

Anger, Legacies of Violence, and Group Conflict: An Experiment in Post-Riot Acre, Israel

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Abstract

Extant research hypothesizes that anger over past intergroup conflict serves as a catalyst for future conflict. However, few studies have experimentally tested this hypothesis on a representative population that has experienced ethnic conflict. I use a behavioral economics experiment to measure how anger over past intergroup conflict influences intergroup relations. Subjects were sampled proportional to population and ethnicity in Acre, Israel—a mixed city of Jews and Palestinian Citizens of Israel (PCIs) that experienced PCI-Jewish riots in 2008. During the experiment, they were randomly primed for anger about the riots or given a neutral manipulation. Subjects then allocated income between themselves and three partners: one from their ingroup, one from their outgroup, and one whose identity was unclear. The main result is counterintuitive: priming anger over the riots does not increase discrimination. Rather, it reduces altruism to all groups, and this result is strongest for “High Aggression” types. While qualitative interviews suggest that intergroup tensions are high in Acre, blame for the riots falls on both ingroup and outgroup members.

TOTAL WORD COUNT: 9,425¹

¹Calculated using TeXCount <http://app.uio.no/ifi/texcount/>

1 Motivation

In October of 2008, a young Palestinian Citizen of Israel (PCI) man drove into a predominately Jewish neighborhood in Acre, Israel on Yom Kippur.² On this day, Jews refrain from driving, talking on the phone, bathing, and they fast for penance.³ The decision to drive into a Jewish neighborhood on one of the holiest days of the years for Jews might have been viewed as innocuous, or simply inconsiderate in other contexts. However in the “mixed” city of Acre this action sparked four nights of Jewish-PCI riots known as the Yom Kippur Riots.⁴

Most empirical studies on the causes of ethnic violence have focused on election considerations of elites, interethnic civil society relations, or underlying structural conditions.⁵ Yet, other research suggests that psychological factors—particularly emotions play a key role in understanding ethnic conflict and participation. For instances, emotions over past salient events of ethnic conflict can serve as focal rallying points in “intractable conflicts.”⁶ Scholars of ethnic politics have theorized that leaders manipulate emotions over past intergroup violence to make ethnic⁷ identities salient, and foment intergroup conflict for political gain.⁸ Anger marshaled over past intergroup violence is argued to be a central factor in ethnic violence such as the Yom Kippur Riots.⁹ Furthermore, recent research suggests that exposure to intergroup violence¹⁰ is thought to influence prospects for peaceful resolution of conflicts.¹¹ *The extant literature suggests that priming anger over past intergroup conflict (such as the Yom Kippur Riots) will lead to increased in ingroup cohesion, and increased animosity to the outgroup, resulting in higher levels of discrimination.*

More recent psychological research present a more nuanced theory of intergroup anger.¹² Anger

²Akko in Hebrew and Akka in Arabic. Throughout the paper I will refer to Arab-Israelis as Palestinian Citizens of Israel (PCIs), as this is their preferred self-identification.

³Many secular Jews also selectively follow these edicts.

⁴Mixed cities are the name given to Israeli cities where both Jews and PCIs live. Other mixed cities include Haifa, Jaffa, Ramle, Nazareth, Maalot-Tarshiha, Nazareth Illit, and Lod.

⁵See Wilkinson 2006, Varshney 2001, and Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010 respectively.

⁶See Bar-Tal 2001.

⁷Throughout the paper, I will use ethnic conflict and intergroup conflict interchangeably. I treat ethnicity as a specific subset of group-based identities, in which membership is largely determined via descent Chandra 2006.

⁸Snyder 2000.

⁹Horowitz 2001.

¹⁰Voors, Nillesen, Verwimp, Bulte, Lensink and Van Soest 2012; Benmelech, Berrebi and Klor 2009; Lyall 2009.

¹¹However, the results of exposure to violence are varied, with Lyall 2009 finding it decreases the willingness to seek revenge against the outgroup, and Benmelech, Berrebi and Klor 2009 finding the opposite.

¹²Maitner, Mackie and Smith 2006; Zeitzoff 2012.

is considered a core emotion that prepares individuals to correct perceived offenses and take action.¹³ The target of anger can be an individual, or a particular group when group-based identities are salient.¹⁴ In intergroup settings, anger has been shown to lead individuals to support taking risks for both peace and military action.¹⁵ Further research suggest that group anger is neither a positive or negative emotion, but dose specific: in small amounts intergroup anger can lead to an increased willingness to take risks for peace with an outgroup.¹⁶ However, in too large amounts it can lead to outright hatred. It is hypothesized that frustration over failure of the ingroup to behave appropriately and mollify an outgroup threat can lead to *increased* ingroup directed anger.¹⁷

These studies of intergroup emotions posit that anger serves as a regulatory mechanism.¹⁸ When the outgroup is considered to have transgressed, priming intergroup anger can lead for the ingroup to lash out at the outgroup. However, in situations where the ingroup is believed to have behaved ‘inappropriately,’ priming anger can lead to decreased support for the ingroup. In many intergroup settings, members of different groups may not particularly like each other, but the status quo is wary cooperation, rather than outright conflict.¹⁹ Acre is no exception.²⁰ Riots, such as the Yom Kippur Riots, are considered a rupture in status quo intergroup relations. During the spiral of ethnic violence, both members of ingroup and outgroup commit transgressions. *Priming anger over the Yom Kippur Riots will lead individuals to express disappointment in the way members of both their ingroup and outgroup behaved. Both Jews and PCIs will be less altruistic to members of ingroup and outgroup members.* The two competing hypotheses for the effect of priming anger over past intergroup conflict are: the *Conventional Wisdom* hypothesis (anger should increase discrimination) and the *Regulatory Anger* hypothesis (anger should decrease altruism to both ingroup and outgroup members).

The extant studies of anger and intergroup conflict suffer from either external or internal validity issues. These issues can be further classified into at least one of the three following research

¹³Frijda, Kuipers and ter Schure 1989; Lerner and Keltner 2001.

¹⁴Tajfel and Turner 1979; Mackie, Devos and Smith 2000; Banks and Valentino 2012.

¹⁵Huddy, Feldman and Cassese 2007.

¹⁶Halperin, Russell, Dweck and Gross 2011.

¹⁷Maitner, Mackie and Smith 2006, p. 726.

¹⁸Maitner, Mackie and Smith 2007

¹⁹Fearon and Laitin 1996.

²⁰See <http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/recipe-riot>

design problems. (1) Most studies of intergroup conflict lack micro-foundations. They implicitly assume that individuals exposed to past intergroup violence become angry when reminded of the violence,²¹ or that leaders are easily able to mobilize them by manipulating anger over the past violence.²² Yet, they only measure aggregate outcomes such as riots²³ or insurgent attacks,²⁴ and not individual behavior. (2) Even those studies that do use individual data, measure attitudes and not behavior.²⁵ (3) Finally, they use student or convenience samples,²⁶ thereby making generalizations to populations living in tense ethnic settings difficult. To improve upon these shortcomings, and measure the causal effect of anger over past ethnic violence on present-day intergroup conflict, I conducted a behavioral economics experiment in Acre.

The experimental design offers five principal advantages over previous research on emotions and intergroup violence. (1) Subjects were sampled proportional to population and ethnicity from relevant neighborhoods in Acre. (2) Anger over the riots was experimentally manipulated. (3) The behavioral game portion of the experiment closely modeled how individuals conceptualize intractable group conflict: individuals could maximize the total payoff for them and their partners (social welfare), or maximize their personal income at the expense of their partners' income.²⁷ (4) I am able to compare ingroup versus outgroup allocations using the partner's neighborhood as a realistic, but subtle signal of their partners' ethnic identity.²⁸ (5) Finally, subjects did not further interact with their partners whom they were dividing money, so the division represents a cleaner measure of intergroup conflict, not clouded by concerns of reciprocity.

For the experiment, 150 Jewish and 147 PCI (297 total subjects) male residents of Acre, Israel were recruited in July and August of 2011. Subjects were sampled proportional to the population from three neighborhoods: a predominately Jewish neighborhood, a predominately PCI neighbor-

²¹Benmelech, Berrebi and Klor 2009.

²²Snyder 2000; Wilkinson 2006.

²³Wilkinson 2006.

²⁴Lyll 2009.

²⁵For instance Halperin et al. 2011. Brewer 1979; McConnell and Leibold 2001 and Whitt and Wilson 2007 argue persuasively why it is better to measure behavior, as opposed to attitudes, when trying to tap into intergroup attitudes.

²⁶Mackie, Devos and Smith 2000.

²⁷Bar-Tal 2001.

²⁸As Zizzo 2010 argues, using "Jewish partner," or "PCI partner" could have potentially biased the results by cueing subjects to the fact that we are interested in intergroup relations.

hood, and a mixed neighborhood. The experiment took place in the subjects' individual households. During the course of the experiment they were randomly assigned to one of two treatments: one that heightened anger about the Yom Kippur Riots (*Anger Treatment*) or one that did not (*Neutral Condition*). Afterward, subjects played a game in which they divided income between themselves and three partners from the three different neighborhoods (including their own). The different neighborhoods served as a signal of their partners' ethnicities (Jewish, PCI, and unsure/mixed). In the game, subjects could take as much income away from their partner as they wanted and add it to their own income at a discounted rate. After subjects made their monetary choices, they then completed a survey of their political and social attitudes, as well as their exposure to the riots.

The key finding that emerges from the experiment is that, contrary to previous research, *priming anger over the riot does not increase discrimination against outgroup members. Rather it reduces altruism to all group members, and this effect is most pronounced at an ingroup-level.* The negative effects of the anger on ingroup and outgroup altruism are largely driven by the “High Aggression” subjects. This calls into question previous assumptions about emotions and ethnic violence, as highly aggressive individuals are precisely those who the extant literature suggests should be most swayed to discriminate by emotional primes.²⁹ Two secondary findings follow from previous research. (1) I find that there is a large norm of discrimination in Acre: subjects on average gave almost twice as much income to ingroup members, compared to outgroup members across treatments.³⁰ (2) Echoing previous findings on exposure to violence, riot exposure leads to greater ingroup contributions,³¹ especially for PCIs. This latter finding suggests that Acre is not simply an outlier in terms of ethnic conflict, but rather that the effect of anger is distinct from exposure to violence. Structured interviews conducted with Jewish and PCI residents of Acre show that recalled anger of the Yom Kippur Riots does not solely lead to aggressive feelings towards the outgroup. Rather, it leads both groups to express disappointment at outgroup as well as ingroup members for their conduct. These findings have implications beyond Acre. In many ethnically diverse societies politicians attempt to gain political advantage by priming emotions over past ethnic violence.³²

²⁹Scacco 2009; Horowitz 2001.

³⁰Brewer 1979.

³¹Blattman 2009; Bellows and Miguel 2009.

³²Snyder 2000.

The experiment suggests that responses to such ethnic appeals are not automatically pro-ingroup and anti-outgroup, but rather more circumspect.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives the background on Acre and the Yom Kippur Riots and Section 3 describes recruitment and experimental protocol. Section 4 provides summary statistics of the subject pool and discusses the effectiveness of the manipulations. In Section 5 I present the empirical results from the experiment, and in Section 6 I interpret the findings in light of qualitative interviews. Further results and robustness checks are discussed in the Appendix and *Supplementary Information*.

2 Acre: Background and Yom Kippur Riots

2.1 Background

Acre is a mixed city of 46,100 in which approximately one-third of the residents are PCIs and two-thirds are Jews. PCIs are concentrated in the southern area of the city known as the Old City.³³ The city center (HaMerkaz) is evenly split between Jews and PCIs, while Jews make up the dominant majority in the eastern neighborhoods.³⁴ These eastern neighborhoods, Shuknah Burla, Neve Alon, Neve Aviv, Ben Gurion and Avraham Danino, of the city are collectively known as the “Shikun.”³⁵ The segregated nature of the city stems from the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. Before the war, Acre’s population of 15,500 was over 90 % Arab.³⁶ After Jewish forces captured the city, a large percentage of the Arab population was forced into exile as refugees,³⁷ with the remaining families confined to the Old City under Israeli military control. PCIs continued to live under military jurisdiction until 1966. PCI residents from the Old City, along with PCIs from surrounding villages, began to move into the HaMerkaz.³⁸ Meanwhile, the Shikun neighborhood housed a continual wave of Jewish immigrants: first Mizrahi³⁹ (1950’s-1960’s), and then later Jews of Soviet origin (1970’s and

³³The Old City is what remains of a former walled Crusader city.

³⁴See Falah 1996 and Central Bureau of Statistics 2011.

³⁵Literally “neighborhood” in Hebrew.

³⁶Torstrick 2000, p.52.

³⁷Morris 2004, p. 229.

³⁸Torstrick 2000, p.72-73.

³⁹Literally ‘Eastern Jews.’ This is the term for Jews from Arab lands.

again in 1990's).⁴⁰ More recently, the Shikun has seen an influx of Religious Zionists and former Jewish settlers from Gaza after the 2005 disengagement from Gaza.

Acre holds a unique position in Israel. It is a mixed city with a Jewish majority located in the Northern District of Israel. The Northern District is the only district in Israel with a PCI majority.⁴¹ This unique geographic and demographic position has made it a continual focal point and barometer for Jewish-PCI tension.⁴² For example, in 1969 the arrest of six PCI residents of Acre suspected of terrorism and sabotage led to rioting by the city's Jewish residents. Local police had to intervene to stop Jewish residents from marching on the Old City.⁴³ In 1986, against the backdrop of the First Intifadah, several PCI youths attacked a local police station and freed three prisoners in retaliation for the appointment of a perceived anti-PCI special adviser to Acre on tourism.⁴⁴ More recently in October 2000, Acre was one of the cities in Israel rocked by violent confrontations between Israeli police and PCIs at the start of the Second Intifada.⁴⁵ Acre is of particular interest to researchers of group anger and the legacy of intergroup violence because of the four nights of rioting during and after Yom Kippur in 2008.

2.2 Yom Kippur Riots

Around midnight on October 8, 2008, on the eve of Yom Kippur, a young PCI resident of Acre, Taufik Jamal, drove through the predominately Jewish neighborhood of Shuknah Burla in the Shikun.⁴⁶ He was reportedly playing loud music from his car.⁴⁷ To some Jewish residents of the local housing complex, Jamal's actions were deliberately provocative. One of those young Jewish male residents recounted, "he (Jamal) was mocking us on our holiest day...this is a Jewish state!"⁴⁸ Jewish youths from the lower income apartment complex stopped Jamal's car and attacked him.⁴⁹

⁴⁰Falah 1996.

⁴¹Central Bureau of Statistics 2011.

⁴²Izenberg October 23, 2008; Torstrick 2000; The Mossawa Center December 2008.

⁴³Torstrick 2000, p. 74-75.

⁴⁴Rudge 8 September 1986.

⁴⁵Bennett September 1, 2003.

⁴⁶The particular area of Shuknah Burla, Yehuda Alkalai Street is comprised of low-income, housing projects belonging to the Amidar public housing company Torstrick 2000.

⁴⁷The Mossawa Center December 2008, p. 9.

⁴⁸Author interview July 27, 2011 Acre, Israel.

⁴⁹<http://www.jpost.com/Features/FrontLines/Article.aspx?id=118150>

He then fled into a PCI family friend's home awaiting the arrival of the police. More Jewish youths circled the apartment throwing stones and chanting anti-Arab slogans.⁵⁰ Around 4:00 AM, erroneous rumors spread through the Old City that Jamal had been killed.⁵¹ Palestinian youths then left the Old City and proceeded to HaMerkaz with knives and stones. They vandalized, torched and broke into Jewish shops. The following night Jewish youths responded by torching Arab-owned businesses and burned at least three PCI homes, despite a heavy police presence.⁵² One PCI resident who had family members injured describes his experience:

“My friends and I simply went to the city center (HaMerkaz) to make sure our family and friends were OK...we were caught in the middle of the riot police and the Magav (Israeli Border Police). The police used tear gas on us more than the Jews, even though they (the Jews) were causing most of the problems...my aunt was hit by a rubber bullet in the leg. The next day all exits from the (walled) Old City were monitored by heavily-armed Magav guys and they scared all of us. The police and the mayor (Shimon Lanrki) always take the Jews' side.”⁵³

Approximately 50-60 individuals were arrested, including Jamal, the PCI motorist who drove through the Shikun.⁵⁴ Thirty homes were damaged, three PCI homes in the Shikun beyond repair, and over one hundred cars and eighty shops (both PCI and Jewish) were vandalized.⁵⁵ The riots lasted for a total of four nights, and left many residents and observers wondering how the city could so quickly spiral into violence.⁵⁶

The Yom Kippur Riots had resonance beyond Jewish-PCI relations in Acre. The riots led to renewed calls from right-wing Israelis for a “Loyalty Law,” where PCIs would be forced to swear loyalty to the Jewish state or be stripped of citizenship.⁵⁷ A Knesset investigation into the cause of the riots led many Israelis to question the position of the minority PCIs in a Jewish state. Left-wing

⁵⁰The Mossawa Center December 2008 and author interview July 27, 2011 Acre, Israel.

⁵¹Kershner 2008; The Mossawa Center December 2008.

⁵²Raved 2008.

⁵³Author interview August 9, 2011 Acre, Israel.

⁵⁴BBC News 2008.

⁵⁵The Mossawa Center December 2008, p.16.

⁵⁶Susser 2008.

⁵⁷Peraino 2009.

and Arab Members of the Knesset (MKs) blamed the Jewish youths who attacked the motorist and the influx of Religious Zionists associated with the Hesder Yeshiva for exacerbating tensions in the city. Right-wing MKs argued that the Arab citizens of Acre should be punished.⁵⁸ On October 26, two weeks after the riots ended, the offices of the Hesder Yeshiva of Acre, a Religious Zionist affiliated institution, which combines Talmudic study with military service, were set on fire by three PCIs. The riots also led to renewed calls from right-wing Israelis for a “Loyalty Law,” where PCIs would be forced to swear loyalty to the Jewish state or be stripped of citizenship.⁵⁹ The riots have continued to be a source of friction between PCIs in Acre, as tensions over housing and economic development continue to be framed in terms of the Yom Kippur Riots.⁶⁰ In the next section I describe my experiment that seeks to uncover how anger over the riots influences present-day group conflict in Acre.

3 Experiment

3.1 Overview and Recruitment

To measure the effect of priming anger over the 2008 Yom Kippur Riots on intergroup conflict between Jews and PCIs in Acre, I conducted an experiment that manipulated anger over the riots and then had residents of Acre play a behavioral economics game. In the game, subjects chose to divide income between themselves and partners from different neighborhoods. Neighborhoods were selected to serve as a signal of their partners’ ethnicities. The division of income structure of the game built on previous games where subjects divided income between groups.⁶¹ However, in my experiment subjects made a trade-off between maximizing the joint income with their partner (social welfare), or maximizing their own income (relative differences). The *Conventional Wisdom* suggests that subjects primed for anger over the riots, both Jews and PCIs should be more altruistic to their ingroup members and less altruistic to outgroup members (compared to subjects not primed

⁵⁸Lavi 2008.

⁵⁹Peraino 2009.

⁶⁰See <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/24/israel-historic-city-acre-tensions> and <http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/acre-jews-protest-sale-of-home-to-arabs-raising-ethnic-tensions-premium-1.507993>

⁶¹Brewer 1979; Whitt and Wilson 2007.

for anger). In addition to the behavioral economics game, I had subjects complete a post-experiment survey that gauged political attitudes and their level of exposure to the riots.

Male residents of Acre participated in the study in July and August of 2011.⁶² They were sampled from three neighborhoods in Acre with differing percentages of Jewish (PCI) residents.⁶³ The three neighborhoods and their geographic boundaries according to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics⁶⁴ are the Old City, the City Center (HaMerkaz), and Shuknah Burla in the Shikun. The neighborhoods were selected for two reasons. (1) As Table 1 shows they provide natural variation in ethnicity. (2) The neighborhoods also corresponded to those neighborhoods largely affected by the riots.⁶⁵ A map of the neighborhoods including enumeration areas is shown in Figure 1:




Figure 1: Neighborhoods Surveyed in Acre

The demographic characteristics of each neighborhood are presented in Table 1.

Subjects were sampled proportional to population and ethnic group percentage in each of the three neighborhoods demarcated on the map in Figure 1.⁶⁶ Each neighborhood was divided into

⁶²I wanted to include females in my sample. However, residents with local knowledge of Acre were worried that conservative females would not participate or freely express their views. Additionally, most acts of aggression are committed by males, so excluding females does not greatly reduce the external validity of this study.

⁶³There are two principal ethnic groups—Jews and PCIs—in Acre. So the absence of one group signifies the presence of the other: $\%Jewish=100-\%PCI$.

⁶⁴Central Bureau of Statistics 2011

⁶⁵The riot began in Shuknah Burla, and then spreading to the HaMerkaz and the Old City. This information was compiled from author interviews with residents of Acre and The Mossawa Center December 2008; BBC News 2008 news accounts.

⁶⁶In discussions with local representatives, I avoided sampling Jews from the Old City and PCIs from Shuknah

| Characteristic | <i>Shuknah Burla</i> | <i>HaMerkaz</i> | <i>Old City</i> |
|-----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| % Jewish | 93.8 | 51.9 | 3.5 |
| % of Jews Born in Israel | 63.7 | 54.6 | — |
| Population in Thousands | 3.8 | 5.4 | 3.6 |
| Households in Thousands | 1.2 | 1.8 | 0.9 |
| Median Male Age | 29.0 | 29.0 | 28.0 |
| % Matriculation (Educ.) | 50.5 | 38.8 | 34.2 |
| % Labor Force Participation | 69.6 | 60.5 | 39.9 |

Table 1: **Neighborhood Characteristics Based on the 2008 Census**

three geographical enumeration areas of roughly equal population size. Survey assistants (SAs) were then given a map of each enumeration area and sampled proportional to population, selecting every fourth household. SAs only surveyed households of their given ethnicity. For instance, Jewish SAs surveyed the Jewish households and PCI SAs surveyed the PCI households. Mixed survey teams (one Jewish SA and one PCI SA) surveyed the HaMerkaz.⁶⁹ Surveys were given in Arabic to PCIs and Hebrew to Jewish residents of Acre. There were difficulties with low response rates among Jews living in the HaMerkaz and Jewish immigrants with Hebrew difficulties. A survey company, the Mahshov Institute, was hired to contact remaining Jewish households from a landline sampling frame to schedule appointments and provide translators where needed. The experimental protocol proceeded in exactly the same way as in the door-to-door sample, with subjects being surveyed in their home face-to-face; the only difference was the mode of contact.⁷⁰

Eligible respondents had to be males between the age of 22-65.⁷¹ All selected households were

Burla. This was done for three reasons. (1) The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics only presents the dominant percentage of each religious group. (2) Following the riots, several PCI families have moved out of Shuknah Burla,⁶⁷ so the percentage of Jews is higher than the 2008 census statistics⁶⁸ would suggest in Table 1. (3) Finally, the very small minority of Jews and PCIs that live in outgroup-dominated neighborhoods are likely to be different than Jews or PCIs who reside in the other neighborhoods.

⁶⁹Only the SA of a given ethnicity knocked on the door in HaMerkaz. Ex ante, SAs were able to correctly identify the vast majority of apartments and homes in HaMerkaz (using surname or other religious characteristics).

⁷⁰There can be problems with collecting a sample using multiple modes (i.e. door-to-door vs. a landline sampling frame). The *Supplementary Information* discusses this in greater detail.

⁷¹The minimum age of 22 was put in place to insure that Jews included in the survey would have finished their compulsory military service at the time of the survey. I also did not restrict the sample to men ages 18-35, or

visited between 5:00PM-10:00PM, to avoid skewing the sample towards unemployed individuals. Selected households were approached twice more if no one was home on the first visit, for three total visits. Within selected households, eligible males were randomly chosen via a Kish grid.⁷² Prospective respondents were asked if they would like to participate in a study on community relations in Acre where they could earn between 20 and 76 Shekels (approximately 5 to 20 USD). If they assented, then the experimental protocol began. If they did not, the next household was substituted using the same randomization procedure. The response rate broken down by ethnicity and mode is presented in Table 2 below.

| Neighborhood | PCI | | Jews | | |
|--------------|------------|---------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| | # Subjects | Response Rate (Door-to-Door) | #Subjects | Response Rate (Door-to-Door) | Response Rate (Phone) |
| Burla | — | — | 89 | 23.9% | 16.2% |
| Merkaz | 63 | 67.7% | 61 | 18.9% | 14.5% |
| Old City | 84 | 77.8% | — | — | — |
| <i>Total</i> | 147 | | 150 | | |

Table 2: **Number of Subjects Recruited (by Neighborhood and Ethnicity) and Response Rate (by Mode)**

As Table 2 shows, the response rate was significantly higher for PCIs as compared to Jews. This is partially due to opportunity cost: on average, Jewish residents of Acre are wealthier than PCI residents.⁷³ One concern may be that any difference in experimental behavior between Jews and PCIs may be due to group economic differences in respondents rather than ethnicity, so I also include controls for employment status. Additionally, I construct post-stratification weights for Jews to correct for low response among immigrants.⁷⁴

even younger for two reasons. (1) The current study is about the broader political impact of anger over past ethnic violence, not who is most likely to participate in ethnic violence (i.e. younger men). (2) I am able to compare how the most aggressive men—those who are hypothesized to be most likely to participate—compare to the less aggressive men. In Section 5.4, I do precisely this and find the results are largely driven by the most aggressive men.

⁷²Kish 1949.

⁷³Central Bureau of Statistics 2011.

⁷⁴Further discussion of sampling and the use of post-stratification weights is discussed in the *Supplementary Information*.

3.2 Experimental Protocol

The experiment lasted about 20-30 minutes.⁷⁵ During the experiment subjects were asked to go to a quiet corner of their household where they would be free to answer questions without interference. The survey was self-administered. The protocol began with a short background demographic survey. Following the background survey, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two emotional manipulations: an *Anger Treatment* or a *Neutral Condition*.⁷⁶ The manipulation is derived by social psychologist⁷⁷ and has been used extensively in political psychology.⁷⁸ The manipulations showed subjects a picture and asked them to write about what makes them angry about the riots in the *Anger Condition*, or write about tourism in the *Neutral Condition*. In the *Anger Treatment* subjects were presented with the following information:

Brief Background Statistics on the 2008 Acre Riots

**Began on Yom Kippur Eve (Kol Nidre).*

**Lasted four nights (October 8th-11th)*

**700 extra police officers were deployed*

**Between 60-70 people were arrested*

**The estimated damage from the riots was about 10 million shekels (NIS)*

They were also shown the picture of a rioter being restrained in Figure 2.⁷⁹ They were then asked to complete the following:

The 2008 Acre Riots caused people to feel a lot of emotions. We are interested in what made

⁷⁵See **Supplementary Information** contains the sampling design, experiment, survey protocol, instructions, and all survey questions.

⁷⁶Figure 6 in the Appendix presents the randomization check for the *Anger Treatment*. It shows that the treatment was orthogonal to demographic characteristics (age, neighborhood of residence, post-stratification weights). All sensitive questions (riot exposure and intergroup attitudes) were asked post-treatment to avoid priming the riots before the behavioral experiment. Figure 6 shows that the *Anger Treatment* does not influence responses on these sensitive questions.

⁷⁷Ekman 1992.

⁷⁸Lerner, Gonzalez, Small and Fischhoff 2003; Myers and Tingley 2011; Zeitzoff 2012.

⁷⁹There may be a concern that the picture of the rioter in Figure 2 was easily identified as being Jewish or PCI. Interviews with local residents suggested this was not the case, as answers varied on his ethnicity (Jewish/PCI). Given the large Mizrahi Jewish population in Acre, it is not easy to visually distinguish between secular PCIs and Jews.



Figure 2: A rioter being restrained after confronting Acre police
Photo by Uriel Sinai/Getty Images

and continues to make you most ANGRY about the riots. Please describe in detail the one thing that made and still makes you most ANGRY about these riots. Write as detailed a description of that one thing (that made you most angry) as possible. If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might even get ANGRY from learning about the riots.⁸⁰

In the *Neutral Condition*, subjects were asked to write about their thoughts and feelings on a more neutral topic, tourism, and presented with the picture in Figure 3.

Background on the City of Acres attractions

**Recognized by the United Nations as a “World Heritage Site” for its great significance to the World’s cultural heritage*

**Over 444,000 tourists visit the city each year*

**Beautiful beaches for fishing, swimming, and relaxing*

**Internationally famous fish and traditional hummus restaurants*

Acre has a lot to offer visitors and tourists, including wonderful beaches, restaurants and historical sites. Tourism to Acre helps everybody and brings a lot of money to the city and local businesses. We are interested in what you think the City of Acre could do to make the city even more attractive to tourists. Improve the beaches? Better conservation of historical sites? Better

⁸⁰The *Anger Treatment* is intentionally agnostic of the target of the anger in order to get a baseline measure of the effect of anger on intergroup conflict. Looking at calls to action or emotional endorsements by politicians (such as Bullock, Imai and Shapiro 2011) represent an important future avenue of research.



Figure 3: **View of Acre**

Photo by <http://www.crown-tours.com/city.html>

advertising for the restaurants? More museums? Please write what you think below.

The *Neutral Condition* and *Anger Treatment* were carefully designed to provide a comparison between priming anger over the riots and a neutral stimulus that was orthogonal to the riots. I pre-tested a variety of different primes including a *Riot Only* condition—which only mentioned the riots, but did not attempt to manipulate anger as in the *Anger Treatment*. However, the *Riot Only* treatment also elevated anger comparable to the *Anger Treatment*. In using the current design, *Anger Treatment* versus *Neutral Condition*, I am adhering to extant theories of ethnic conflict. This research⁸¹ do not argue that it is simply anger that drives ethnic conflict, rather *anger over past ethnic violence* (i.e. the *Anger Treatment*). I then test this against a treatment orthogonal to the riot (the *Neutral Condition*) and that is salient to both Jews and PCIs—tourism in Acre.⁸²

After subjects completed the emotional manipulation, they were given a brief manipulation check of questions asking how angry/afraid (other emotions as well) they felt at that moment. They then were confronted with a monetary decision on how to divide income between themselves and other subjects designated as their partners.⁸³ This decision was framed as a one-shot interaction:

⁸¹Petersen 2002; Horowitz 2001.

⁸²See <http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/when-acre-goes-boutique-1.421651>. Furthermore, the prime was designed to elicit anger over the riots in an ethical way by not using deception or inflammatory language that could potentially exacerbate intergroup tensions in Acre.

⁸³They were told that there was “some chance that your decision will go to another subject from the specified

they were told that their partner had no input to the decision, and would not influence how much money they received. Subjects were told nothing more about their three potential partners, other than that they were males, aged 22-65 from the three different neighborhoods also participating in the game. Subjects were given two forms. One was a neighborhood form that contained a list of the three neighborhoods (Old City, HaMerkaz, Burla) in randomized order (1,2,3) to prevent order effects. Each neighborhood was assigned a number (*Neighborhood 1, Neighborhood 2...etc.*). To prevent experimenter bias, SAs never saw the neighborhood form, only the form that contained the subjects' choices and the neighborhood numbers.

Subjects were also given a separate sheet of paper that contained three decision tables as shown in Table 3 (one for each neighborhood). They were informed that each row represented a choice of how many shekels they wanted to take away from their partner and add to their own income. Subjects made three choices: one for each neighborhood. They were told that they would randomly be paid for one of these choices. This random payoff was used to increase the salience of the choices subjects made by increasing their monetary value.⁸⁴ Subjects started with 20 shekels and their potential partner with 40 shekels. For every 5 shekels they took away from their partner they were able to keep 2 shekels and 3 were 'lost.' Taking away shekels not only imposed a cost on the partner, but also on society, as 60% of the shekels taken were destroyed. Subjects faced a trade-off between maximizing their own income, take 36 shekels for themselves and giving their partner nothing, or maximizing social welfare, give 40 shekels to their partner and 20 shekels for themselves. For each row, they kept the amount in the column that says "My final income" and their partner got the income in the far right column ("My partner's final income"). For each of their three partners from the three neighborhoods, they placed an "X" in the row next to their choice in the choice column as shown in Table 3.

The key question is how does the *Anger Treatment* influence how much subjects allocate to each neighborhood in the game." The words "some chance" were used as opposed to "certainty" to avoid deception. Each subjects' decisions were put into bags that had a chance of being drawn by future participants (hence the use of "some chance"). All decisions actually had chances of being drawn by individuals. The last participants choices were included in a bag and drawn by males 22-65 from the assigned neighborhoods. It is true that this introduces uncertainty into subjects' decisions. Yet, logistically and ethically this was the preferable way to conduct this experiment.

⁸⁴Morton and Williams 2010, p. 279.

of their partners? Previous research in social psychology and political science⁸⁵ would suggest that in the absence of group identity, a slightly more than a 50-50 split in favor of the subject making the decision would be the average strategy (26, 25 split in Table 3). Deviations from this strategy, where subjects allocate higher amounts to partners from ingroup neighborhoods and lower amounts to those from outgroup neighborhoods, would suggest norms of discrimination and high levels of intergroup conflict. Some might disagree with this interpretation of discrimination as a measure of intergroup conflict, saying that discrimination and conflict are separate processes.⁸⁶ I argue that a greater willingness to take income from an anonymous partner is an aggressive act, albeit at a much lower level⁸⁷ than participation in ethnic violence. Moreover, a key difference from other behavioral economics games is that the more money taken in the game, the more the total amount of income shrinks. The increasing social costs in the game further highlights the aggressive nature of the decision to take money.⁸⁸

| Choice for Neighborhood 1 | How much I take from my partner | How much I add to my own income | My final income | My partners final income |
|----------------------------------|--|--|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| | 0 shekels | 0 shekels | 20 shekels | 40 shekels |
| | 5 shekels | 2 shekels | 22 shekels | 35 shekels |
| | 10 shekels | 4 shekels | 24 shekels | 30 shekels |
| | 15 shekels | 6 shekels | 26 shekels | 25 shekels |
| | 20 shekels | 8 shekels | 28 shekels | 20 shekels |
| | 25 shekels | 10 shekels | 30 shekels | 15 shekels |
| | 30 shekels | 12 shekels | 32 shekels | 10 shekels |
| | 35 shekels | 14 shekels | 34 shekels | 5 shekels |
| | 40 shekels | 16 shekels | 36 shekels | 0 shekels |

Table 3: **Monetary Choices**

After filling out the decision tables, subjects completed a survey that gauged their perceptions about their potential partners from the three different neighborhoods, their political attitudes, and their exposure to the 2008 riots. After a subject filled out the survey, he randomly drew one set of numbers each from two separate bags. The first bags contained the numbers 1-3 on small sheets of paper. Whichever number (N) they drew from the first bag they were paid the amount

⁸⁵Brewer 1979; Whitt and Wilson 2007.

⁸⁶Brewer 1999.

⁸⁷Burnham 2007; Millet and Dewitte 2009; McDermott, Tingley, Cowden, Frazzetto and Johnson 2009.

⁸⁸Bosman and Van Winden 2002.

that corresponded to the division of income they made for neighborhood N . The second bag they drew from contained allocations from subjects who had previously made decisions for subjects their neighborhood. Subjects drew a number from this bag also. They were paid the sum of these two amounts: their decision for neighborhood N and someone who had previously played the game.⁸⁹ The average payoff to a subject was 52.7 shekels (NIS).⁹⁰

4 Sample Characteristics and Manipulation Checks

4.1 Sample Characteristics

| | <i>Shuknah Burla</i> (Jews) | <i>HaMerkaz</i> (Jews) (PCIs) | <i>Old City</i> (PCIs) |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| Average Age | 41.4 | 44.4 | 38.2 |
| % Born in Israel (Jews) | 69.7 | 68.9 | — |
| %Matriculation Cert. | 55.1 | 41.0 | 73.0 |
| % Participate in Labor Force | 73.0 | 62.3 | 85.7 |
| Riot Exposure | 1.07 | 1.12 | 0.52 |
| Total # of Subjects | 89 | 61 | 63 |

Table 4: Mean Sample Demographics by Neighborhood and Ethnicity

Table 4 presents the mean sample demographics for Jews and PCIs broken down by neighborhood. On average the PCI sample is younger than the Jewish sample. PCIs in HaMerkaz have average higher levels of education and labor force participation than any of the other neighborhoods.⁹¹

Subjects were asked in the post-experiment survey whether they, their family or any of their close friends suffered physical harm or property damage as a result of the riots. Each subject was assigned a *Riot Exposure* score based on the sum of the degree of closeness to someone exposed to physical harm and/or property damage from the riots. Closer relations with someone who was

⁸⁹To avoid cuing concerns about reciprocity, subjects were not informed about receiving income from someone who had previously played the experiment until after they completed the final survey.

⁹⁰This was equal to \$15.28 USD at an exchange rate of 3.45 NIS to \$1 USD.

⁹¹I chose to use labor force participation in place of income, as there is a fair amount of missing income data ($\approx 10\%$). Conversely, there is no missing data on labor force participation, there is a high correlation ≈ 0.6 between income and labor force participation, and Central Bureau of Statistics 2011 gives labor force participation data, but not income data broken down by neighborhood.

injured and/or suffered property damage were assigned higher scores.⁹² Subjects in the Old City report higher levels of physical riot exposure than the other neighborhoods. For a full list of the variables and descriptive statistics used in the analysis see Table 9 in the Appendix.

4.2 Perception of Group Membership

The first relevant manipulation is to see if each neighborhood properly signaled its group affiliation to subjects.⁹³ In the post-experiment survey subjects were asked for each neighborhood—Old City, HaMerkaz, and Shuknah Burla—what they thought was the percentage of Jews (outgroup member for PCIs and ingroup for Jews) living in each neighborhood. Both Jews and PCIs accurately gauged the rank ordering of the percentage Jews by neighborhood (i.e. Shuknah Burla > HaMerkaz > Old City in terms of the percentage of Jews), and both groups fairly accurately assessed the correct percentages. Both Jews and PCIs recognized that Shuknah Burla had greater number of Jews than HaMerkaz (for PCIs $M = 25.6$ and $p < 0.001$ and for Jews $M = 26.3$ and $p < 0.001$). They also were cognizant that HaMerkaz had greater number of Jews than the Old City (for PCIs $M = 48.8$ and $p < 0.001$ and for Jews $M = 40.1$ and $p < 0.001$). Finally, Jews and PCIs both correctly perceived that Shuknah Burla had a greater number of Jews than the Old City (for PCIs $M = 74.3$ and $p < 0.001$ and Jews $M = 66.4$ and $p < 0.001$).⁹⁴

4.3 Anger Manipulation

The second relevant manipulation to explore is the effect of the *Anger Treatment*. To test whether the *Anger Treatment* changes subjects' reported anger relative to the *Neutral Condition*, I construct a t -test with unequal variances. For the emotional manipulation to be successful, subjects in the *Anger Treatment* should report higher levels of anger than subjects in the *Neutral Condition*.⁹⁵ Anger is measured using the sum of self-reported angry, hostile, and furious feelings in the manip-

⁹²For instance someone who personally suffered property damage and a member of their extended family was injured in the riots would receive a score of $4+1=5$. Additional discussion of *Riot Exposure*, its correlations, and robustness to alternate coding is presented in the *Supplementary Information*.

⁹³Controlling for each subject's perception of the percentage of ingroup members living in a neighborhood does not change the results presented in Table 5 (see *Supplementary Information*)

⁹⁴These are from two-tailed t -tests of % Jewish (X) in each neighborhood (i, j) are equal $X_i = X_j$. So $M = X_i - X_j$

⁹⁵Where M is the difference in reported levels of Anger in the *Anger Condition* relative to *Neutral Condition*.

ulation check following the emotional treatments on 5-point scale.⁹⁶ Jews reported higher levels of anger in the *Anger Treatment* than the *Neutral Condition* ($M = 1.99$ and $p < 0.001$). The *Anger Treatment* was also effective in manipulating levels of anger for PCIs ($M = 2.24$ and $p < 0.0001$).⁹⁷

5 Results

5.1 Treatment Effects

There are two key questions: (1) are Jews and PCIs more altruistic to their ingroup and biased against the outgroup (discrimination), and (2) what is the effect of the *Anger Treatment* on contributions across the different neighborhoods (groups)?




Figure 4: **Mean Contribution for Each Neighborhood (By Ethnic Group)**

Bars represent 95% Confidence Intervals

⁹⁶The manipulation check asked “Thinking about yourself and how feel, to what extent do you feel this way NOW.” The emotional scale was from (1) “not at all” to (5) “completely”

⁹⁷I measured levels of fear in the manipulation check and for PCIs, it marginally raised reported levels of fear ($M = 0.28$ and $p < 0.12$). However, in mediation analysis (not shown), the treatment effects are not mediated via fear for PCIs.

Figure 4 examines how much subjects choose to give to their partners comparing Jews to PCIs across both the *Anger Treatment* and *Neutral Condition*.⁹⁸ It is clear from Section 4.2 that subjects recognized neighborhood as a signal of group identity. Figure 4 further shows that there is a strong norm of discrimination along group (neighborhood) lines for both Jews and PCIs. Jews favor their predominately ingroup neighborhoods by contributing more to Shuknah Burla ($M = 12.6$ and $p < 0.001$)⁹⁹ than PCIs. PCIs do the same by contributing more to the Old City than Jews ($M = -15.6$ and $p < 0.001$).

The pattern of discrimination holds when I only examine individuals who live in the mixed HaMerkaz.¹⁰⁰ PCIs from the Hamerkaz are even more discriminatory against the Jewish neighborhood of Shuknah Burla ($M = 17.2$ $p < 0.001$) than residents of the Old City. Additionally, PCIs contribute more to the PCI neighborhood of the Old City ($M = 6.70$ $p < 0.005$) than Jews do.

The results from Figure 4 demonstrate that the neighborhood manipulation correctly signals ingroup and outgroup affiliation and subsequent discriminatory behavior. For the remainder of the paper, I define ingroup contributions as Jewish contributions to Shuknah Burla and PCI contributions to the Old City. Conversely, outgroup contributions are defined as Jewish contributions to the Old City and PCI contributions to Shuknah Burla. For both Jews and PCIs, contributions to the ethnically mixed neighborhood of HaMerkaz are referred to as “mixed” due to their ambiguous ethnic status.

How does the *Anger Treatment* influence subjects’ contributions between their ingroup and outgroup? Figure 5 reports the treatment effects by looking at the difference in means (two-tailed t -test with unequal variance) for subjects’ contributions to their ingroup, mixed neighborhood (HaMerkaz), outgroup, and discrimination (the difference between ingroup and outgroup contributions) for those in the *Anger Treatment* versus those in the *Neutral Condition*.

From the Figure 5, the *Anger Treatment* appears to decrease contributions for all the neighborhoods and quantities of interest. The raw average treatment effects (ATE and black estimates in Figure 5) for the mixed ($M = 1.65$ and $p < 0.198$) and outgroup ($M = 0.868$ and $p < 0.583$)

⁹⁸A histogram of the distribution of contributions on ethnicities across neighborhoods is shown in Figure 9 in the Appendix.

⁹⁹ $M = J_i - PCI_i$ where J is how much Jews contribute and PCI is how much PCIs contribute to neighborhood i .

¹⁰⁰This separates group-based decisions from subjects “just being nice to their neighbors.”




Figure 5: **Treatment Effect of Anger on Contributions**

Bars represent 95% Confidence Intervals. The estimate with the black bars shows the raw difference in means across the *Anger Treatment*. The estimates with the blue bars present an OLS estimate for the *Anger Treatment* controlling for the sample design (dummy variable for Jewish, neighborhood of residency) include post-stratification weights for Jews.

neighborhoods, as well as discrimination ($M = 1.31$ and $p < 0.440$) between ingroup and outgroup are not significantly different from 0. However, the *Anger Treatment* does lower contributions to the ingroup ($M = 2.18$ and $p < 0.083$)—albeit at a marginal level of significance. The blue bars are OLS estimates of the *Anger Treatment* that include sample controls (Jewish and neighborhood of residency) and post-stratification weights to correct for the low response among Jewish subgroups. The treatment effects controlling for the sample design, show the same negative effect as the raw ATE (point estimate), but improve the efficiency. Both the raw ATE and effect with sample design controls suggest that contrary to the *Conventional Wisdom*, the *Anger Treatment* led to a decrease in altruism to both ingroup and outgroup members. Priming anger over the riots does not appear to increase discrimination. In the subsequent analysis, I control for relevant variables such as riot exposure to gain efficiency and explore heterogenous treatment effects.

5.2 Pooled Results

Given that the dependent variable (contribution decisions) is truncated between 0 NIS and 40 NIS, a Tobit model is used to model subjects' choice decision to each neighborhood.¹⁰¹ Table 5 presents the pooled model for subjects' contributions to the various neighborhoods: ingroup, mixed, outgroup, along with discrimination (difference between ingroup and outgroup). For each of the four quantities of interest I present two models. The first model contains only the principle variables of interest (bold above the horizontal line). A second model includes the additional controls (below the horizontal line). I also include post-stratification weights for Jewish respondents to correct for the potential threats to inference from the low response rate among Jewish immigrants. These weights were constructed using marginals from 2008 Israel Census¹⁰² for the percentage of Jews in the *Labor Force, Born in Israel*, and those that have a matriculation certificate *Education* for each neighborhood with Jews (HaMerkaz and Shuknah Burla).¹⁰³

The *Anger Treatment* decreases subjects' contributions across the different neighborhoods. However, it has the greatest magnitude and highest significance at an ingroup-level. Priming anger over the riots does not seem to increase ingroup contributions or discrimination against the outgroup. Jews also contribute less to their ingroup neighborhood than PCIs do—and this is also reflected in their lower levels of discrimination (negative signs on *Jewish* in Columns 1, 2, 7, and 8). The effect of *Riot Exposure*—whether an individual or their friends and family were injured or had property damaged in the riots—increases allocations to individuals from an ingroup and increased discrimination towards the outgroup.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹Greene 2008.

¹⁰²Central Bureau of Statistics 2011.

¹⁰³The results are robust to using the unweighted data. A full discussion of the effects of survey response rate, mode of contact among the Jews, and sample weights are presented in the *Supplementary Information*.

¹⁰⁴It would be naive to assume that riot exposure is completely exogenous. Scacco 2009; Beber, Roessler and Scacco 2012 show that younger men with lower opportunity costs (e.g. unemployed), are more likely to participate in riots. In the *Supplementary Information* I use matching to explore the robustness of the findings for the *Anger Treatment* and *Riot Exposure*. The findings are robust, and match those in Table 5.

Dep. Variable: Contribution by Neighborhood

| Variable | Ingroup (1) | Ingroup (2) | Mixed (3) | Mixed (4) | Outgroup (5) | Outgroup (6) | Discrim. (7) | Discrim. (8) |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| Anger Treatment | -4.54** (1.89) | -4.04** (1.81) | -2.86* (1.64) | -3.19** (1.61) | -3.04 (2.73) | -4.03+ (2.67) | -1.26 (1.84) | -0.43 (1.77) |
| HaMerkaz | -7.73*** (1.99) | -6.10*** (1.79) | -2.39 (1.70) | -0.98 (1.67) | -5.68** (2.83) | -3.99 (2.84) | -2.26 (1.82) | -2.47 (1.80) |
| Jewish | -7.41*** (1.93) | -7.55*** (2.12) | 0.23 (1.66) | 0.095 (1.94) | 0.79 (2.73) | 1.37 (2.92) | -5.74*** (1.84) | -6.58*** (2.12) |
| Riot Exposure | 1.53** (0.60) | 1.72*** (0.55) | 0.30 (0.49) | 0.57 (0.46) | -0.56 (0.84) | -0.35 (0.82) | 1.35** (0.53) | 1.37** (0.53) |
| Age | | 0.063 (0.36) | | 0.35 (0.32) | | 0.62 (0.53) | | -0.34 (0.37) |
| Labor Force | | -1.13 (2.04) | | -1.34 (1.82) | | -4.68+ (3.02) | | 3.17+ (1.93) |
| Bagrut | | 1.67 (1.79) | | -1.47 (1.72) | | -1.01 (2.77) | | 1.77 (1.76) |
| Political Ingroup | | 0.48*** (0.17) | | 0.26+ (0.16) | | 0.31 (0.27) | | 0.12 (0.16) |
| Outgroup Favors Coex. | | 0.93*** (0.29) | | 0.54* (0.30) | | 0.93* (0.49) | | 0.099 (0.33) |
| Physical Aggression | | 0.56 (0.45) | | 0.29 (0.43) | | -0.69 (0.65) | | 0.72+ (0.44) |
| Contact | | -0.065 (0.070) | | 0.024 (0.067) | | 0.32*** (0.10) | | -0.26*** (0.072) |
| Constant | 38.2*** (2.27) | 28.1*** (4.38) | 24.2*** (1.82) | 18.0*** (3.57) | 14.3*** (3.04) | 5.29 (6.56) | 17.4*** (2.12) | 16.3*** (4.24) |
| σ | 14.8*** (1.05) | 13.6*** (1.00) | 13.6*** (0.88) | 13.0*** (0.87) | 21.7*** (1.49) | 20.7*** (1.44) | 15.5*** (0.72) | 14.7*** (0.74) |
| N | 294 | 285 | 294 | 285 | 294 | 285 | 294 | 285 |
| Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$) | 11 | 9 | 26 | 24 | 98 | 93 | 2 | 2 |
| Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$) | 94 | 91 | 38 | 37 | 30 | 30 | 31 | 29 |

+ $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Pooled Contributions (Weighted Tobit Model)

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed using data from Central Bureau of Statistics 2011.

Another concern may be that the Yom Kippur Riots led certain individuals (i.e. those in the mixed HaMerkaz) to leave their neighborhood and move to another one. This type of sorting behavior would be correlated with riot exposure and may bias results. The findings for the *Anger Treatment* and *Riot Exposure* are robust to only including subjects who have lived in their neighborhood since before the riot (see *Supplementary Information*).

5.3 Disaggregated Results

Jews and PCIs hold very different positions within Israeli and Acre society. Jews hold more positions of power in politics and civil society, and on average, have higher levels of education and income. PCIs—as a minority in a Jewish state—are more marginalized.¹⁰⁵ Given these group-based differences, it is useful to see if PCIs and Jews responded differently to the *Anger Treatment*. Therefore, I disaggregate Jewish and PCI contributions and analyze them separately.

¹⁰⁵Smooha 1990.

Dep. Variable: Jewish Contribution by Neighborhood

| Variable | Ingroup (1) | Ingroup (2) | Mixed (3) | Mixed (4) | Outgroup (5) | Outgroup (6) | Discrim. (7) | Discrim. (8) |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Anger Treatment | -4.25* (2.30) | -3.18+ (2.06) | -2.68 (2.16) | -1.57 (2.07) | -1.02 (3.70) | 0.033 (3.39) | -2.53 (2.37) | -2.58 (2.29) |
| HaMerkaz | -4.48* (2.40) | -2.79 (2.22) | 1.89 (2.14) | 2.65 (1.94) | 6.76* (3.79) | 6.72* (3.42) | -8.01*** (2.22) | -6.73*** (2.27) |
| Riot Exposure | 0.33 (0.91) | 1.06 (0.81) | -0.17 (0.80) | 0.83 (0.73) | -0.45 (1.29) | 0.83 (1.13) | 0.50 (0.68) | 0.32 (0.77) |
| Born in Israel | | 2.82 (2.65) | | 0.96 (2.49) | | 6.85* (3.99) | | -2.29 (2.66) |
| Age | | 0.33 (0.47) | | 0.53 (0.43) | | 2.21*** (0.69) | | -1.06** (0.49) |
| Labor Force | | 5.01** (2.51) | | 4.64* (2.36) | | 7.99** (3.75) | | -1.17 (2.54) |
| Education | | 1.44 (1.98) | | 0.50 (2.13) | | 2.07 (3.60) | | -0.21 (2.18) |
| Political Ingroup | | 0.41** (0.20) | | 0.39** (0.19) | | 0.32 (0.36) | | 0.14 (0.24) |
| Outgroup Favors Coex. | | 0.65* (0.33) | | 0.90*** (0.34) | | 1.17* (0.62) | | -0.24 (0.49) |
| Physical Aggression | | 0.39 (0.59) | | -0.50 (0.58) | | -1.11 (0.85) | | 1.06+ (0.66) |
| Contact | | 0.0091 (0.095) | | -0.13+ (0.085) | | 0.30** (0.13) | | -0.22** (0.11) |
| Constant | 30.2*** (2.02) | 13.6*** (4.69) | 23.1*** (1.94) | 10.2** (4.81) | 9.03** (3.48) | 22.7** (9.61) | 15.4*** (2.30) | 22.5*** (6.23) |
| σ | 12.5*** (1.28) | 11.2*** (1.16) | 12.3*** (1.16) | 11.1*** (1.02) | 20.7*** (1.85) | 18.2*** (1.61) | 14.0*** (0.93) | 13.3*** (0.92) |
| N | 148 | 145 | 148 | 145 | 148 | 145 | 148 | 145 |
| Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$) | 6 | 4 | 13 | 11 | 49 | 47 | 1 | 1 |
| Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$) | 28 | 28 | 14 | 14 | 12 | 12 | 10 | 10 |

+ $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Jewish Contributions (Weighted Tobit Model)

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed from Central Bureau of Statistics 2011.

Dep. Variable: PCI Contribution by Neighborhood

| Variable | Ingroup (1) | Ingroup (2) | Mixed (3) | Mixed (4) | Outgroup (5) | Outgroup (6) | Discrim. (7) | Discrim. (8) |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Anger Treatment | -4.67 (3.23) | -6.29** (3.09) | -2.64 (2.47) | -3.60 (2.49) | -4.00 (3.71) | -6.67* (3.72) | -0.58 (2.74) | 0.46 (2.73) |
| HaMerkez | -11.4*** | -7.28** | -6.88** | -3.38 | -19.1*** | -13.2** | 4.38+ | 1.97 |
| Riot Exposure | (3.36) | (3.58) | (2.71) | (3.79) | (4.17) | (5.16) | (2.90) | (3.57) |
| | 2.48*** | 2.15** | 0.34 | 0.60 | -1.22 | -1.00 | 2.27*** | 1.92** |
| | (0.87) | (0.88) | (0.66) | (0.69) | (1.18) | (1.09) | (0.78) | (0.74) |
| Age | | -0.041 (0.66) | | 0.21 (0.52) | | -0.85 (0.80) | | 0.39 (0.62) |
| Labor Force | | -10.5*** | | -7.68** | | -17.2*** | | 7.24** |
| Education | | (3.92) | | (3.00) | | (4.44) | | (3.07) |
| | | 2.57 | | -2.56 | | -1.07 | | 2.00 |
| | | (3.11) | | (2.93) | | (4.31) | | (2.98) |
| Political Ingroup | | 0.40+ | | 0.020 | | 0.025 | | 0.19 |
| | | (0.27) | | (0.23) | | (0.33) | | (0.23) |
| Outgroup Favors Coex. | | 1.02* | | -0.11 | | -0.047 | | 0.64 |
| | | (0.59) | | (0.54) | | (0.76) | | (0.51) |
| Physical Aggression | | 0.48 | | 0.70 | | -1.15 | | 0.79 |
| | | (0.66) | | (0.57) | | (0.81) | | (0.58) |
| Contact | | -0.13 | | 0.099 | | 0.24* | | -0.25*** |
| | | (0.10) | | (0.090) | | (0.13) | | (0.091) |
| Constant | 40.1*** | 38.8*** | 26.0*** | 26.2*** | 21.1*** | 35.1*** | 13.2*** | 4.55 |
| | (3.25) | (6.97) | (2.38) | (5.11) | (3.85) | (7.69) | (2.73) | (5.01) |
| <i>sigma</i> | 17.6*** | 15.6*** | 14.6*** | 13.6*** | 20.9*** | 18.9*** | 16.3*** | 15.3*** |
| | (1.72) | (1.53) | (1.32) | (1.26) | (2.22) | (2.08) | (1.10) | (1.15) |
| <i>N</i> | 146 | 140 | 146 | 140 | 146 | 140 | 146 | 140 |
| Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$) | 5 | 5 | 13 | 13 | 49 | 46 | 1 | 1 |
| Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$) | 66 | 63 | 24 | 23 | 18 | 18 | 21 | 19 |

+ $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: PCI Contributions (Unweighted Tobit Model)

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses.

In Tables 6 (Jewish) and 7 (PCI), I examine how the *Anger Treatment* and *Riot Exposure* influence Jews' and PCIs' contributions. Each table estimates the effect for ingroup, mixed, outgroup, and discrimination in contributions both without and with controls. For Jewish contributions I use post-stratification weights and also control for *Born in Israel*.

The results from Table 6 and 7 also show the negative effect of the *Anger Treatment*, particularly at an ingroup-level. While not significant in all specifications, the *Anger Treatment* appears to play a stronger role in PCI contributions than Jewish contributions (the larger coefficients and the fact that it also reduces outgroup contributions).¹⁰⁶ A noticeable difference between the Jewish and PCI tables is the fact that *Riot Exposure* only increases ingroup contributions and discrimination for PCIs. *Riot Exposure* does not significantly influence Jewish contributions. In the ***Supplementary Information*** I test whether the *Anger Treatment* was moderated via *Riot Exposure*, and find no evidence of this.

An alternative interpretation of my negative effects of the *Anger Treatment* might be that perhaps the *Neutral Condition* was actually “pro-social”, and that *Anger Treatment* is simply a control.¹⁰⁷ In that scenario, all my treatment effects would be opposite in sign (positive). Subjects in the *Neutral Condition* might simply be more generous to ingroup and outgroup members, and the *Anger Treatment* would provide a baseline level of contribution. Whether my argument, or this alternative interpretation is more likely is fundamentally unidentified, however I can use the fact that there is a lot of discrimination in Acre between ingroup and outgroup members to see which explanation is more likely. Approximately 1/3 of individuals gave the maximum amount to ingroup members, and 1/3 gave the minimum amount to outgroup members (pooled across treatments). If the *Neutral Condition* increases contributions, then one would expect there to be larger, and more significant treatment effects on outgroup contributions relative to ingroup contributions, as ingroup contributions are already fairly high (ceiling effects). In contrast, if one believes the argument put forth here by the *Anger Treatment* decreasing contributions across groups, then one would expect more significant effects for ingroup contributions relative to the

¹⁰⁶In the ***Supplementary Information*** I plot the bootstrapped marginal effects using the estimates from Tables 5-7. They confirm the negative effect of the *Anger Treatment* on altruism.

¹⁰⁷In other words the treatment is the control, and vice versa.

outgroup, as outgroup contributions are already fairly low (floor effects). The stronger and more significant results for the treatment effect on ingroup contributions across specifications supports the the main finding and my interpretation: the results are largely driven by the *Anger Treatment* decreasing contributions.

5.4 Anger and Aggressive Men

The results strongly suggest that the *Anger Treatment* does not lead to greater ingroup favoritism, or discrimination more generally. In fact, the strongest and most robust findings are that it reduces ingroup contributions. However, it may be that there are heterogenous treatment effects. Perhaps aggressive males are more affected by the priming of the riots than less aggressive males? Scholars of political violence argue that most acts of intergroup violence such as riots are committed by aggressive young men.¹⁰⁸ To see whether high aggression individuals respond with greater discrimination than low aggression individuals to the *Anger Treatment*, I subset the data by *Physical Aggression*. I split the data on the empirical distribution of responses to the *Physical Aggression* question: “given enough provocation, I may hit another person” on a 7-point agreement scale (1=strongly disagree to 7 strongly agree).¹⁰⁹ Individuals who scored above $\approx 50\%$ of responses on the *Physical Aggression* (3 or above) are coded as “High Aggression.” Those who answered below $\approx 50\%$ of respondents (1 or 2) are coded as “Low Aggression.” I then see whether “High Aggression” and “Low Aggression” types respond differently to the *Anger Treatment* for ingroup and outgroup allocations and the difference between the two (discrimination). Table 8 reports the results. The *Anger Treatment* does not appear to make the most aggressive subjects more discriminatory. Moreover, it appears that the negative effects of the *Anger Treatment* for both ingroup and outgroup are largely driven by the “High Aggression” subjects—precisely those that the extant research identifies should be the most reactive and discriminatory.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸Urdal 2006; Scacco 2009.

¹⁰⁹*Physical Aggression* is positively correlated with being young. A full list of correlates of being “High Aggression” is presented in the ***Supplementary Information***. Alternative factors that Horowitz 2001; Scacco 2009 also theorize to predict highly aggressive individuals—age and employment status—are also explored in the ***Supplementary Information*** and confirm the findings in Table 8.

¹¹⁰Horowitz 2001, p.119.

Israel has a reputation as an aggressive and very direct culture.¹¹¹ If as the *Conventional Wisdom* suggests, simply priming anger over past violence should increase discrimination, then I should find this discriminatory effect among “High Aggression” men living in Acre, Israel, a lower-income, ethnically tense city. Instead I find that priming anger over the Yom Kippur Riots leads to decreased contributions to *both ingroup and outgroup* members, and the result is driven by the “High Aggression” types. This suggests an alternative, more nuanced effect of anger, in line with the *Regulatory Anger* hypothesis. In the next section I provide context and interpret this more nuanced effect of anger and suggest plausible mechanisms.

| Variable | Dep. Variable: Contributions | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| | Ingroup | | Outgroup | | Discrim. | |
| | High Agg. (1) | Low Agg. (2) | High Agg. (3) | Low Agg. (4) | High Agg. (5) | Low Agg. (6) |
| Anger Treatment | -7.72*** (2.92) | -0.97 (2.02) | -9.50** (4.38) | 1.04 (2.88) | 0.50 (2.70) | -1.52 (2.18) |
| HaMerkaz | -5.27+ (3.23) | -6.42*** (2.09) | -9.81* (5.25) | -2.23 (3.06) | 0.68 (2.92) | -3.39+ (2.28) |
| Jewish | -10.7*** (3.53) | -6.29*** (2.32) | -0.67 (4.86) | 3.88 (3.30) | -6.77** (3.27) | -7.52*** (2.51) |
| Riot Exposure | 1.42* (0.79) | 2.28*** (0.69) | -1.60 (1.22) | 0.39 (1.10) | 1.96*** (0.72) | 1.16+ (0.78) |
| Controls | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| <i>N</i> | 142 | 148 | 142 | 148 | 142 | 148 |
| Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$) | 4 | 5 | 58 | 37 | 1 | 1 |
| Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$) | 54 | 39 | 15 | 15 | 19 | 11 |

+ $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: **High Aggression vs. Low Aggression Contributions (Weighted Tobit Model)**

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed using data from Central Bureau of Statistics 2011. All regressions contain all the controls used in Columns 2, 6, and 8 from Table 5 with the exception of *Physical Aggression*.

6 Interpretation and Conclusion

Two key findings emerge from the empirical analysis. (1) Priming Anger over the Yom Kippur Riots decreases altruism, particularly towards ingroup members. (2) Riot exposure appears to have the opposite effect, with it increasing ingroup contributions and discrimination, particularly for PCIs.

¹¹¹For examples see Miguel, Saiegh and Satyanath 2011. Also as stated in an official “Tips for Doing Business in Israel” put out by the Israeli Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor describes Israel’s direct culture, “(the) Israeli, who is often perceived as being arrogant, aggressive and pushy, is actually being direct and honest.” See <http://www.tamas.gov.il/NR/exeres/3614E1A7-2D84-4F27-A4DC-3585A6F6450E.htm>

The finding that exposure to violence (the riots) increases ingroup altruism is well-supported by previous research,¹¹² and further suggest that Acre is not simply an outlier. Rather, it seems that cuing anger over the riots does something different than exposure to violence. The negative effect of the *Anger Treatment* on contributions is most strongly felt at an ingroup-level, and is largely driven by the most aggressive individuals. This goes against the *Conventional Wisdom* that simply cuing anger over past violence leads to increased discrimination and intergroup conflict.¹¹³ Elites attempting to foment interethnic violence in ethnically charged environments may not be so easily able to use anger as a catalyst for future violence.¹¹⁴ In-depth interviews I conducted with Jewish and PCI residents suggest a possible mechanism for the *Anger Treatment's* generalized decrease in altruism (not along group lines).

A common belief held by Jewish residents in Acre is that the decision by the PCI motorist to drive into the predominately Jewish neighborhood on Yom Kippur was part of systematic provocation by PCIs in Acre. As one Jewish resident of Shuknah Burla in his late twenties told me, “they were teasing and mocking us (Jews) on Yom Kippur.”¹¹⁵ He further went on to connect the riots to the larger situation in Acre and Israel with respect to Jewish-PCI relations. “In the past, the police and the government favored us Jews...now the government is in favor of the Arabs...this is a Jewish state!” Another interviewee, also from Shuknah Burla, echoed these fears of the PCIs gaining increased control in Acre (physically showing me on a map of Acre), “the Arabs (PCIs) used to only be in the Old City, now they have moved in HaMerkaz, and soon they will move into Shuknah Burla and the city will be theirs.”¹¹⁶ Jewish residents’ anger over the riots is connected to the larger issues between Jews and PCIs in Israel. Their anger and frustration is also directed towards the state of Israel, which they feel has “abandoned them (Jews)” in Acre. More moderate Jews, had a slightly different take. As one young Jewish student who lived in Burla and attended the local college recounted to me, “these young guys in Burla are idiots. I have no problems with Arabs. These young Jewish guys are idiots. They only started something because they have noth-

¹¹²Bellows and Miguel 2009; Gilligan, Pasquale and Samii 2012.

¹¹³Horowitz 2001; Petersen 2002

¹¹⁴Snyder 2000; Wilkinson 2006.

¹¹⁵Author interview July 27, 2011 Acre, Israel.

¹¹⁶Author interview July 27, 2011 Acre, Israel.

ing better to do...and same with the Arab guys who responded (and participated in the riots).”¹¹⁷ Jews of different political views laid the blame for the riots on different actors. Yet their anger was targeted at both their ingroup (other Jews) and the outgroup.

The anger of PCI residents over the riots is qualitatively different from the Jewish respondents, but still directed at ingroup and outgroup members. One of the common refrains stated by PCIs was that the attack on the PCI motorist that sparked the riot was justified. However, later actions, such as attacking PCI houses in Shuknah Burla was not. They also expressed anger at their perceived disproportionate exposure to the riots. As one PCI resident of HaMerkaz in his 50’s stated, “the Jewish guys should only have gone after him (the PCI motorist)...if one PCI guy does something wrong, he is responsible, not all PCIs.”¹¹⁸ What made the PCI residents angry was the disproportionate response of the Jewish residents of Acre and the Acre police. A male resident of the Old City who had family injured in the riots described, “the police were not prepared and did not protect the PCI families and their homes in Shuknah Burla...and when they used tear gas (on the protesters)...all the tear gas was sent towards our (the PCI) side.”¹¹⁹

The negative effect of anger over the riots on ingroup cohesion should not be misconstrued as a reduction in outgroup-directed animosity in post-riot Acre. Discrimination is largely the norm in Acre. Yet, Jews and PCIs also expressed anger at the behavior of their fellow ingroup members in disrupting the status quo. PCIs in particular condemned the actions of Jamal, the PCI driver who drove into Burla on Yom Kippur eve, and the Acre police. Right-leaning Jews were angry at both PCIs and members of the Acre Police Department and government for not favoring them enough, while moderate Jews blamed youths of Acre “with nothing better to do.” Rather than rallying around their ethnic group, the anger over the riots cued memories of their own group not handling the situation properly.

The results from the experiment paint a nuanced version of how anger over legacies of violence influence current ethnic relations. Individuals appear to have more circumspect responses to emotional primes over past violence that may prevent its future outbreak. These findings differ from

¹¹⁷ Author Interview June 28, 2011 Acre, Israel.

¹¹⁸ Author interview August 9, 2011 Acre, Israel.

¹¹⁹ Author interview August 9, 2011 Acre, Israel.

the extant literature. Rather than leading individuals to react with greater discrimination, the *Anger Treatment*'s strongest effects was in decreasing altruism to the ingroup. The findings also point the way toward future research. The experimental set-up in this paper was agnostic to both the target of the anger and the level of group threat. This was done intentionally to provide a baseline measure of the effect of priming anger over past violence on group conflict, not clouded by either of these concerns. However, there is reason to think politicians might also try to heighten both group threat and channel anger toward the outgroup.¹²⁰ In future research, including group threat and manipulating the target of anger may help researchers tease apart when priming anger over past intergroup conflict falls on deaf ears, and when it leads to conflict.

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¹²⁰See Snyder 2000; De Figueiredo and Weingast 1999.

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A Appendix

| Variable | PCIs | | | | Jews | | | | Description | | |
|------------------------------|------|-------|-------|------|------|------|-------|-------|-------------|------|---|
| | Obs. | Mean. | S.D. | Min. | Max. | Obs. | Mean. | S.D. | | Min. | Max. |
| HaMerkaz | 147 | 0.429 | 0.497 | 0 | 1 | 150 | 0.407 | 0.493 | 0 | 1 | 1 = subject lives in HaMerkaz, 0 otherwise Period of time a subject has lived in their current neighborhood. 1=3 years or less, 2=4-7 years, 3=8-11 years, and 4= 12 or more years. |
| Time Lived in Neighborhood | 147 | 3.49 | 0.95 | 1 | 4 | 149 | 3.12 | 1.20 | 1 | 4 | |
| Anger Treatment | 147 | 0.510 | 0.502 | 0 | 1 | 150 | 0.513 | 0.501 | 0 | 1 | 1= subject receives anger treatment, 0 otherwise 1 to 7 (strongly disagree to strongly agree) hit someone if provoked |
| Physical Aggression | 143 | 3.853 | 2.400 | 1 | 7 | 149 | 2.691 | 2.046 | 1 | 7 | |
| Age | 147 | 3.73 | 2.46 | 1 | 9 | 150 | 4.92 | 2.80 | 1 | 9 | 1=22-25 yrs., 2=26-30 yrs..9=60-65 yrs. |
| Education | 147 | 0.517 | 0.501 | 0 | 1 | 150 | 0.493 | 0.502 | 0 | 1 | 1 if they received a Matriculation certificate (Bagrut) at the end of high school , 0 if not. The Bagrut is taken at the end of high school to determine suitability for college and university. |
| Labor Force | 147 | 0.660 | 0.475 | 0 | 1 | 150 | 0.687 | 0.465 | 0 | 1 | Employed=1 in the formal labor force, 0 if not |
| Contact | 145 | 21.4 | 15.3 | 0 | 48 | 150 | 11.0 | 11.0 | 0 | 40 | Sum # times had coffee/talked on phone/ dinner/ been in home in past yr. of opposite ethnic group |
| Political Ingroup | 147 | 8.28 | 5.98 | 0 | 28 | 150 | 8.75 | 5.90 | 1 | 28 | Used to measure how much they support religious groups that are pro-ingroup. For Jews: 1-support Haredi to 7 support Relig. Zion multiplied by their reported level of religiosity (1-secular to 4-very relig.). For PCIs: 1-oppose to 7 support the Islamic Movement in 1948 Palestine multiplied by religiosity (1-secular to 7-very relig.) and whether the subject was Muslim (0,1) |
| Perception % Jewish Burla | 146 | 86.8 | 20.0 | 0 | 100 | 150 | 82.9 | 22.6 | 0 | 100 | % Jewish they thought lived in Shukhnah Burla |
| Perception % Jewish HaMerkaz | 147 | 61.2 | 17.8 | 30 | 100 | 149 | 56.6 | 24.7 | 0 | 100 | % Jewish they thought lived in HaMerkaz |
| Perception % Jewish Old City | 146 | 12.5 | 21.1 | 0 | 100 | 149 | 16.6 | 34.4 | 0 | 100 | % Jewish they thought lived in Old City |
| Outgroup Favors Coex. | 146 | 4.27 | 2.99 | 1 | 10 | 148 | 4.55 | 2.98 | 1 | 10 | For Jews, whether partner in Old City 1- strongly opposes to 10-strongly supports coexistence b/n Arabs and Jews; For PCIs, whether partner in Shuknah Burla 1-strongly opposes to 10-strongly supports coexistence |

Table 9: Variable Description




Figure 6: **Randomization Check for Anger Treatment** Two-tailed t-test with unequal variance. T-test for post-stratification weights are calculated only for Jews. Dashed red lines represent $p = 0.10$ and solid red lines represent $p = 0.05$.




Figure 7: Distribution of Contributions across Ethnicities and Neighborhoods