effectively to mitigate conflict. No other study even examined such resources variables as moderating factors. On the basis of our analytical framework, we see this lack of attention to resources as a major omission. Attention to behavior is a bit better in this regard, with nearly half (i.e., 9) of the studies examining peace-building behaviors. Some studies skipped the peace-building behavior stage and directly assessed conflict dynamics, for example, Blattman, Hartman, and Blair (2014) assessed the severity of land disputes.

**Evidence from Intervention Studies**

In the subsections that follow, we discuss the evidence from these 19 studies in more detail. We begin with a discussion ordered in terms of intervention components: messaging, contact, discussion, dialogue, self-reflection, incentives, and training. This allows for a clear discussion of the connections between the various intervention components, intergroup harmony goals, resources, and
peace-building behaviors. We follow with a discussion of moderators, including ethnic group endowments and status asymmetries, as well as political institutions.

**Messaging.** Most of the interventions (14 of 19) include peace messaging. We can relate peace messaging back to our analytical framework through presumed effects on intergroup harmony goals. Indeed, nearly all interventions with messaging examined such effects using various measures of outgroup regard and attitudes toward conflict (only the study by Collier and Vincente, 2014, did not measure such outcomes). The estimated effects vary, with most of the studies (9 out of 14) reporting positive effects and the rest reporting mixed, null, or even negative effects. Notably, the studies by Bilali, Vollhardt, and Rarick (2015), Biton and Salomon (2006), Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, Gross, and Dweck (2011), and Hameiri, Porat, Bar-Tal, Bieler, and Halperin (2014) focused exclusively on messaging and reported positive effects. This indicates that we can be rather confident that messaging can, in principle, strengthen participants’ intergroup harmony goals and therefore orient them toward conflict mitigation. Only half of the studies that involved messaging assessed peace-building behaviors. Here, the results are more mixed. Our analytical framework anticipates such a possibility, given that messaging may do little to change someone’s perception of his or her ability to contribute to conflict mitigation, and a positive secondary appraisal is necessary for undertaking peace-building behaviors.

**Contact.** Five of the studies examined interventions that facilitated direct contact between members of the different groups implicated in the conflict. Intergroup contact theory focuses on how contact, given relevant enabling conditions, can reduce prejudice (Allport, 1979). Through the lens of our analytical framework, this would affect primary appraisals in intergroup conflict situations by making intergroup harmony goals more accessible and stronger. All five of the studies on contact interventions evaluated such effects, again with relatively mixed findings. Only Walther et al. (2015) examined contact in the absence of other activities, finding the expected positive effect on outcomes relevant for primary appraisal. Interestingly, Walther et al. also included a measure of ability to communicate with members of the outgroup, a personal resource-type outcome that could contribute to secondary appraisals of self-perceived ability to contribute to conflict mitigation. Unfortunately, they did not analyze the effects of the intervention on this outcome. Neither did the study examine behavior. Two studies did examine behavioral outcomes after contact. Malhotra and Liyanage (2005) measured monetary donations to a charity helping outgroup children, finding an increase in such altruistic behavior toward the outgroup. Svensson and Brunéus (2013) studied amounts invested in a trust game with an outgroup member, finding no significant effect on such behavior, suggesting no effect on the perceived trustworthiness of outgroup members.
**Discussion.** Six of the studies examine interventions that facilitated discussion among ingroup members. The goal of such discussions is often to get participants to internalize pro-peace norms, indicated by the fact that discussion is consistently coupled with peace messaging. The evidence base is too thin for us to know if such discussion increases the effectiveness of pro-peace messaging. Indeed, in a field experiment in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Paluck (2010) found that discussion can actually decrease the effectiveness of pro-peace messaging. In that case, a radio soap opera coupled with a call-in talk show and community-level discussions actually led to decreases in outgroup regard and lower likelihood of willingness to share material resources with outgroups. This is in contrast to research by Paluck (2009), Paluck and Green (2009a), and Bilali et al. (2015) on radio soap operas in nearby Rwanda and Burundi that did not facilitate discussions, and for which no such perverse effects were reported.

**Dialogue.** Similar to discussions, dialogues are often coupled with peace messaging as part of an effort to promote the internalization of pro-peace norms. Dialogue also serves as a way to deepen intergroup contact by allowing different ethnic group members to share their points of view. This can contribute to learning about the outgroup and redefining ingroup boundaries, two of the mechanisms through which contact can reduce prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998). Knowledge about the outgroup is a resource that allows people to interact with the outgroup more effectively. As such, dialogue interventions have the potential to strengthen both intergroup harmony goals and resources. That being the case, the evidence base does not allow us to assess whether dialogue boosts the effects of contact. We do note though that the two studies that incorporate dialogue without contact—Bruneau and Saxe (2012) and Paluck (2010)—reported only mixed effects on outcomes for outgroup regard or value of peace.

**Self-reflection.** Seven studies considered interventions that promoted self-reflection among participants. In four of the studies, the reflection was part of a broader peace education curriculum for students. Čehajić-Clancy, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, and Ross (2011) was the one study that focused exclusively on self-reflection activities, having participants perform self- and group-affirmation tasks. They report positive effects on outcomes related to outgroup regard. Self-reflection, and in particular affirmation tasks, may positively affect personal resources and ability to act effectively, but only Halperin et al. (2013) and Salomon (2004) report on such possibilities, in each case reporting positive effects.

**Incentives.** Two of the studies consider the effects of interventions that involve material incentives. The nature of the incentives differs in the two studies. Jha and Shayo (2016) study the effects of an indirect incentive that is based on providing to Israeli participants stocks of companies, some of which operate in Israel and others
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in areas governed by the Palestinian Authority. These incentives are “indirect” because they orient participants toward trying to influence the broader political system rather than being tied directly to participants’ own behavior. They find that receipt of such stocks increases willingness to support compromise solutions to the conflict and increases self-reported rates of voting for pro-peace versus hawkish parties. Yablon (2012) studies an intervention that includes more direct incentives. In this case, participants who remained in a 6-month program had the opportunity to participate in fun activities such as visiting an amusement park. We consider this to be a direct incentive because one’s opportunity to enjoy such benefits depends on sticking with the program over the course of the 6 months. Other programs, such as the Seeds of Peace summer camps or interethnic sports leagues that provide equipment and extraordinary access to leagues, also involve these kinds of direct incentives, even if this is rarely acknowledged explicitly. Yablon (2012) reports positive effects on outcomes relating to outgroup regard and the value of peace, although the intervention is one that includes all of the elements considered here and so the contribution of the incentives is not clear.

Training. Eight of the studies look at interventions that include some kind of training in conflict mitigation. And yet, only two of the studies report effects on personal resources and ability to act effectively to mitigate conflict. Collier and Vicente (2014) study an NGO campaign to train citizens’ on monitoring and collectively standing up against interethnic and interfactional violence in the context of Nigeria’s 2007 election. They report positive effects on participants’ awareness of others’ desire to counter violence and their knowledge of ways to resist violence. Halperin et al. (2013) report positive effects of training in cognitive reappraisal on Jewish Israeli participants’ ability to control their level of anger and rage after being exposed to inciting scenes showing Palestinian militants. Among these studies half (i.e., four) also reported effects on behavior or general conflict dynamics. Blattman et al. (2014) found that training in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) increased participants’ ability to resolve property disputes but, surprisingly, increased perceived levels of conflict across various cleavages, including communal and religious. Collier and Vicente (2014) reported positive effects on participants’ willingness to take costly actions to promote anti-violence norms.

Moderating Effects of Ethnic Group Endowments and Status Asymmetries

Seven of the 19 reviewed studies reported results separately by ethnic group membership. Four of the seven studies found group differences for at least one of the assessed outcomes. This large proportion highlights the importance of evaluating program effects separately whenever an intervention targets multiple ethnic groups. Consistent with the mixed evidence for ethnic minorities in the intergroup
contact literature (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005), there was no evidence that the otherwise effective dispute resolution intervention affected minority participants in the study by Blattman et al. (2014). Two studies suggest that appraisals of resources matter more for low- than for high-status groups. First, peace education led Palestinian participants to increase their sense of structural benefits accruing from peace (Biton & Salomon, 2006). Second, in Bruneau and Saxe’s (2012) study, Palestinian participants benefited more from being heard by Jewish Israelis than from listening to the other side. The authors reason that Palestinians benefit because their perspective on the conflict is not heard as often as Jewish Israelis’ perspective due to the lower status of Palestinians as a group. Finally, in Yablon (2012) different kinds of pre-intervention motivations moderated the effect of the intervention for participants from different ethnic groups. Probably because these effects were peripheral to their central hypothesis, the author did not discuss the ethnic differences further.

The studies in sub-Saharan African countries avoid analyses by ethnic group, sometimes because authors perceived such analyses as being too sensitive. Bilali et al. (2015) report that they did not ask participants in Burundi about their ethnicity because that would make participants extremely uncomfortable. In Rwanda (Paluck, 2010) it would be illegal to ask participants about their ethnicity. Svensson and Brounéus’s (2013) study included participants from a multitude of ethnic backgrounds, probably leaving too few observations in each cell to check for heterogeneity of treatment by participant ethnicity. These examples demonstrate how difficult it can be to conduct separate analyses for the multiple groups involved in a conflict.

Even in Israel, a place that is often seen as an example of a society at conflict with ethnic group based status asymmetries, assessing moderation by ethnic group is complicated. For example, the assignment of groups to high versus low status could vary depending on whether one defines status in terms of allies in the broader region, perceived threats to personal safety, or historic precedence of victimization. Indeed, groups’ roles as perpetrators or victims, often (although not necessarily) connected to their status, are contested in many conflicts (Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012).

**Moderating Effects of Political Institutions**

It is no coincidence that over half of the studies we found were conducted in Israel. Unlike many other regions affected by ethnic conflict, Israel’s democratic political institutions provide opportunities for its citizens to use micro-level peacebuilding behaviors to affect macro-level policies. For example, if they rely on citizens’ votes to be re-elected, as is the case in a democracy, political leaders should be especially responsive to public advocacy. This political context also makes it easier for researchers to evaluate interventions in terms of access to
research participants and funding, number of local experts, potential of the research to impact policy, and so forth. Nevertheless, given how widespread micro-level peace-building interventions are, it is important to evaluate them even when they are embedded in less favorable political opportunity structures.

In regions where repression is high, political access is not available, elites are often unified in their support for further conflict escalation, and no influential allies for a possible peace-movement exist, micro-level interventions may need to have a different focus. Promoting peace-building outcomes under these circumstances is probably fruitless, and may be disheartening and too risky for participants. Instead, interventions can focus exclusively on developing resources. Building resources can prepare people for when the political opportunity structures change in the future. Resources, especially resilience, can also help people cope and adjust to extremely adversarial life circumstances (Cohrs, Christie, White, & Das, 2013). In societies with minimal opportunity structures, adjustment- and emotion-focused coping maybe the best and perhaps only way for people to survive (Folkman et al., 1986; Lazarus & DeLongis, 1983).

Implications for Policy and Research

Many governments, donors, and international organizations view programs for mitigating violent intergroup conflict as a priority. Hundreds of millions of dollars are committed each year to programs that aim to increase ordinary citizens’ willingness and ability to contribute to conflict mitigation. These programs are typically initiated in countries where violence is an immediate concern. Psychologists, political scientists, and other social scientists can contribute to this policy agenda through research that investigates how citizens can help to prevent these nascent conflicts from escalating.

Our analytical framework has implications both for the design of such programs and for the evaluation of their effects. We propose two complementary channels through which citizen-oriented interventions can affect participants’ interest and ability to contribute to mitigating conflict. The first channel is mostly attitudinal. It involves strengthening intergroup harmony goals, increasing one’s regard for the outgroup, and increasing commitment to norms of amicable conflict resolution. The second channel involves strengthening one’s ability to act effectively. The higher one’s perceived self-efficacy, stock of problem-solving skills, or trust-network connections, the more inclined a person should be in translating an interest in peace into action.

Research on citizen-oriented interventions has tended to focus on outcomes related to intergroup harmony goals to the neglect of outcomes related to resources and efficacy. On the basis of our analytical framework, this means that much of this research only accounts for half of the story. Moreover, it is limited in light of what real-world programs actually contain. Many programs explicitly include activities
aimed at developing participants’ skills, self-efficacy, and social connections. The first key implication of our findings is that *those designing programs should be explicit in incorporating resource- and capacity-building into their theories of change, and those evaluating programs should assess them in these terms.* This includes measuring resources prior to interventions, so as to assess moderating effects, and after interventions, so as to assess whether resources increased. The studies reviewed above by Collier and Vicente (2014), Halperin et al. (2013), and Salomon (2004) provide examples of doing so, although even these are quite limited in their attention to resources.

The key link between micro-level interventions on the one hand and conflict escalation dynamics on the other is via peace-building behaviors. In our theoretical discussion, we described three classes of behavior: (i) strategies to regulate the behavior of ingroup peers via ingroup policing, (ii) cultivating pro-peace norms through public advocacy, and (iii) working to place those who support peace into positions of power through political action. Although somewhat better than the attention given to resources and capacities, only a minority of the intervention studies that we reviewed actually looked at behavioral outcomes. Measuring real-world behavior is necessary to make an empirical case for whether an intervention can affect conflict dynamics. The ethics of doing so are complicated, however. We cannot require individuals to report their vote choices, nor should research induce participants to take actions that may bring undue risk for themselves. We see this as an area where innovation is needed, leading to our second implication: *those designing programs should be specific and give deep consideration to the types of conflict-mitigating behaviors that they aim to affect, and those evaluating programs should consider credible ways to measure behavioral outcomes that are directly related to conflict mitigation.*

Macro-level contextual factors, such as political institutions and group status, shape the kinds of behavioral strategies that ordinary citizens might take up in contributing to conflict mitigation. Such contextual factors also determine the relative importance of primary versus secondary appraisals in conflict encounters and thus the primary channels through which an intervention can affect conflict dynamics. For example, in competitive democratic systems, voting for pro-peace parties constitutes a key conflict mitigation strategy. The secret ballot allows an individual to contribute in a way that requires little of personal resources or capacities. When voting is what really counts, interventions focused on attitudinal change are well motivated so long as they can be applied at a large enough scale to affect electoral outcomes. However, it is important to note that even behaviors that require relatively little effort fail surprisingly often because intentions are not followed by actions (Datta and Mullainathan, 2014).

Macro-level variables determine the extent of resources individuals need to engage in peace-building behaviors. In political systems where voting is not possible or ineffective, affecting conflict dynamics will require more than changing
one’s attitudes and participating in elections. Perhaps the aim should be to inspire participants to publicly advocate for peace. Doing so can “multiply” the effect of an intervention by helping to spread pro-peace norms. But public advocacy can require bravery, and so it becomes more important for interventions to promote participants’ resources and capacities when we turn attention to public advocacy. Ingroup policing is a strategy through which individuals can help to ensure local intergroup disputes do not escalate. Given that it requires dissenting vis-à-vis other ingroup members, it may draw heavily upon personal resources and capacities, especially for members of disadvantaged groups. These considerations flow directly from our analytical framework and lead to our third implication: those designing programs and those researching them should consider how contextual factors, such as political institutions and group endowments, determine barriers to conflict mitigation.

We hope to increase researchers’ and program implementers’ abilities to collaborate in methodologically rigorous research. Only 19 studies met our selection criteria, which seems few given that citizen-targeted peace-building programs are funded in 140 countries. We would have many more studies to review had we included pre–post evaluations and/or laboratory studies in our review. While the many existing pre–post interventions in the field (e.g., Galily, Leitner, & Shimon, 2013; Schroeder & Risen, 2014) are a promising start, unfortunately they cannot give conclusive answers about the causal impact of the evaluated programs. Not knowing what the trajectory for participants would have been, had they not participated in the program, precludes us from attributing any observed effects of the intervention. Many political and social events in society or in people’s communities that occur in parallel with a peace-building intervention can change participants’ attitudes for the better, confounding our ability to isolate program effects. This potential for such confounding is especially pronounced in societies with ongoing or recent ethnic conflict, which can change quickly and dramatically within short periods of time (e.g., when a ceasefire is negotiated). Perhaps even more problematic, a deterioration of outcomes over time can obscure the positive effects of interventions. For example, without a control group, Biton and Salomon (2006) would have concluded that their intervention is ineffective. In reality, however, it prevented Palestinian program participants’ attitudes from deteriorating as much as for participants in the control group.

Many laboratory studies test or develop theories relevant for peace-building with participants who are not exposed to ethnic conflict, such as, research on collective guilt (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). This kind of work is very valuable for identifying psychological processes that could work as interventions in the field. Unfortunately, research often stops there, instead of following Kurt Lewin’s proposed cycle of alternate laboratory and field research (Lewin, 1946). It is important to test the processes in the field because funding agencies and the public value face validity (Cialdini, 2009), and this is for good reasons. Often
innovation is required for implementing a process that is successful in the laboratory in an intervention targeting citizens during ethnic conflict (e.g., a perspective taking intervention in Liberia). Also, because of the many macro-level moderators are absent in the laboratory (Adams & Stocks, 2008; e.g., government repression), it is important to ensure that knowledge from the laboratory generalizes to the field before spending millions of dollars. We believe that collaborations between those studying psychological processes in the laboratory and those funding and managing peace-building programs could be very fruitful. Our fourth implication is thus: *those designing programs should make sure their programs are evaluated in a rigorous manner and those evaluating programs should make serious attempts to identify causal impacts, for example, through randomized controlled trials, and test interventions in the field where they are meant to occur.*

The primary message of this review is for those designing and studying micro-level conflict mitigation interventions to go beyond thinking about improving attitudes to thinking about conflict-mitigating behaviors, the resources and capacities needed to undertake such behaviors, and the contextual conditions that constrain behavior. By doing this, researchers will provide policymakers stronger evidence on whether and how to apply the vast sums of resources available to enabling citizens to be effective agents in mitigating intergroup violence.

### References


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