Refugees, Xenophobia, and Domestic Conflict: Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Turkey

Appendix

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Figure A.1: Location of Syrian Refugee Camps in Turkey

A Syrian Refugees in Turkey

A.1. Refugee Camps

Figure A.1 depicts the location of refugee camps in Turkey that existed at the time of our survey. At that time, there were 22 camps. The provinces with camps, and the number of camps per province are listed in Table A.1.

A.2. Refugees and Locals – Numbers

Table A.1 summarizes the number of refugees per province in provinces with camps (where the majority of refugees reside), the number of camps per province, the local population size of these provinces, and the percentage of refugees out of total province population (out-of-camp refugees number and percentage are shown in parentheses).

Figure A.2 depicts the number of refugees that arrived in Turkey from the beginning of the conflict until the second half of 2014. The graph shows that refugee influx increased in late 2012 as violence has escalated in Syria. The graph also suggests that whereas the number of refugees in camps has remained constant since the beginning of 2013, the number of out-of-camp refugees has continued to grow.

A.3. Our Sample

We surveyed 1,257 respondents in central, eastern, and south-eastern Turkey. We randomly sampled respondents using a stratified sampling procedure that was designed to produce variation on the key factors associated with refugees and Turkish politics: refugee presence, past incumbent political

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Table A.1: Refugee percentage out of total population in provinces with camps

Province	Border province*	Number of camps on June 6, 2014†	Local population in the end of 2013	Refugee population on June 6, 2014 (out-of-camp refugees)	% of refugees out of total population†† (% of out-of-camp refugees out of) total population)
Adana	no	1	2,149,260	23,287 (11,800)	1.1% (0.5%)
Adiyaman	no	1	597,180	11,395 (1,530)	1.9% (0.3%)
Gaziantep	yes	4	1,844,438	192,185 (158,707)	9.4% (7.9%)
Hatay	yes	5	1,503,066	141,011 (126,408)	8.6%(7.8%)
K. Maras	no	1	1,075,706	48,809 (32,292)	4.3%(2.9%)
Kilis	yes	2	128,590	77,474 (39,691)	37.6%(24.6%)
Malatya	no	1	762,540	7,778 (500)	1.0%(0.1%)
Mardin	yes	2	779,740	47,224 (39,293)	5.7%(4.8%)
Osmaniye	no	1	498,980	20,510 (11,794)	3.9%(2.3%)
Sanliurfa	yes	4	1,801,980	178,852 (106,822)	9.0%(5.6%)

* "yes" if province is bordering Syria, "no" if province is not bordering Syria.
† June 6, 2014 is the closest date before the beginning of our survey for which UNHCR data
† are available. The survey was conducted from June 8, 2014 through July 1, 2014.
†† total population = locals in 2013 + refugees on June 6, 2014. For the purpose of calculating
the % of out-of-camp refugees, total population is the sum of local population in 2013 and the
number of out-of-camp refugees on June 6, 2014.

Figure A.2: Arrival of refugees from Syria

Syrian Refugees in Turkey
Source: UNHCR

Number of refugees (thousands)

1/1/2012   7/1/2012   1/1/2013   7/1/2013   1/1/2014   7/1/2014

Date

------- Estimated total number (registered and unregistered)
——— Total registered
–·–·– Registered in-camp

support (AKP), and residing in a province with a history of violence due to the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. We dropped 15 respondents from the analysis because in these interviews the enumerators reported that someone else interfered during the survey. Thus, our analysis covers 1,242 respondents, among them 526 Kurds.

Turkey is a unitary state composed of 81 provinces. We first selected 27 provinces that: 1) have significant presence of Syrian refugees in southeast Turkey[1] ; 2) were under emergency rule (OHAL) or declared as "adjacent zones" (mücavir alan in Turkish, which was a softer type of emergency rule) after 1987[2]; and 3) do not have significant refugee population, were not OHAL provinces or adjacent zones, but border provinces that host many refugees or border OHAL / adjacent zone provinces.[3]

These 27 provinces are composed of 307 districts, which we divide into 12 strata according to three factors: refugee presence, past experience with the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, and support for the incumbent AKP political party. We classify districts with refugee camps as "high" refugee presence, whereas districts without camps, but located in provinces with camps as having "medium" refugee presence. Districts with no camps located in provinces with no significant refugee population (no camps and not Mersin) are coded as having "low" refugee presence. Past experience with Turkish-Kurdish conflict is based on whether a given district was in an OHAL province or in a province declared as adjacent zone. We classify support for the incumbent AKP as "low" if the district's AKP vote-share in the municipal election in March 2014 is equal to or lower than the national median (43.3%), and as "high" if it is above the median.[4]

Next, we randomly sampled 33 districts based on the proportional share of each strata in the total population of the 307 districts, and on the proportional share of urban districts in each stratum.[5] We oversampled individuals and districts that had a high presence of refugees, and also high exposure to Turkish-Kurdish conflict (OHAL and adjacent zone districts). Figure 1 in the main text shows the geographic distribution of our sample. The list of the provinces and districts, as well as the number of respondents in each district, is in Table A.2.

Within each district, our enumerators chose a random starting point. They then randomly selected households, and individuals within each household with the most recent birthday were asked to participate in a survey about "current events." Households, not individuals were substituted. Sample demographics are shown in the main text.

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[1]We focus on southeast Turkey because this is where the majority of refugees resided at the time of the survey UNHCR (2014). We included all the provinces with camps and the province of Mersin. The latter does not have a camp, but there is plenty of qualitative evidence that Mersin hosted many Syrian refugees. See for example AFAD (2013, 19), Orhan and Gündoğar (2015, 32), and Çetingüleç (2014).

[2]OHAL provinces included in our sampling frame are Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Mardin, Siirt, and Van. While Diyarbakır was under emergency rule during the entire period between 1987-2002, the rest of these provinces were declared adjacent zones towards the end of this period; and Elazığ was declared an adjacent zone earlier, between 1993-96. The overall duration of emergency rule (including the periods as adjacent zones) was 9 years in Bitlis and Elazığ while it was 15 years in the rest (Belge, 2016). Provinces that were only declared adjacent zones and have experienced a softer type of emergency rule are Adıyaman and Muş. Adıyaman was an adjacent zone for 7 years, while Muş was an adjacent zone for 14 years (Belge, 2016). We excluded Hakkari, Şirnak and Tunceli due to security situation in those areas.

[3]These are Ağri, Erzincan, Erzurum, Karaman, Kayseri, Konya, Niğde, and Sivas.

[4]Within the 307 districts, we also excluded several areas that presented safety concerns to the enumerators (Sincik and Gerger in Adıyaman province, Saray in Van province, and Pervari in Siirt province).

[5]Districts were labeled as urban if they were classified as metropolitan or central districts by the Turkish Statistical Institute, or had populations of greater than 50,000, more than half of which are in urban areas.

Table A.2: Our Sample

Province	District	Camp in province	Camp in district	Respondents	Kurds	OHAL or adjacent zone
Adana	Saricam	1	1	40	4	0
Adana	Yuregir	1	0	59	13	0
Adiyaman	Celikhan	1	0	30	27	1
Adiyaman	Kahta	1	0	69	69	1
Adiyaman	Merkez	1	1	40	37	1
Diyarbakir	Baglar	0	0	60	56	1
Diyarbakir	Ergani	0	0	30	30	1
Elazig	Merkez	0	0	45	1	1
Gaziantep	Oguzeli	1	0	30	4	0
Gaziantep	Sahinbey	1	0	59	12	0
Hatay	Altinozu	1	1	70	2	0
Hatay	Antakya	1	1	50	1	0
Kahramanmaras	Dulkadiroglu	1	1	42	2	0
Kahramanmaras	Pazarcik	1	0	27	0	0
Kahramanmaras	Turkoglu	1	0	29	1	0
Kayseri	Hacilar	0	0	18	1	0
Kayseri	Kocasinan	0	0	40	2	0
Kayseri	Sarioglan	0	0	30	0	0
Kilis	Elbeyli	1	1	30	3	0
Kilis	Merkez	1	1	30	2	0
Mardin	Kiziltepe	1	0	24	24	1
Mardin	Midyat	1	1	31	17	1
Mardin	Nusaybin	1	1	31	28	1
Mardin	Yesilli	1	0	48	22	1
Mersin	Mezitli	0	0	40	2	0
Mersin	Tarsus	0	0	20	12	0
Mus	Malazgirt	0	0	40	40	1
Osmaniye	Merkez	1	1	30	1	0
Sanliurfa	Karakopru	1	0	30	27	0
Sanliurfa	Viransehir	1	1	40	36	0
Siirt	Sirvan	0	0	30	30	1
Sivas	Yildizeli	0	0	30	0	0
Van	Catak	0	0	20	20	1

B   Treatment Descriptions and Key Variables

B.1.   Treatments

Once a randomly selected person within a household agreed to participate, the survey proceeded as follows. First, subjects were asked some basic demographic questions, followed by warm-up questions about how they are doing in general, and how they feel about the direction of Turkey. We then randomly assigned subjects to one of five experimental conditions. In the *Control* condition, subjects did not receive any information about the refugees. In the other four treatments, the enumerator read a brief statement heightening the salience of the refugees in Turkey, and then subjects received treatments. The *Economic Cost, Ethnic Balance,* and *Militant Ties* treatments were all meant to reflect the key mechanisms through which refugees influence attitudes towards violence (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). The *Women and Children* treatment was meant to balance out the negative tone of the treatments, with a more positive tone, and also to reflect AKP's justification of its open-door policy towards the refugees. It was also used to differentiate whether the negative aspects of the refugees (*Economic Cost, Ethnic Balance,* and *Militant Ties*), or simply mentioning the refugees (*Women and Children*) influenced respondents' attitudes. We might be concerned that our treatments are "double-barreled," in that we are priming both the refugees and a mechanism. However, we argue that this is not problematic. First, our treatments are designed to mimic elite cues (see the discussion of media coverage in the Background section in the main text). Elite cues do not simply argue that refugees are a threat, but also usually point to why (e.g. stealing jobs, increasing rent, committing crimes, etc.). We would be concerned if we found that all of the treatments went in the same direction–then we would be unable to identify whether it was the refugee prime inherent in the treatments, or the mechanism prime which shifted attitudes. However, as we show below, the treatments have very different effects on attitudes suggesting that the mechanism matters, and that the treatments are differentiated from one another. Finally, we note the possible criticism that perhaps our treatments are too "weak" to have an influence on respondents' attitudes. We have two responses. 1) Following other research that shows the strong effects on political attitudes of priming demographic threats (Craig and Richeson, 2014*a,b*; Danbold and Huo, 2015), our treatments emphasized the demographic threat posed by Syrian refugees. 2) The treatments were explicitly designed to mimic elite rhetoric surrounding refugees. However, the wording of our treatments also had to reflect the fact that the areas in Turkey where we ran our survey had, and continue to have a history of ethnic tension, and conflict. Thus our treatments reflect actual statements of elites about refugees, while avoiding using inflammatory language against an already vulnerable population (refugees).

Enumerator [Omitted in the Control Condition]: Now we are going to talk about a very important issue facing Turkey.

Enumerator [Omitted in the Control Condition]: There has been a lot of talk in the news about Syrian refugees here in Turkey. There are over a million Syrian refugees living in and out of camps here in Turkey. That number is expected to double to over 1.5 Syrian million refugees by next year. Experts familiar with the refugee situation point out that Syrian refugees will outnumber Turks in some parts of Turkey. They also argue that it is a mistake to call the Syrian refugees 'guests,' as the majority of the refugees will remain permanently in Turkey and not return to Syria.

[Randomly assign to one of the five following scenarios]

1. <u>Control</u>

2. <u>Economic Cost</u> (Negative)
   Enumerator: Experts familiar with the Syrian refugee situation say that the actual cost of the refugees to Turkish citizens is much higher than people think. The Turkish government has spent 6 billion Turkish lira (3 Billion USD) on housing and feeding the refugees. Also, the large refugee population means there are more people looking for jobs and setting up businesses. So, the refugees are using public money and taking away jobs that is meant for Turkish citizens.

3. <u>Ethnic Balance</u> (Negative)
   Enumerator: Experts familiar with the Syrian refugee situation say that the actual cost of the refugees to Turkish citizens is much higher than people think. They argue that refugees disrupt the multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-sectarian structure of Turkey, which includes Turks, Kurds, Laz, Circassians, Arabs, Sunnis, and Alevis. The refugees are threatening the peaceful coexistence between the different groups in Turkey.

4. <u>Militant Ties</u> (Negative)
   Enumerator: Experts familiar with the Syrian refugee situation say that the actual cost of the refugees to Turkish citizens is much higher than people think. They argue that refugees bring with them ties to militant rebel groups and arms. These relationships threaten to destabilize parts of Turkey and to bring the fighting from the Syrian Civil War here to Turkey.

5. <u>Women and Children</u> (Positive)
   Enumerator: Experts familiar with the Syrian refugee situation say that the flow of refugees has done even more good than originally thought. They argue that thanks to Turkey's open-door policy, hundreds of thousands of women and children have been saved the horrors of experiencing the Syrian Civil War.

B.2. Key Variables

- **Alcohol Not OK**: It is not acceptable for someone to drink alcohol (1 Strongly Disagree to 7 Strongly agree).

- **Household Income**: Approximately what is your household's monthly income in Turkish lira (TL)?[6]

  1. Less than 300 TL
  2. 301-600 TL
  3. 601-900 TL
  4. 901-1200 TL
  5. 1201-1500 TL

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[6]At the time of the survey, 1 USD $\approx$ 2.15 TL.

6. 1501-1800 TL

7. 1801-2100 TL

8. 2101-2400 TL

9. 2401-2700 TL

10. 2701-3000 TL

11. 3001-3300 TL

12. 3301-3600 TL

13. 3601-3900 TL

14. 3901-4200 TL

15. 4201-4500 TL

16. More than 4501 TL

- **Wealth Index:** Calculated first component of principal component analysis whether or not subjects owned the following:

  - Smartphone
  - Car
  - Computer
  - Washing machine
  - Dishwasher

- **Religious Index:** Calculated first component of principal component analysis of the following questions:

  - How frequently do you pray?
    1. No
    2. Only on religious holidays
    3. Every Friday
    4. More than once a week
    5. Every day at least once
    6. 5 times a day
    7. Only during Ramadan
  - It is not acceptable for someone to drink alcohol (1 Strongly Disagree to 7 Strongly Agree)
  - Women in my house cover their hair when leaving the house (1 Almost Never to 7 Almost Always)

- **Refugee Exposure**: The sum of exposure for each type of interaction in Table B.3 that is then rescaled to lie between 0-1.

The following questions are about your interaction with Syrian refugees and how often do you or members of your immediate household experience the following CURRENTLY.

Table B.3: Refugee Exposure

Interaction	(1) Never	(2) Once a month	(3) Once a week	(4) 2-3 times a week	(5) Daily
See or hear Syrian refugees on public transportation					
See or hear Syrian refugees on the street (begging or selling items)					
Do business or interact in your business with Syrian refugees					
Interact with Syrian refugees in social settings (dinner, mosque, restaurants, celebrations, hotels)					
See or interact with Syrian refugees at the local market					

Dependent Variables (Note: All variables below were rescaled to lie between 0-1.)

- **Attitudes Towards Refugees**: To what extent do you feel humanitarian warmth towards each group of Syrian refugees – Arab/Alawite/Kurdish/Sunni (1 very cold to 7 very warm)

- **Refugees Economic Threat**: My family and I feel economically threatened by the presence of Syrian refugees (1 Strongly Disagree to 7 Strongly Agree)

- **Refugees Less Safe**: The presence of Syrian refugees is making Turkey less safe (1 Strongly Disagree to 7 Strongly Agree)

- **Peace Process Support**: I would be willing to sign a petition to show my support for the peace process in Turkey (1 Strongly Disagree to 7 Strongly Agree)

C   Randomization Checks

Tables C.4 and C.5 demonstrate that respondents in different experimental conditions are overall comparable across a number of variables – education, urban dwelling, age, religiosity, income, residence in OHAL, and exposure to refugees in their daily life. As these tables show, none of these variables determines allocation to a treatment group, with the exception of smartphones that are more likely to be owned by Kurds who receive the *Economic Cost* treatment.

D   Refugee Exposure Measures

In our survey experiment, we separate the effect of exposure to information about refugees from individual measures of respondents' exposure to refugees in their daily lives. As we show in Table A.1, Turkish provinces vary in the number of refugees and the share of refugees out of their total

Table C.4: Randomization Checks – Non-Kurds

	Logit			OLS			
	High School	Urban	OHAL	Age	Alcohol OK	Smartphone	Refugee Exposure
Economic Cost	-0.09	0.23	-0.05	-0.21	-0.13	-0.03	-0.00
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.35)	(0.13)	(0.27)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Ethnic Balance	-0.09	0.10	0.17	-0.12	0.15	0.06	0.01
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.34)	(0.13)	(0.27)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Militant Ties	-0.01	0.03	-0.40	-0.20	-0.10	0.02	-0.02
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.38)	(0.13)	(0.27)	(0.06)	(0.04)
Women & Children	-0.14	0.07	0.02	0.09	-0.29	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.35)	(0.13)	(0.27)	(0.06)	(0.04)
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.005	0.006	-0.002	-0.001	-0.004
N	716	716	716	716	709	716	695

Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
We report pseudo R^2 and adjusted R^2 values for logit and OLS regressions, respectively.

Table C.5: Randomization Checks – Kurds

	Logit				OLS		
	High School	Urban	OHAL	Age	Alcohol OK	Smartphone	Refugee Exposure
Economic Cost	0.32	0.05	0.32	-0.10	0.41	0.11**	-0.05
	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.15)	(0.36)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Ethnic Balance	0.05	0.10	-0.04	0.02	0.27	0.05	-0.03
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.15)	(0.37)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Militant Ties	-0.06	0.23	0.21	0.05	0.06	0.05	-0.01
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.28)	(0.15)	(0.36)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Women & Children	-0.27	0.06	0.02	0.20	0.07	0.07	-0.00
	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.15)	(0.37)	(0.05)	(0.04)
R^2	0.006	0.001	0.003	0.000	-0.004	0.001	-0.005
N	524	526	526	526	524	526	490

Standard errors are in parentheses. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$
We report pseudo R^2 and adjusted R^2 values for logit and OLS regressions, respectively.

population. In our regressions, we include a variable *Refugee Exposure* that measures respondents' exposure to refugees in their daily lives (see Table B.3 above). In addition, we include province dummies that, among other things, control for distance from the Syrian border and for camp in province. To calculate the index of individual refugee exposure for each respondent, we sum all the answers that respondents provide to exposure questions, and then rescale it to range from 0 to 1 (0 means no exposure, 1 means maximum exposure). Here we present correlations between this index (*Refugee Exposure*) and other variables.

The correlations in Table D.6 confirm that our measures are reliable. Having a refugee camp in the district is positively associated with the self-reported refugee exposure data. Likewise, OHAL residents report lower refugee exposure – this is consistent with the fact that most refugee camps are outside the OHAL provinces, and those that are in OHAL are less populous. Likewise, urban residents also report higher refugee exposure. This is consistent with the information that out-of-camp refugees reside in Turkish towns. Our regressions also show that much of the variation in respondents' self-reported refugee exposure is related to province of location–i.e. the significance of the variable *OHAL*, and the increase in R^2 once we include the province dummies. Kurdish respondents appear to be positively correlated with refugee exposure, but this is because we control for *OHAL*. Overall, the Kurds in our survey tend to report lower refugee exposure than the non-Kurds. *t*-test shows that the mean refugee exposure score for the non-Kurds is 0.54, whereas for the Kurds it is 0.46, and this difference is statistically significant ($p-value = 0.0001$). Moreover, the Kurds are less likely to reside in provinces with camps than the non-Kurds in our sample (70% of the non-Kurds and 63% of the Kurds in our sample reside in a province with camps, and this difference is statistically significant, $p-value = 0.0042$).

E   Regression Tables

Tables E.7 and E.8 present our main results. Bootstrapped coefficient plots based on these Tables are in the main text.

F   Robustness Checks

F.1.   Results with an Alternative Measure of Exposure to Violence

One of our findings is that respondents from provinces with a history of violence (*OHAL*) have warmer attitudes towards the refugees. To examine whether we observe the same relationship with a more nuanced measure of political violence at the province-level, we also estimate our models using the province-level PKK fatalities data in Tezcür (2015). Because the province-level PKK fatalities data are collinear with the province dummies, we drop the province dummies in these regressions but include a dummy variable for camp in the province, and the log of district distance to the border – two variables that can potentially affect public attitudes towards refugees and peace process. The results of these models are in Tables F.9 and F.10. Our finding is robust to using this alternative measure: Respondents from provinces with higher number of PKK fatalities have warmer attitudes towards refugees.

Table D.6: Correlates of Refugee Exposure (OLS)

	Refugee Exposure Index		
Camp in District	0.084***	0.055***	0.012
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.023)
AKP Supporter		-0.045**	-0.30*
		(0.019)	(0.016)
OHAL		-0.149***	-0.043
		(0.024)	(0.069)
Kurdish		-0.015	0.046*
		(0.021)	(0.027)
Age		0.013	0.007
		(0.009)	(0.007)
Female		-0.038**	-0.033**
		(0.018)	(0.015)
Religious		-0.085**	-0.048
		(0.043)	(0.038)
Urban		0.107***	0.036
		(0.022)	(0.022)
Ramadan		-0.095***	0.098**
		(0.033)	(0.040)
Education Level		0.038*	0.017
		(0.023)	(0.019)
Wealth		-0.024	-0.007
		(0.035)	(0.030)
Constant		0.539***	0.453***
		(0.046)	(0.048)
Province Dummies	No	No	Yes
Observations	1185	1043	1043
R-squared	0.017	0.112	0.420

Standard errors in parentheses.* p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01.

Table E.7: Treatment Effects on Main Dependent Variables All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	How warm do you feel towards refugees from the following groups:			
	Arab	Alawite	Kurdish	Sunni
Economic Cost	-0.054	0.003	-0.020	0.030
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Ethnic Balance	-0.067	-0.059	-0.065*	-0.004
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Militant Ties	-0.114***	-0.095**	-0.123***	-0.061
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Women and Children	-0.111***	-0.089**	-0.105***	-0.073*
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.042)
Kurdish ×	0.093	0.046	0.098	0.042
Economic Cost	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.063)	(0.067)
Kurdish ×	-0.015	-0.008	0.104*	-0.011
Ethnic Balance	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.066)
Kurdish ×	0.110*	0.053	0.120*	0.109
Militant Ties	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.066)
Kurdish ×	0.088	0.037	0.122*	0.074
Women and Children	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.067)
AKP Supporter	0.041*	-0.022	-0.011	0.019
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)
OHAL	0.282***	0.424***	0.340***	0.387***
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.088)	(0.093)
Refugee Exposure	0.081*	0.133***	0.063	0.046
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.044)
Kurdish	-0.013	0.002	-0.002	0.000
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.056)
Observations	991	984	1012	997
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01				

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Table E.8: Treatment Effects on Main Dependent Variables All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	Do refugees		Do you support
	Pose economic threat	Make Turkey less safe	The peace process
Economic Cost	0.023	0.042	0.019
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.039)
Ethnic Balance	-0.007	-0.017	0.019
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.039)
Militant Ties	0.070	0.085**	-0.022
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.040)
Women and Children	0.087*	0.084**	-0.066*
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.040)
Kurdish ×	-0.038	-0.096	0.103*
Economic Cost	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.062)
Kurdish ×	-0.025	0.020	-0.040
Ethnic Balance	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.061)
Kurdish ×	-0.040	-0.094	0.072
Militant Ties	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.061)
Kurdish ×	-0.072	-0.111*	0.134**
Women and Children	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.062)
AKP Supporter	-0.069***	-0.061***	0.084***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.021)
OHAL	-0.157	-0.120	0.182**
	(0.100)	(0.095)	(0.088)
Refugee Exposure	0.155***	0.130***	0.046
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.041)
Kurdish	-0.026	-0.037	0.016
	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.053)
Observations	1022	1022	1014
Replications	5000	5000	5000
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01			

Table F.9: Treatment Effects on Main Dependent Variables with an Alternative Measure of Exposure to Violence All regressions include a dummy for whether the province has a camp, district distance to the border and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	How warm do you feel towards refugees from the following groups:			
	Arab	Alawite	Kurdish	Sunni
Economic Cost	-0.048	0.004	-0.018	0.031
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Ethnic Balance	-0.066	-0.064	-0.072	-0.008
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Militant Ties	-0.111**	-0.095**	-0.122***	-0.066
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Women and Children	-0.111**	-0.092**	-0.106**	-0.074
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Kurdish ×	0.124*	0.089	0.135*	0.075
Economic Cost	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.073)
Kurdish ×	-0.007	0.010	0.125*	0.010
Ethnic Balance	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.072)
Kurdish ×	0.111	0.062	0.127*	0.124*
Militant Ties	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.072)
Kurdish ×	0.105	0.057	0.144**	0.091
Women and Children	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.071)	(0.073)
AKP Supporter	0.015	-0.043*	-0.036	-0.004
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Number of PKK	0.689***	0.420***	0.656***	0.550***
militants killed/1000	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.087)	(0.088)
Refugee Exposure	-0.112***	-0.055	-0.134***	-0.108***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.039)
Kurdish	-0.086	-0.032	-0.021	-0.044
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Camp in Province	-0.070*	-0.164***	-0.085**	-0.157***
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)
District Distance (log)	-0.041**	-0.035*	-0.004	-0.044**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Observations	991	984	1012	997

Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01

Table F.10: Treatment Effects on Main Dependent Variables with an Alternative Measure of Exposure to Violence All regressions include a dummy for whether the province has a camp, district distance to the border and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	Do refugees		Do you support
	Pose economic threat	Make Turkey less safe	The peace process
Economic Cost	0.030	0.046	0.013
	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.043)
Ethnic Balance	-0.005	-0.015	0.010
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Militant Ties	0.078*	0.092**	-0.018
	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.043)
Women and Children	0.094**	0.091**	-0.067
	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.044)
Kurdish ×	-0.064	-0.111	0.134*
Economic Cost	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.068)
Kurdish ×	-0.027	0.021	-0.004
Ethnic Balance	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Kurdish ×	-0.068	-0.111	0.073
Militant Ties	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.067)
Kurdish ×	-0.098	-0.130*	0.152**
Women and Children	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.069)
AKP Supporter	-0.089***	-0.075***	0.046**
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Number of PKK	0.331***	0.441***	0.612***
militants killed/1000	(0.088)	(0.084)	(0.083)
Refugee Exposure	0.191***	0.165***	- 0.065*
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Kurdish	-0.026	-0.048	-0.018
	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Camp in Province	0.002	0.035	0.077**
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)
District Distance (log)	0.011	0.011	-0.003
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Observations	1022	1022	1014

Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01

Table F.11: Treatment Effects on Main Dependent Variables No controls except for Kurdish dummy.

	How warm do you feel towards refugees from the following groups:			
	Arab	Alawite	Kurdish	Sunni
Economic Cost	-0.064	-0.039	-0.045	0.004
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Ethnic Balance	-0.048	-0.052	-0.052	0.008
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Militant Ties	-0.097**	-0.089*	-0.105**	-0.047
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Women and Children	-0.098**	-0.087*	-0.095**	-0.051
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Kurdish ×	0.169**	0.148**	0.164**	0.102
Economic Cost	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Kurdish ×	-0.003	0.027	0.089	0.003
Ethnic Balance	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Kurdish ×	0.146**	0.098	0.131*	0.120*
Militant Ties	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Kurdish ×	0.109	0.069	0.129*	0.066
Women and Children	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.071)
Kurdish	0.029	0.027	0.119**	0.081
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.051)
Observations	1162	1153	1188	1172
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01				

F.2. Results Without Control Variables

Here we report the results of our model without controls. We omit all province-level controls and province dummies, as well as all the individual controls, with the exception of the Kurdish indicator which we include to explore the effect of treatments on Kurds and non-Kurds. As we demonstrate in Tables C.4 and C.5, the respondents assigned to different treatments groups are comparable across a wide variety of controls. Nonetheless, in our main estimations, we include controls to correct for any random imbalances, and to improve the efficiency of our treatment coefficients. Here we show that the effects of our treatments are not driven by the inclusion of controls.

Tables F.11 and F.12 present the results without controls (only with a dummy for Kurdish respondents). The coefficients that are significant in Tables E.7 and E.8 remain significant, with the exception of *Women and Children* treatment that is significant at 90% level in results with controls, and is not significant when the controls are omitted. The rest of the results hold, and the coefficients do not change by much.

Table F.12: Treatment Effects on Main Dependent Variables No controls except for Kurdish dummy.

	Do refugees		Do you support
	Pose economic threat	Make Turkey less safe	The peace process
Economic Cost	0.031	0.045	-0.011
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Ethnic Balance	0.007	-0.007	0.010
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Militant Ties	0.070	0.091**	-0.020
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Women and Children	0.098**	0.076*	-0.048
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Kurdish ×	-0.101	-0.120*	0.127*
Economic Cost	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.065)
Kurdish ×	-0.023	0.004	-0.053
Ethnic Balance	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Kurdish ×	-0.065	-0.108	0.055
Militant Ties	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Kurdish ×	-0.127*	-0.119*	0.096
Women and Children	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Kurdish	-0.002	-0.008	0.137***
	(0.049)	(0.047)	(0.046)
Observations	1204	1201	1197
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01			

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F.3. Does Exposure to Refugees Drive Our Findings?

One possible explanation for our findings is that Kurds are less likely to reside in provinces with camps, and are less exposed to refugees in their daily life. Thus, they do not express negative attitudes towards the refugees, whereas the non-Kurds are more likely to be affected by the refugees and are thus becoming more negative following our treatment. We explore this possibility by replicating our results focusing only on the provinces with camps. In these provinces, 40% of our sample are Kurdish, and the remaining are non-Kurdish. Tables F.13 and F.14 replicate the results in Table E.7 and E.8 in provinces with camps. The results of these checks show that most of our findings hold: Kurds are not exhibiting negative attitudes towards refugees following our treatments, unlike the non-Kurds. Moreover, the *Economic Cost* and the *Women and Children* treatments make Kurds more positive towards Sunni refugees, compared to Kurds in the treatment group. Kurds in provinces with camps also become more supportive of the peace process following the *Economic Cost*. Non-Kurds in these provinces are becoming less supportive of the peace process following the *Women and Children* treatment, though this result is not significant in the full sample. Thus, based on these tests, we conclude that the lack of negative effects of our treatment on Kurds is not due to their low level of exposure to refugees.

F.4. Do the Kurdish Respondents Provide Favorable Answers?

We show that the Kurds we survey are not systematically providing favorable answers – something that may account for why the Kurds appear to have more positive attitudes towards refugees, as well as why they are more supportive of the peace process, and less supportive of violence.

In Table F.15 we show that when asked about their level of identification with Turkey, Kurds are less likely than non-Kurds to say that they identify with Turkey (the dependent variable is rescaled between 0 and 1). If Kurds were providing favorable answers, we would expect the coefficient of *Kurdish* to be positive and significant, or not significant, but instead it is negative and statistically significant (as is the sign on the variable *OHAL*).

F.5. Are there Heterogeneous Treatment Effects due to Personal Exposure to Refugees?

An additional concern might be that individual exposure to refugees might affect the impact of our treatments on respondents. Although in our regressions we control for individual exposure to refugees, here we show that this exposure does not change the effect of the treatments–i.e. respondents who report high exposure to refugees in their daily lives respond similarly following our treatments to respondents who are not heavily exposed to refugees. We interact a binary indicator of high exposure–defined as 75th percentile of the *Refugee Exposure* variable–with each of our treatments. The results in Tables F.16 and F.17 show that respondents with high exposure do not differ from others in their response to our questions following the treatments.

F.6. Weighted Results

Another concern may be that our results are driven by the efficiency gained from our stratified sampling strategy. In Table F.18 and Table F.19 we present the weighted treatment results. The results largely match those of the unweighted results.

Table F.13: Results in camp provinces only. Here we test whether the non-negative attitudes of Kurds are driven by their low exposure to refugees. We focus only on provinces with camps, where refugee exposure is higher. 40% of this subsample are Kurds, and the remaining are non-Kurds. All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	How warm do you feel towards refugees from the following groups:			
	Arab	Alawite	Kurdish	Sunni
Economic Cost	-0.055	0.008	-0.007	0.052
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Ethnic Balance	-0.041	-0.013	-0.034	0.054
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.051)
Militant Ties	-0.139***	-0.102**	-0.132***	-0.039
	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Women and Children	-0.118**	-0.080	-0.094*	-0.045
	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Kurdish ×	0.144*	0.106	0.148*	0.086
Economic Cost	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.088)
Kurdish ×	0.067	0.044	0.125	-0.019
Ethnic Balance	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.087)
Kurdish ×	0.215**	0.155*	0.208**	0.208**
Militant Ties	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.087)
Kurdish ×	0.097	0.043	0.134	0.041
Women and Children	(0.086)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.088)
AKP Supporter	0.054*	-0.012	-0.003	0.041
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)
OHAL	0.390***	0.363***	0.369***	0.420***
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.058)
Refugee Exposure	0.031	0.116**	0.039	0.026
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.055)
Kurdish	-0.050	-0.015	-0.010	0.014
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.068)	(0.071)
Observations	672	668	678	673
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01				

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Table F.14: **Results in camp provinces only.** Here we test whether the non-negative attitudes of Kurds are driven by their low exposure to refugees. We focus only on provinces with camps, where refugee exposure is higher. 40% of this subsample are Kurds, and the remaining are non-Kurds. All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	Do refugees		Do you support
	Pose economic threat	Make Turkey less safe	The peace process
Economic Cost	-0.014	0.029	0.015
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.049)
Ethnic Balance	-0.013	-0.029	-0.000
	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.049)
Militant Ties	0.093*	0.131**	-0.074
	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.049)
Women and Children	0.094*	0.103**	-0.125**
	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.050)
Kurdish ×	0.052	-0.061	0.145*
Economic Cost	(0.091)	(0.086)	(0.083)
Kurdish ×	-0.048	-0.022	0.008
Ethnic Balance	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.081)
Kurdish ×	-0.084	-0.145*	0.155*
Militant Ties	(0.089)	(0.085)	(0.081)
Kurdish ×	-0.118	-0.137	0.223***
Women and Children	(0.090)	(0.085)	(0.082)
AKP Supporter	-0.085***	-0.061**	0.082***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)
OHAL	-0.105*	0.035	0.212***
	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.055)
Refugee Exposure	0.066	0.069	-0.030
	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.052)
Kurdish	-0.031	-0.036	-0.020
	(0.073)	(0.069)	(0.067)
Observations	688	687	687
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01			

Table F.15: Are the results driven by favorable answers provided by Kurdish respondents? All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	Identify with Turkey			
Kurdish	-0.073***	-0.073**	-0.074***	-0.075**
	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.030)
OHAL	-0.266 ***	-0.267***	-0.266***	-0.269***
	(0.062)	(0.072)	(0.062)	(0.073)
Kurdish×OHAL		0.001		0.004
		(0.052)		(0.052)
Economic Cost			-0.026	-0.026
			(0.021)	(0.021)
Ethnic Balance			-0.008	-0.008
			(0.021)	(0.021)
Militant Ties			-0.003	-0.003
			(0.021)	(0.021)
Women and Children			0.001	0.001
			(0.021)	(0.021)
AKP Supporter	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.017
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Refugee Exposure	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Observations	1035	1035	1035	1035
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01				

Table F.16: Treatment Effects on Main Dependent Variables – Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with Exposure to Refugees All regressions include a province dummy and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

| | **How warm do you feel towards refugees from the following groups:** | | | |
	Arab	Alawite	Kurdish	Sunni
Economic Cost	-0.024	-0.021	-0.008	0.010
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)
Ethnic Balance	-0.092**	-0.077**	-0.028	-0.020
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Militant Ties	-0.063*	-0.067*	-0.070**	-0.009
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Women and Children	-0.080**	-0.092**	-0.056	-0.052
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)
High exposure ×	0.024	0.161**	0.113	0.140*
Economic Cost	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.074)
High exposure ×	0.069	0.047	0.012	0.038
Ethnic Balance	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.073)
High exposure ×	-0.035	-0.040	-0.022	-0.039
Militant Ties	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.073)
High exposure ×	0.007	0.050	-0.008	0.023
Women and Children	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.068)	(0.073)
AKP Supporter	0.036	-0.029	-0.016	0.014
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)
OHAL	0.292***	0.438***	0.352***	0.394***
	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.088)	(0.093)
High exposure	0.025	0.028	0.023	-0.018
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.053)
Kurdish	0.040	0.027	0.086**	0.038
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Observations	991	984	1012	997

Standard errors in parentheses: * $p<0.10$,** $p<0.05$,*** $p<0.01$

Table F.17: Treatment Effects on Main Dependent Variables – Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with Exposure to Refugees All regressions include a dummy for whether the province has a camp, district distance to the border and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	Do refugees		Do you support
	Pose economic threat	Make Turkey less safe	The peace process
Economic Cost	-0.005	-0.009	0.057
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.035)
Ethnic Balance	-0.024	-0.002	-0.021
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.035)
Militant Ties	0.023	0.008	0.004
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.035)
Women and Children	0.030	0.012	0.001
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.036)
High exposure ×	0.051	0.046	0.016
Economic Cost	(0.079)	(0.075)	(0.070)
High exposure ×	0.016	-0.035	0.087
Ethnic Balance	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.068)
High exposure ×	0.102	0.135*	0.014
Militant Ties	(0.077)	(0.073)	(0.068)
High exposure ×	0.094	0. 095	-0.052
Women and Children	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.069)
AKP Supporter	-0.073***	-0.062***	0.079***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.021)
OHAL	-0.160	-0.132	0.194**
	(0.100)	(0.095)	(0.089)
High exposure	-0.024	-0.056	0.030
	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.050)
Kurdish	-0.052	-0.081**	0.066*
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.035)
Observations	1022	1022	1014

Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01

Table F.18: Weighted Treatment Effects on Main Dependent Variables All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	How warm do you feel towards refugees from the following groups:			
	Arab	Alawite	Kurdish	Sunni
Economic Cost	-0.085**	-0.008	-0.048	0.025
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Ethnic Balance	-0.111***	-0.100***	-0.121***	-0.044
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Militant Ties	-0.127***	-0.087***	-0.148***	-0.060*
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Women and Children	-0.112***	-0.081**	-0.121***	-0.081**
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Kurdish ×	0.090	0.021	0.056	-0.010
Economic Cost	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.065)
Kurdish ×	0.029	0.032	0.134**	0.045
Ethnic Balance	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.063)
Kurdish ×	0.132**	0.018	0.108*	0.097
Militant Ties	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.063)
Kurdish ×	0.136**	0.074	0.149**	0.120*
Women and Children	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.064)
AKP Supporter	0.029	-0.015	-0.005	0.008
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.020)
OHAL	0.269***	0.473***	0.373***	0.413***
	(0.083)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.084)
Refugee Exposure	0.127***	0.129***	0.086**	0.063*
	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Kurdish	-0.048	-0.035	-0.054	-0.004
	(0.053)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.053)
Observations	1037	1033	1056	1044
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01				

Table F.19: Weighted Treatment Effects on Main Dependent Variables All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	Do refugees		Do you support
	Pose Economic Threat	Make Turkey Less Safe	The Peace Process
Economic Cost	0.008	0.023	0.007
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Ethnic Balance	-0.026	-0.023	-0.002
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Militant Ties	0.061	0.057	-0.008
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Women and Children	0.082**	0.083**	-0.075**
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.036)
Kurdish ×	-0.045	-0.058	0.074
Economic Cost	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.065)
Kurdish ×	0.024	0.105	-0.031
Ethnic Balance	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.064)
Kurdish ×	-0.035	-0.051	0.071
Militant Ties	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Kurdish ×	-0.053	-0.092	0.122*
Women and Children	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.065)
AKP Supporter	-0.058***	-0.073***	0.086***
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
OHAL	-0.112	-0.093	0.220**
	(0.090)	(0.088)	(0.085)
Refugee Exposure	0.235***	0.157***	0.099**
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Kurdish	-0.070	-0.079	0.004
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Observations	1058	1057	1038
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01			

F.7. Results with Ordered Probit

Another concern may be that our results are driven by our choice of OLS as the estimation model. In Tables F.20 and F.21 we present our results using an ordered probit model. Our results remain unaffected by the choice of ordered probit.

F.8. Results with Split Sample between non-Kurds and Kurds

We also run our models in separate samples for Kurds and non-Kurds. Our results remain unaffected: While the *Militant Ties* and *Women and Children* treatments have a significant effect on attitudes in non-Kurdish sample, they don't have significant effects in the Kurdish sample. The results of these models are in Tables F.22- F.25.

Table F.20: Treatment Effects on Main Dependent Variables (Ordered Probit) All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	How warm do you feel towards refugees from the following groups:			
	Arab	Alawite	Kurdish	Sunni
Economic Cost	-0.208	0.042	-0.050	0.096
	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.140)	(0.140)
Ethnic Balance	-0.217	-0.169	-0.190	-0.003
	(0.141)	(0.142)	(0.140)	(0.140)
Militant Ties	-0.414***	-0.325**	-0.424***	-0.201
	(0.145)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.142)
Women and Children	-0.398***	-0.303**	-0.361**	-0.239*
	(0.144)	(0.145)	(0.143)	(0.143)
Kurdish ×	0.308	0.116	0.338	0.113
Economic Cost	(0.232)	(0.234)	(0.233)	(0.231)
Kurdish ×	-0.062	-0.017	0.326	-0.066
Ethnic Balance	(0.231)	(0.230)	(0.230)	(0.227)
Kurdish ×	0.476**	0.238	0.516**	0.408*
Militant Ties	(0.234)	(0.233)	(0.231)	(0.230)
Kurdish ×	0.333	0.153	0.450*	0.292
Women and Children	(0.236)	(0.238)	(0.236)	(0.233)
AKP Supporter	0.128	-0.085	-0.047	0.052
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.077)
OHAL	0.736**	1.290***	0.984***	1.085***
	(0.306)	(0.309)	(0.310)	(0.307)
Refugee Exposure	0.267*	0.441***	0.217	0.142
	(0.152)	(0.154)	(0.151)	(0.151)
Kurdish	-0.078	-0.013	-0.015	0.039
	(0.197)	(0.197)	(0.195)	(0.194)
Observations	991	984	1012	997
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01				

Table F.21: Treatment Effects on Main Dependent Variables (Ordered Probit) All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	Do refugees		Do you support
	Pose Economic Threat	Make Turkey Less Safe	The Peace Process
Economic Cost	0.075	0.118	0.064
	(0.140)	(0.139)	(0.141)
Ethnic Balance	-0.016	-0.033	0.052
	(0.138)	(0.138)	(0.141)
Militant Ties	0.246*	0.318**	-0.056
	(0.140)	(0.141)	(0.142)
Women and Children	0.317**	0.288**	-0.216
	(0.143)	(0.141)	(0.143)
Kurdish ×	-0.102	-0.268	0.599**
Economic Cost	(0.222)	(0.222)	(0.248)
Kurdish ×	-0.084	0.030	-0.135
Ethnic Balance	(0.219)	(0.218)	(0.230)
Kurdish ×	-0.149	-0.328	0.216
Militant Ties	(0.219)	(0.218)	(0.230)
Kurdish ×	-0.269	-0.411*	0.559**
Women and Children	(0.223)	(0.221)	(0.240)
AKP Supporter	-0.204***	-0.204***	0.313***
	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.079)
OHAL	-0.478	-0.390	0.676*
	(0.300)	(0.300)	(0.347)
Refugee Exposure	0.467***	0.443***	0.214
	(0.149)	(0.149)	(0.154)
Kurdish	-0.106	-0.120	0.039
	(0.186)	(0.183)	(0.196)
Observations	1022	1022	1014
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01			

Table F.22: Non-Kurdish respondents only. All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	How warm do you feel towards refugees from the following groups:			
	Arab	Alawite	Kurdish	Sunni
Economic Cost	-0.058	-0.004	-0.024	0.019
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.043)
Ethnic Balance	-0.063	-0.056	-0.064	-0.006
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Militant Ties	-0.111***	-0.095**	-0.122***	-0.063
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Women and Children	-0.104**	-0.086**	-0.102**	-0.069
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.043)
AKP Supporter	0.050*	0.005	0.011	0.046
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)
OHAL	0.392***	0.304***	0.252***	0.406***
	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.074)
Refugee Exposure	0.103*	0.105**	0.098*	0.028
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.055)	(0.057)
Observations	604	603	605	606
Standard errors are in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01				

Table F.23: Non-Kurdish respondents only. All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	Do refugees		Do you support
	Pose economic threat	Make Turkey less safe	The peace process
Economic Cost	0.013	0.037	0.025
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Ethnic Balance	-0.007	-0.010	0.030
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Militant Ties	0.066	0.086**	-0.022
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Women and Children	0.084*	0.091**	-0.059
	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.043)
AKP Supporter	-0.054*	-0.058*	0.137***
	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.030)
OHAL	-0.140*	0.039	0.139*
	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Refugee Exposure	0.183***	0.168***	0.032
	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.057)
Observations	608	608	597
Replications	4380	4362	4405
Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses: * $p<0.10$,** $p<0.05$,*** $p<0.01$			

Table F.24: Kurdish respondents only. All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	How warm do you feel towards refugees from the following groups:			
	Arab	Alawite	Kurdish	Sunni
Economic Cost	0.034	0.037	0.071	0.054
	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.051)
Ethnic Balance	-0.099*	-0.067	0.038	-0.029
	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.045)	(0.050)
Militant Ties	-0.008	-0.045	-0.015	0.031
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.050)
Women and Children	-0.041	-0.061	0.004	-0.026
	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.045)	(0.051)
AKP Supporter	0.038	-0.048	-0.033	-0.020
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.038)
OHAL	0.204	0.293**	0.272**	0.245**
	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.108)	(0.119)
Refugee Exposure	0.017	0.154*	-0.023	0.027
	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.064)	(0.072)
Observations	387	381	407	391
Standard errors are in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01				

Table F.25: Kurdish respondents only. All regressions include dummies for the provinces and individual demographic controls: age, sex, a religiosity index, a wealth index, urban, education levels, and Ramadan dummy (for whether the survey was conducted before or during Ramadan).

	Do refugees		**Do you support**
	Pose economic threat	Make Turkey less safe	The peace process
Economic Cost	-0.020	-0.058	0.118***
	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.043)
Ethnic Balance	-0.036	-0.002	-0.030
	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.042)
Militant Ties	0.026	-0.014	0.038
	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.041)
Women and Children	0.019	-0.023	0.051
	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.043)
AKP Supporter	-0.047	-0.031	0.017
	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.031)
OHAL	0.001	-0.010	0.295***
	(0.132)	(0.123)	(0.102)
Refugee Exposure	0.132*	0.061	0.077
	(0.080)	(0.074)	(0.059)
Observations	414	414	417
Replications	1941	1907	4494
Standard errors are in parentheses: * p<0.10,** p<0.05,*** p<0.01			

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