

# A BOTTOM-UP THEORY OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY

*Supplementary Appendix*  
March 7, 2017

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# 1 Examples of stimulus materials

## Type of Appeal

Previous research has found that emotions and emotional appeals can influence political behavior — including perception of threat (Lerner et al., 2003), ingroup cohesion (Zeitsoff, 2014), rally ‘round the flag effects (Aday, 2010; Lambert et al., 2010), and voter persuasion (Brader, 2005). Furthermore, Kahneman (2011) argues that cognition occurs in two modes — an impulsive, “hot” cognition, and a slower, effortful (“cold”) type of thinking. Since we were interested in how different partisan endorsements and group cues influence foreign policy opinion, in Experiments 1-2 we also investigate the possibility that that different appeals — a colder, cognitive message (*Cold Cognition Treatment*), and a hotter, affect-laden one (*Hot Cognition Treatment*) — may change how subjects process the various endorsements.

In each of the two experiments, subjects were randomly shown a map (*Cold Cognition Treatment*), or a picture that was found to be threatening (*Hot Cognition Treatment*).<sup>1</sup> The argument put forth by the Democrat or Republican elite policymaker in our experiment also varied depending on the treatment. Table 1 shows how these appeals varied by appeal type (*Cold Cognition* or *Hot Cognition*) and scenario (*China* or *Terrorism*).

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<sup>1</sup>A pre-test on 100 American adults recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk was used to select threatening and more neutral stimuli. Pre-test results confirmed the images used in the *Hot Cognition* treatment significantly increased fearful and threatening perceptions compared to the *Cold Cognition* treatment. This is similar to the manipulation used in Gadarian (2014). For a helpful guide to developing emotional manipulations in political science experiments, see Albertson and Gadarian (2016).

Table 1: Type of Appeal: Experiments 1-2

Scenario	Emotional	Logical
China	“It’s not rocket science. China is trying to bully the US, and bullies only respond to force. My gut tells me we need to shift military resources to the region to send a signal and protect our interests.”	“China is using its military to expand it’s influence. Cool, cold logic dictates that we need to shift military resources to the region to send a signal and protect our interests.”
Terrorism	“It’s not rocket science. Terrorists are trying to kill Americans, my gut tells me we should use our military to get them over there before they attack us.”	“Terrorists are using these countries as a base of operations. Cool, cold logic dictates that we should use our military to neutralize the terrorist threat over there.”

Figure 1: Group Endorse Cue

*The graph below shows the responses of people who have previously taken the survey. Those who answered the earlier questions on the survey like you strongly supported sending US special forces into foreign countries to go after terrorists.*




Figure 2: Group Oppose Cue

*The graph below shows the responses of people who have previously taken the survey. Those who answered the earlier questions on the survey like you strongly opposed sending US special forces into foreign countries to go after terrorists.*




Table 2: Elite partisan cue treatments for Experiment 3

Cue	Wording
Control	[blank]
Dem. Support, Repub. Oppose	Republicans and Democrats in Congress are divided on the issue. Republicans strongly support shifting US military resources to the region, while Democrats oppose such a move, and call for diplomatic efforts instead.
Repub. Support, Dem. Oppose	Democrats and Republicans in Congress are divided on the issue. Democrats strongly support shifting US military resources to the region, while Republicans oppose such a move, and call for diplomatic efforts instead.
Both Support	Both Republicans and Democrats in Congress are united on the issue, and strongly support shifting US military resources to the region.

# Policymakers Debate China's Rise



Mounting concern for what China's rise means for Asia (Rose McDermott / Reuters)

WASHINGTON - China's rise across Asia has provoked great concern amongst the United States and its Asian allies. Several recent statements from high-level Chinese officials have directly and indirectly threatened US interests. Furthermore, China has increasingly flexed its military muscle. It has used its military to extend its territorial claims on the South China Sea, expanded the range of its Navy, and become increasingly more aggressive in asserting its air space.

A heated debate is happening between policymakers in Washington. Some have argued that the US should use its military muscle to stop China threatening US interests. Others have argued that military force is a risky choice that may escalate tensions even further, and have argued for diplomacy.

A senior Republican lawmaker with years of foreign policy experience, speaking off the record, said: "China is using its military to expand its influence. Cool, cold logic dictates that we need to shift military resources to the region to send a signal and protect our interests."

Figure 3: China Scenario with Cold Cognition Treatment

## Officials debate counterterror plan



Instability in the Middle East is posing renewed security challenges (Rick Herrmann / Reuters)

WASHINGTON - The growing instability in Syria and Egypt, and continued unrest in Pakistan and Afghanistan have provoked great concern amongst the US and its European allies. Several recent intelligence reports suggest that an increase in foreign fighters and jihadi terrorists operating in these conflicts have directly and indirectly threatened US interests. These conflicts have provided safe havens for terrorists to recruit, train, and gain experience in tactics.

A heated debate is happening between policymakers in Washington. Some have argued the US should send US special forces troops to directly combat terrorism on the ground in these countries. Others have countered that intervening in these conflicts is a risky choice that could put US troops and assets at risk, and have argued for the US to continue to monitor the threat, but not directly intervene.

A senior Democratic lawmaker with years of foreign policy experience, speaking off the record, said: "It's not rocket science. Terrorists are trying to kill Americans. My gut tells me we should use our military to get them over there before they attack us here."

Figure 4: Terrorism Scenario with Hot Cognition Treatment

Table 3: Elite cue treatments for Experiments 4-5

<b>Cue</b>	<b>ICSID Scenario Wording</b>	<b>China Scenario Wording</b>
Control	Those who support ICSID argue that it protects investments and guarantees a transparent legal process for resolving disputes. Others have argued that ICSID tilts the playing field further in favor of big multinational corporations, and that disputes with foreign investors should be handled by the existing American legal system.	Some have argued that the US should increase its naval presence to deter China from further provocative acts in the South China Sea. Others have argued that such a move is a risky choice that may escalate tensions even further, and have instead called for diplomacy.
Elite Divided	Democrats and Republicans in Congress are divided on the issue. Republicans strongly support using ICSID for investor-state disputes, while Democrats are opposed, calling for disputes with foreign investors to be handled by the existing American legal system.	Democrats and Republicans in Congress are divided on the issue. Republicans strongly support increasing US naval presence in the region, while Democrats oppose such a move, and call for diplomatic efforts instead.
Elite Consensus	Those who support ICSID argue that it protects investments and guarantees a transparent legal process for resolving disputes. Others have argued that ICSID tilts the playing field further in favor of big multinational corporations, and that disputes with foreign investors should be handled by the existing American legal system. Democrats and Republicans in Congress are united. Both Democrats and Republicans strongly support using ICSID for investor-state disputes.	Some have argued that the US should increase its naval presence to deter China from further provocative acts in the South China Sea. Others have argued that such a move is a risky choice that may escalate tensions even further, and have instead called for diplomacy. Democrats and Republicans in Congress are united. Both Democrats and Republicans strongly support increasing US naval presence in the region.

## 2 Supplementary analyses and robustness checks

### 2.1 Study 1 (SSI): Experiments # 1-2

Table 4: Randomization Check on Treatments (Logit)

	Dependent Variable: Assignment to Treatment			
	Emotional Appeal	Democrat Endorse	Group Endorse	Group Oppose
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Male	−0.150 (0.128)	−0.093 (0.128)	0.047 (0.136)	0.004 (0.135)
White	−0.090 (0.176)	0.092 (0.176)	−0.185 (0.184)	−0.025 (0.185)
Age	0.002 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	−0.007 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Education	−0.019 (0.035)	−0.031 (0.035)	0.013 (0.037)	0.016 (0.037)
Income	0.037 (0.032)	−0.019 (0.032)	0.041 (0.034)	−0.001 (0.034)
Party ID	0.021 (0.032)	−0.011 (0.032)	0.043 (0.034)	−0.033 (0.034)
Militant Assertiveness	0.165 (0.336)	0.176 (0.337)	−0.479 (0.359)	0.574 (0.356)
Internationalism	0.244 (0.367)	0.344 (0.367)	−0.038 (0.391)	0.280 (0.388)
N	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031
AIC	1,443.144	1,443.422	1,317.756	1,339.891

Results from study 1. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01.




Table 5: Summary Statistics and Sample Characteristics

	N	NA	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.	Description
Male	1035	0	0	1	0.000	0.480	0.500	
White	1035	0	0	1	1.000	0.829	0.377	White, not Hispanic.
Age	1035	0	18	89	52.000	50.028	15.944	
Education	1035	0	1	9	6.000	6.022	1.953	From no high school to graduate degree. Mean (6) is Associate's degree.
Income	1032	3	1	10	3.000	3.719	2.118	Household income. From less than 20,000 USD to more than 200,000 USD. Mean is between 35,000 USD and 75,000 USD.
Party ID	1034	1	1	7	4.000	3.909	2.196	7-point scale; 1 (Strong Democrat) to 7 (Strong Republican).
Militant Assertiveness	1035	0	0	1	0.500	0.509	0.205	Militant Assertiveness scale (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser, 1999; Kertzer and McGraw, 2012); normalized to 0-1.
Internationalism	1035	0	0	1	0.563	0.544	0.179	Internationalism scale (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser, 1999; Kertzer and McGraw, 2012); normalized to 0-1.
Armed Force China Scenario	1035	0	0	1	0.478	0.466	0.271	Support for sending military resources to Asia. Continuous 0-10 normalized to 0-1. 0 (Strongly Oppose) to 1 (Strongly Support).
Armed Force Terrorism Scenario	1021	14	0	1	0.500	0.488	0.287	Support for sending US Special Forces to fight terrorism. Continuous 0-10 scale normalized to 0-1. 0 (Strongly Oppose) to 1 (Strongly Support).

Results from study 1.

Figure 5: Substantive effects of treatments and main dispositional variables



This figure plots the substantive effects from the basic treatment effect models (see models 1 and 2 in Table 1 in the main text) in black, a series of models estimated solely on the subset of participants who did not receive a group cue (see models 3 and 4 in Table 6) in dark grey, and a set of models estimated solely on those participants who passed the elite cue manipulation check (see models 1 and 2 in Table 3 in Appendix §2.1) in light grey. All three dispositional variables are rescaled from 0-1, so that the effect estimate represents the effect of going from the minimum to the maximum level of each variable (e.g. from strong Democrat to strong Republican, etc.). The results remain consistent throughout: group cues significantly affect participants' views, while the elite partisan cue has no effect, and the effect of partisanship is weaker than that of general foreign policy orientations.

Table 6: Do Elite Endorsements Matter in the Absence of Group Treatments? (OLS)

	Dependent Variable: Support for Armed Force							
	China (1)	Terrorism (2)	China (3)	Terrorism (4)	China (5)	Terrorism (6)	China (7)	Terrorism (8)
Emotional Appeal	0.027 (0.029)	-0.015 (0.033)	0.025 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.030)	0.028 (0.029)	-0.017 (0.033)	0.025 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.030)
Democrat Endorse	-0.051* (0.029)	-0.021 (0.033)	-0.039 (0.027)	-0.029 (0.029)	-0.048 (0.060)	0.037 (0.069)	-0.062 (0.056)	0.060 (0.061)
Party ID			0.007 (0.007)	0.003 (0.008)	0.023** (0.009)	0.033*** (0.011)	0.005 (0.009)	0.015 (0.010)
Party ID $\times$ Dem. Endorse					-0.00003 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.015)	0.006 (0.013)	-0.022 (0.014)
Militant Assertiveness			0.496*** (0.067)	0.621*** (0.074)			0.497*** (0.067)	0.628*** (0.074)
Internationalism			0.137* (0.072)	0.194** (0.080)			0.138* (0.072)	0.197** (0.079)
Controls			✓	✓			✓	✓
N	338	334	336	332	338	334	336	332
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.009	-0.006	0.201	0.235	0.039	0.021	0.199	0.239

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

This regression only looks at the subset of respondents who did not receive either the *Group Endorse* or *Group Oppose* condition. All regressions are OLS and control for the randomly assigned order of the scenarios (China Scenario or Terrorism Scenario first). Controls include *Male*, *Age*, *Education*, *Income*, and *White*.

Table 7: Results for only those participants who passed manipulation check

	China	Terrorism	China	Terrorism
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Emotional Appeal	0.006 (0.017)	0.009 (0.018)	0.008 (0.017)	0.009 (0.018)
Democrat Endorse	0.018 (0.017)	-0.035** (0.018)	0.108*** (0.035)	0.046 (0.036)
Group Endorse	0.048** (0.021)	0.059*** (0.021)	0.049** (0.021)	0.059*** (0.021)
Group Oppose	-0.086*** (0.021)	-0.047** (0.022)	-0.086*** (0.021)	-0.048** (0.022)
Party ID	0.005 (0.004)	0.013*** (0.005)	0.015*** (0.006)	0.023*** (0.006)
Party ID X Democrat Endorse			-0.023*** (0.008)	-0.021*** (0.008)
Militant Assertiveness	0.566*** (0.047)	0.551*** (0.048)	0.555*** (0.047)	0.553*** (0.047)
Internationalism	0.160*** (0.050)	0.217*** (0.051)	0.155*** (0.049)	0.218*** (0.050)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	779	813	779	813
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.252	0.257	0.259	0.262

Results from study 1. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01


Table 8: No evidence of elite cue x partisanship x group cue interactions

	Dependent Variable: Support for Armed Force	
	China (1)	Terrorism (2)
Emotional Appeal	0.012 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.016)
Democrat Endorse	-0.070 (0.055)	0.059 (0.057)
Group Endorse	-0.035 (0.054)	0.041 (0.055)
Group Oppose	-0.103** (0.052)	-0.052 (0.056)
Party ID	0.004 (0.009)	0.017* (0.010)
Militant Assertiveness	0.518*** (0.040)	0.570*** (0.042)
Internationalism	0.138*** (0.044)	0.220*** (0.046)
Democrat Endorse X Group Endorse	0.137* (0.077)	-0.051 (0.078)
Democrat Endorse X Party ID	0.008 (0.012)	-0.022* (0.013)
Group Endorse X Party ID	0.019 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.013)
Democrat Endorse X Group Oppose	0.098 (0.075)	-0.072 (0.080)
Group Oppose X Party ID	0.004 (0.012)	0.002 (0.013)
Democrat Endorse X Group Endorse X Party ID	-0.020 (0.017)	0.022 (0.017)
Democrat Endorse X Group Oppose X Party ID	-0.014 (0.017)	0.007 (0.018)
Controls	✓	✓
N	1,031	1,017
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.227	0.263


Results from study 1. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01. See Figure 6 for a visualization of the effects.

Figure 6: No evidence of elite cue x partisanship x group cue interactions

(a) China



(b) Terrorism



Illustrating the substantive effects from Table 8 from Study 1, we find no evidence that the impact of elite cues is moderated by group cues, or that the impact of elite cues is moderated by partisanship. Given the nature of the theory being tested (in which the effect of elite cues is conditional on partisanship, but also may be conditional on social cues), it is necessary to estimate a fully-saturated three-way interaction model (Braumoeller, 2004). The top row depicts the treatment effects in the China scenario for Democrats and Republicans, respectively, while the bottom row does the same for the treatment effects in the Terrorism scenario. Importantly, we see the same “staircase” pattern across all panels, showing the consistent effects of the group cue treatments, irrespective of the elite cue or respondents’ own partisan affiliation.

### 2.1.1 The effects of social cues on certainty and associated beliefs

Although our main interest is in testing how these different types of cues mobilize support for the use of force, we also included a number of additional questions to ascertain how certain participants were about their position on using force, how successful they thought the use of force would be at achieving its goal, and how much of a threat they perceived from the scenarios described. These measures, the results for which are displayed in Table 9, are of interest in as much as they allow us to observe not just how much they supported a given mission, but the potential mechanisms through which the treatments shape judgments, and the broader architecture of participants' beliefs. In the previous set of analyses, we saw that the emotional appeal lacked significant effects on mobilizing support; here we find that participants in the hot cognition (*Emotional Appeal*) treatment were more likely to perceive a threat from China, and also more likely to perceive the pivot to Asia as being successful. Interestingly, we find that group endorsements have a stronger effect in terms of increasing certainty, perceived likelihood of success, and threat perception than group opposition does – the *Group Endorse* treatment significantly increases participants' certainty about their decision in the China scenario, increases perceptions of the likelihood of success in both the China scenario and the Terrorism scenario, and increases threat perception in the China scenario. This asymmetry between group endorsements and group opposition is of theoretical interest, and merits future study.

As before, participant-level characteristics exert the largest impact. Consistent with the psychological literature on the relationship between conservatism, uncertainty avoidance, and threat management (Jost et al., 2007), we see that across both scenarios Republicans express more certainty about their responses than Democrats do, and also perceive higher levels of threat. Once again, though, the substantively largest contributions to the model come from participants' prior foreign policy orientations: participants high in military assertiveness — who tend to believe in the efficacy of the use of force — are far more likely to believe the missions will be successes than their dovish counterparts; internationalists are similarly optimistic compared to isolationists. Although we see similarly sensible results for militant assertiveness with respect to threat perceptions — hawks are more likely to perceive a threat in both the China and Terrorism scenarios — we see that internationalists are actually less rather than more likely to perceive a threat posed by a rising China, reflecting the presence of multiple “faces” of internationalism: a military internationalism eager to deploy force abroad, and a cooperative internationalism that sees opportunities for gains from trade and mutual cooperation (Wittkopf, 1990; Holsti, 2004).

Table 9: Effects on Perceptions of Certainty, Success, and Threat (OLS)

	<u>Certainty of Action</u>		<u>Likelihood of Success</u>		<u>Threat Posed</u>	
	China	Terrorism	China	Terrorism	China	Terrorism
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Emotional Appeal	0.018 (0.016)	0.001 (0.017)	0.028* (0.014)	-0.025 (0.015)	0.036** (0.015)	-0.013 (0.015)
Democrat Endorse	0.001 (0.016)	0.007 (0.017)	0.011 (0.014)	-0.027* (0.015)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.015)
Group Endorse	0.056*** (0.020)	0.012 (0.021)	0.057*** (0.018)	0.049*** (0.018)	0.040** (0.019)	0.021 (0.018)
Group Oppose	0.016 (0.020)	0.021 (0.021)	-0.025 (0.018)	-0.025 (0.019)	0.002 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.018)
Party ID	0.012*** (0.004)	0.014*** (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)
Militant Assertiveness	-0.019 (0.044)	0.024 (0.046)	0.543*** (0.039)	0.565*** (0.040)	0.426*** (0.042)	0.397*** (0.039)
Internationalism	0.013 (0.048)	0.007 (0.050)	0.124*** (0.042)	0.206*** (0.044)	-0.094** (0.045)	0.021 (0.043)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031	1,031
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.028	0.024	0.217	0.246	0.141	0.163

Results from study 1. \*p &lt; .1; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01



## 2.2 Study 2 (Amazon MTurk): Experiment #3

Table 10: Randomization Check on Treatments (Logit)

	Dem Support	Rep Support	Elite Consensus	Group Endorse	Group Oppose
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Militant Assertiveness	−0.240 (0.302)	0.179 (0.305)	−0.039 (0.299)	0.371 (0.282)	−0.498* (0.279)
Internationalism	0.324 (0.348)	0.384 (0.351)	0.009 (0.342)	0.141 (0.323)	−0.242 (0.316)
Party ID	−0.142 (0.256)	0.221 (0.257)	0.151 (0.251)	−0.054 (0.237)	0.086 (0.235)
Male	0.059 (0.125)	0.223* (0.128)	−0.117 (0.123)	0.081 (0.117)	0.078 (0.115)
Age	0.002 (0.006)	−0.004 (0.006)	−0.004 (0.006)	0.006 (0.005)	0.002 (0.005)
Education	−0.086* (0.048)	0.047 (0.049)	0.017 (0.048)	0.032 (0.045)	0.008 (0.044)
Constant	−0.881** (0.366)	−1.718*** (0.377)	−0.979*** (0.364)	−1.374*** (0.345)	−0.538 (0.337)
N	1,445	1,445	1,445	1,445	1,445
AIC	1,639.908	1,603.739	1,662.870	1,808.000	1,849.340

Results from study 2. \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Table 11: Summary Statistics and Sample Characteristics for Study 2

	N	NA	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.	Description
Male	1444	1	0	1	1.00	0.576	0.494	
Age	1445	0	18	75	57.00	34.113	11.020	
Education	1445	0	1	8	5.000	4.225	1.275	From no high school (1) to graduate degree (8). Mean (4) is Associate's degree.
Party ID	1445	1	1	7	0.333	0.394	0.258	7-point scale; normalized to 0 (Strong Democrat) to 1 (Strong Republican).
Militant Assertiveness	1445	0	0	1	0.375	0.406	0.213	Militant Assertiveness scale (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser, 1999; Kertzer and McGraw, 2012); normalized to 0-1.
Internationalism	1445	0	0	1	0.625	0.591	0.184	Internationalism scale (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser, 1999; Kertzer and McGraw, 2012); normalized to 0-1.
Armed Force China Scenario	1445	0	0	1	0.378	0.394	0.274	Support for sending military resources to Asia. Continuous 0-10 normalized to 0-1. 0 (Strongly Oppose) to 1 (Strongly Support).

Table 12: Study 2: Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dem Support	−0.031 (0.020)	−0.090*** (0.033)	−0.059** (0.027)	−0.076 (0.059)	−0.059 (0.049)
Rep Support	−0.030 (0.020)	−0.061* (0.034)	−0.044 (0.028)	−0.102 (0.063)	−0.118** (0.052)
Elite Consensus	0.035* (0.020)	−0.028 (0.033)	−0.005 (0.027)	−0.058 (0.058)	−0.063 (0.048)
Group Endorse	0.050*** (0.017)	−0.015 (0.035)	−0.004 (0.029)	−0.076 (0.063)	−0.050 (0.052)
Group Oppose	−0.077*** (0.017)	−0.135*** (0.034)	−0.075*** (0.027)	−0.151** (0.059)	−0.109** (0.049)
Dem Support × Group Endorse		0.099** (0.049)	0.065 (0.040)	0.127 (0.088)	0.076 (0.073)
Dem Support × Group Oppose		0.091* (0.047)	0.033 (0.039)	0.130 (0.086)	0.078 (0.071)
Rep Support × Group Endorse		0.045 (0.050)	0.023 (0.041)	0.048 (0.092)	0.044 (0.076)
Rep Support × Group Oppose		0.056 (0.048)	−0.014 (0.040)	0.014 (0.088)	−0.010 (0.073)
Elite Consensus × Group Group Endorse		0.114** (0.049)	0.092** (0.040)	0.178** (0.088)	0.170** (0.072)
Elite Consensus × Group Group Oppose		0.085* (0.048)	0.025 (0.039)	0.127 (0.084)	0.089 (0.070)
Dem Support × Party ID				−0.029 (0.122)	−0.007 (0.101)
Rep Support × Party ID				0.114 (0.134)	0.184* (0.111)
Elite Consensus × Party ID				0.089 (0.123)	0.144 (0.102)
Group Endorse × Party ID				0.158 (0.132)	0.112 (0.109)
Group Oppose × Party ID				0.061 (0.130)	0.078 (0.107)
Dem Support × Group Endorse × Party ID				−0.064 (0.188)	−0.024 (0.156)
Dem Support × Group Oppose × Party ID				−0.120 (0.186)	−0.105 (0.154)
Rep Support × Group Endorse × Party ID				−0.036 (0.192)	−0.060 (0.159)
Rep Support × Group Oppose × Party ID				0.074 (0.192)	−0.009 (0.159)
Elite Consensus × Group Endorse × Party ID				−0.174 (0.186)	−0.196 (0.154)
Elite Consensus × Group Oppose × Party ID				−0.146 (0.178)	−0.155 (0.148)
Militant Assertiveness			0.668*** (0.029)		0.667*** (0.029)
Internationalism			0.222*** (0.033)		0.223*** (0.033)
Party ID			0.065*** (0.024)	0.102 (0.083)	−0.029 (0.070)
Male			−0.009 (0.012)		−0.009 (0.012)
Age			−0.0003 (0.001)		−0.0003 (0.001)
Education			0.006 (0.005)		0.007 (0.005)
Constant	19 (0.017)	0.448*** (0.023)	−0.010 (0.040)	0.406*** (0.041)	0.026 (0.048)
N	1,446	1,446	1,445	1,446	1,445
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.042	0.044	0.363	0.072	0.365

Note: \*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01. Treatment effects are in relation to the elite cue and group cue controls.




Figure 7: Polarized elite cues lack significant effects, while the effect of elite consensus is magnified by social cues. The figure visualizes the results from model 3 of Table 12 in Appendix §2.2. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Table 13: Results for only those participants who passed the manipulation check

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dem Support	−0.032 (0.021)	−0.093*** (0.035)	−0.055* (0.029)	−0.103 (0.063)	−0.056 (0.053)
Rep Support	−0.038* (0.021)	−0.088** (0.036)	−0.057* (0.030)	−0.181*** (0.067)	−0.163*** (0.056)
Elite Consensus	0.039* (0.021)	−0.030 (0.035)	−0.005 (0.029)	−0.062 (0.061)	−0.056 (0.051)
Group Endorse	0.051*** (0.019)	−0.015 (0.035)	−0.005 (0.029)	−0.076 (0.063)	−0.051 (0.052)
Group Oppose	−0.068*** (0.018)	−0.135*** (0.033)	−0.076*** (0.027)	−0.151** (0.059)	−0.109** (0.049)
Dem Support × Group Endorse		0.107** (0.052)	0.063 (0.043)	0.135 (0.093)	0.066 (0.077)
Dem Support × Group Oppose		0.089* (0.050)	0.023 (0.041)	0.153* (0.090)	0.085 (0.075)
Rep Support × Group Endorse		0.073 (0.052)	0.039 (0.043)	0.109 (0.095)	0.085 (0.079)
Rep Support × Group Oppose		0.084* (0.051)	0.0002 (0.042)	0.071 (0.092)	0.030 (0.077)
Elite Consensus × Group Endorse		0.103** (0.051)	0.093** (0.042)	0.174* (0.093)	0.179** (0.077)
Elite Consensus × Group Oppose		0.115** (0.051)	0.046 (0.042)	0.193** (0.088)	0.122* (0.074)
Dem Support × Party ID				0.021 (0.128)	0.003 (0.107)
Rep Support × Party ID				0.245* (0.142)	0.265** (0.119)
Elite Consensus × Party ID				0.098 (0.132)	0.126 (0.110)
Group Endorse × Party ID				0.158 (0.130)	0.114 (0.109)
Group Oppose × Party ID				0.061 (0.128)	0.077 (0.107)
Dem Support × Group Endorse × Party ID				−0.056 (0.194)	−0.009 (0.162)
Dem Support × Group Oppose × Party ID				−0.176 (0.192)	−0.155 (0.160)
Rep Support × Group Endorse × Party ID				−0.130 (0.198)	−0.126 (0.165)
Rep Support × Group Oppose × Party ID				−0.003 (0.199)	−0.076 (0.166)
Elite Consensus × Group Endorse × Party ID				−0.198 (0.200)	−0.217 (0.166)
Elite Consensus × Group Oppose × Party ID				−0.236 (0.188)	−0.181 (0.157)
Militant Assertiveness			0.657*** (0.032)		0.654*** (0.031)
Internationalism			0.240*** (0.035)		0.238*** (0.035)
Party ID			0.069*** (0.026)	0.102 (0.083)	−0.025 (0.070)
Male			−0.004 (0.013)		−0.005 (0.013)
Age			−0.0004 (0.001)		−0.0004 (0.001)
Education	21		0.005 (0.005)		0.006 (0.005)
Constant	0.407*** (0.017)	0.448*** (0.023)	−0.010 (0.041)	0.406*** (0.041)	0.027 (0.049)
N	1,250	1,250	1,249	1,250	1,249
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.041	0.042	0.359	0.081	0.364

Results from study 2. Note: \*p &lt; .1; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01. Treatment effects in relation to the elite &amp; group cue controls.

### 2.3 Study 3 (Amazon MTurk): Experiments #4-5

Table 14: Randomization check: China

	Elite Divided	Elite Consensus	Group Endorse	Group Oppose
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Military assertiveness	−0.080 (0.247)	−0.300 (0.248)	0.172 (0.238)	0.059 (0.237)
Internationalism	0.550** (0.269)	−0.077 (0.267)	0.353 (0.258)	−0.283 (0.256)
Party ID	0.135 (0.204)	0.092 (0.205)	0.058 (0.197)	−0.202 (0.196)
Male	−0.045 (0.096)	0.022 (0.097)	0.028 (0.093)	0.035 (0.092)
Age	−0.005 (0.004)	0.007 (0.004)	−0.003 (0.004)	−0.003 (0.004)
Education	0.017 (0.035)	−0.081** (0.036)	−0.055 (0.034)	0.050 (0.034)
Constant	−0.910*** (0.277)	−0.503* (0.274)	−0.413 (0.265)	−0.270 (0.264)
N	1,994	1,994	1,994	1,994
AIC	2,548.103	2,534.239	2,686.388	2,702.630

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Table 15: Randomization check: ICSID

	Elite Divided	Elite Consensus	Group Endorse	Group Oppose
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Military assertiveness	-0.103 (0.247)	0.164 (0.247)	0.059 (0.237)	0.172 (0.238)
Internationalism	0.122 (0.266)	-0.071 (0.267)	-0.283 (0.256)	0.353 (0.258)
Party ID	0.345* (0.204)	-0.380* (0.205)	-0.202 (0.196)	0.058 (0.197)
Male	0.071 (0.096)	-0.070 (0.096)	0.035 (0.092)	0.028 (0.093)
Age	0.007 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)
Education	-0.017 (0.035)	-0.007 (0.035)	0.050 (0.034)	-0.055 (0.034)
Constant	-1.071*** (0.275)	-0.565** (0.274)	-0.270 (0.264)	-0.413 (0.265)
N	1,994	1,994	1,994	1,994
AIC	2,543.611	2,550.857	2,702.630	2,686.388

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

### 2.3.1 Comparison of group cue treatments

Studies 1 and 2 build on [Mann and Sinclair \(2013\)](#) by using a social cue treatment that presents respondents with the responses from other survey respondents who answered the previous survey respondents like them. By using the “like you” language, we avoid the problem of selecting a pre-defined reference group for participants, thereby letting participants define the relevant comparison point for themselves rather than assuming they identify with other members of groups defined by particular descriptive characteristics (as would be the case in treatments that emphasized what other respondents of the same gender, or who resided in the same town, thought).

However, it also raises four sets of questions. First, it raises questions about the mundane realism of the treatment: although participants are often presented with polling data summarizing the views of others, they are rarely so micro-directed as to only reflect the responses of others “like them”. When news articles present polling results, for example, the survey results presented rarely varies depending on the individual reader! Second, it raises questions about the construct validity: although many social networks tend towards homophily (e.g. [McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001](#); [Freelon, Lynch, and Aday, 2015](#)), this tendency is far from universal ([Huckfeldt, Mendez, and Osborn, 2004](#); [Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011](#)). Third, it raises questions about the

mechanisms driving the treatment effects. The interpretation advanced in the main text is that the group cues are *social* cues, operating by presenting information about the beliefs of other societal actors. A more individualistic interpretation, however, might be that the results are being driven by the words “like you”, which may produce pressures for attitudinal consistency, in which respondents who have already expressed a certain set of political attitudes express viewpoints similar to those of other individuals who also happen to share these attitudes. Fourth, it raises questions about the comparability between the social cue and the elite cues, since the elite cues are not presented in the form of responses of “elites like you.”

Thus, for experiments 4-5 in Study 3, we employ two types of group cues. As before, we include both a group endorse cue, and a group oppose cue, in which participants are presented with a set of survey marginals, along with a group control, in which no social cues are presented. Here, however, we include two types of each group cue: a pair of treatments where the survey marginals are the views of respondents who answered the previous set of survey responses *like them*, and a more generic social cue where the survey marginals are simply presented as the views of other survey respondents. By comparing these two sets of treatments, we can determine whether the results are being driven by the “like you” wording.

We carry out this analysis in four steps. First, in Table 18 we run an OLS model with both the original social cue (group endorse “like you” and group oppose “like you” and the generic group endorse, and the generic group oppose (omitting the “like you phrasing”). From a visual inspection, and a formal test of the equality coefficients ( $F$ -test), we find no statistical difference in the coefficients between the original (“like you”) social cues and the generic social cues. This suggests that the effects of our social cues are not driven by the wording “like you.” Second, we estimate a series of Davidson-MacKinnon J tests to compare a model that includes a separate set of indicator variables for each of the four social cues (group endorse “like you”, group oppose “like you”, the generic group endorse, and the generic group oppose), and a model that pools the type of social cue together (a pooled group endorse, and a pooled group oppose); it systematically fails to find evidence that one model is better than the other.<sup>2</sup>

Third, we conduct a simple visual test, plotting the density distributions of our dependent variable of interest for each experiment, conditioning on elite and group cues. If the results are being driven by the “like you” language, we should see systematically different findings between

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<sup>2</sup>For China, in an additive specification:  $t = -0.772$ ,  $p < 0.44$  for the full model, and  $t = 0.625$ ,  $p < 0.532$  for the pooled model; in an interactive specification:  $t = 1.094$ ,  $p < 0.27$  for the full model, and  $t = 1.506$ ,  $p < 0.13$  for the pooled model. For ICSID, in an additive specification:  $t = 1.031$ ,  $p < 0.30$  for the full model,  $t = 0.622$ ,  $p < 0.53$  for the pooled model; in an interactive specification:  $t = -2.754$ ,  $p < 0.006$  for the full model,  $t = 2.873$ ,  $p < 0.004$  for the pooled model. Thus, for three of the four tests, we fail to find evidence that the model fits significantly differ; for the last test, we find they differ, but that neither one outperforms the other. The results from the rank-sum tests, and a visual inspection of Figure 8 confirm this pattern.





the salmon- and turquoise-colored distributions in each panel in Figure 8. Instead, we see that the two sets of treatments track together, only deviating slightly in the elite consensus x group oppose condition in the ICSID experiment (the middle panel in the bottom row of Figure 8(b)).

Table 16: Rank-sum tests comparing the two types of group cues

Elite cue	Social cue	China experiment	ICSID experiment
Control	Endorse	$p < 0.597$	$p < 0.743$
Consensus	Endorse	$p < 0.773$	$p < 0.354$
Divided	Endorse	$p < 0.903$	$p < 0.534$
Control	Oppose	$p < 0.245$	$p < 0.869$
Consensus	Oppose	$p < 0.697$	$p < 0.040$
Divided	Oppose	$p < 0.606$	$p < 0.754$

Fourth, we conduct more formal counterparts to the visual tests from above by estimating a series of Wilcoxon rank-sum tests that explicitly compares each of the two distributions. The test results further buttress the findings from the visual test, in that of the twelve comparisons being made, only the distributions in the elite consensus x group oppose condition in the ICSID experiment significantly differ from one another ( $p < 0.04$ ). Given the sheer number of comparisons, and the overall pattern of the distributions, we thus simplify the analyses presented in the main text by pooling the generic social cue and “like you” social cue together.

Figure 8: Density distributions of group cues



The overlapping density plots confirm the results of the J tests and rank sum tests described above, showing that the two types of group cues have similar effects to one another, such that we pool them in the main analysis in the text. The findings thus suggest that the group cue treatment effects are not being driven by the “like you” language used in Studies 1 and 2.

Table 17: Summary Statistics and Sample Characteristics for Study 3

	N	NA	Min	Max	Median	Mean	Std. Dev.	Description
Male	1994	3	0	1	1.000	0.503	0.500	
Age	1997	0	18	90	33.000	35.878	11.443	
Education	1997	0	1	8	5.000	4.230	1.366	From no high school (1) to graduate degree (8). Mean (4) is Associate's degree.
Party ID	1997	0	0	1	0.333	0.413	0.274	7-point scale normalized to lie between 0 and 1; 0 (Strong Democrat) to 1 (Strong Republican).
Militant Assertiveness	1997	0	0	1	0.375	0.405	0.214	Militant Assertiveness scale (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser, 1999; Kertzer and McGraw, 2012); normalized to 0-1.
Internationalism	1997	0	0	1	0.625	0.591	0.194	Internationalism scale (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser, 1999; Kertzer and McGraw, 2012); normalized to 0-1.
Armed Force China Scenario	1997	0	0	1	0.467	0.462	0.292	Support for sending military resources to Asia. Continuous 0-10 normalized to 0-1. 0 (Strongly Oppose) to 1 (Strongly Support).
Support for ICSID	1445	0	0	1	0.522	0.508	0.262	Support for allowing US citizens be subject to ICSID. Continuous 0-10 normalized to 0-1. 0 (Strongly Oppose) to 1 (Strongly Support).

Table 18: Study 3 Results (disaggregated by social cue)

	China			ICSID		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elite Divided	-0.031 (0.016)	-0.026** (0.013)	-0.026 (0.013)	-0.044*** (0.014)	-0.043*** (0.014)	-0.042*** (0.014)
Elite Consensus	0.063*** (0.016)	0.072*** (0.013)	0.071*** (0.013)	0.047*** (0.014)	0.046*** (0.014)	0.046*** (0.014)
Group Endorse (“Like You”)	0.011 (0.020)	0.004 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.045** (0.018)	0.045** (0.018)	0.045** (0.018)
Group Endorse	0.022 (0.020)	0.011 (0.017)	0.013 (0.017)	0.042** (0.018)	0.040** (0.018)	0.040** (0.018)
Group Oppose (“Like You”)	-0.094*** (0.020)	-0.094*** (0.017)	-0.095*** (0.017)	-0.064*** (0.018)	-0.069*** (0.018)	-0.068*** (0.018)
Group Oppose	-0.088*** (0.020)	-0.093*** (0.017)	-0.093*** (0.017)	-0.075*** (0.018)	-0.077*** (0.018)	-0.077*** (0.018)
Militant Assertiveness		0.655*** (0.028)	0.651*** (0.028)		0.0004 (0.029)	0.004 (0.029)
Internationalism		0.142*** (0.030)	0.141*** (0.031)		0.286*** (0.031)	0.289*** (0.031)
Party ID		0.065*** (0.023)	0.060** (0.023)		-0.016 (0.024)	-0.015 (0.024)
Controls			✓			✓
<i>F</i> -test of equality between coefficients on Social Cue Treatment Versions (1) (“Like You”) vs. (2) (Generic)						
Group Endorse Treatments	0.585	0.688	0.567	0.838	0.795	0.789
Group Oppose Treatment	0.761	0.964	0.932	0.557	0.659	0.578
N	1,997	1,997	1,994	1,997	1,997	1,994
R <sup>2</sup>	0.049	0.308	0.310	0.060	0.107	0.108
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.045	0.305	0.305	0.057	0.103	0.102

\*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01

All regressions are OLS and control for the randomly assigned order of the scenarios (China Scenario or ICSID Scenario first). Controls include *Male*, *Age*, and *Education*.

Table 19: Study 3 Results (Interactive Effects)

	China			ICSID		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elite Divided	−0.030*	−0.074**	−0.050	−0.043***	−0.011	−0.007
	(0.016)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.032)	(0.031)
Elite Consensus	0.064***	0.020	0.029	0.047***	0.093***	0.088***
	(0.016)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Group Endorse	0.017	−0.008	−0.008	0.043***	0.066**	0.065**
	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Group Oppose	−0.091***	−0.138***	−0.134***	−0.069***	−0.027	−0.031
	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Order	−0.010	−0.008	−0.018	0.012	0.011	0.009
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Military assertiveness			0.651***			0.004
			(0.028)			(0.029)
Internationalism			0.143***			0.288***
			(0.031)			(0.031)
Party ID			0.061***			−0.017
			(0.023)			(0.024)
Male			0.025**			−0.006
			(0.011)			(0.011)
Age			0.0004			−0.0003
			(0.0005)			(0.001)
Education			−0.0002			−0.001
			(0.004)			(0.004)
Divided × Endorse		0.048	0.025		−0.029	−0.033
		(0.044)	(0.037)		(0.039)	(0.038)
Divided × Oppose		0.060	0.036		−0.050	−0.053
		(0.043)	(0.037)		(0.039)	(0.038)
Consensus × Endorse		0.027	0.023		−0.037	−0.035
		(0.042)	(0.036)		(0.038)	(0.037)
Consensus × Oppose		0.084**	0.086**		−0.078**	−0.072*
		(0.042)	(0.036)		(0.038)	(0.037)
Constant	0.486***	0.513***	0.112***	0.511***	0.485***	0.342***
	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.039)
N	1,997	1,997	1,994	1,997	1,997	1,994
R <sup>2</sup>	0.048	0.051	0.313	0.060	0.062	0.110

\*p &lt; .1; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01

Table 20: Study 3 Results among those who passed the manipulation check

	China			ICSID		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Elite Divided	−0.041** (0.016)	−0.084** (0.037)	−0.048 (0.031)	−0.048*** (0.015)	−0.016 (0.035)	−0.018 (0.034)
Elite Consensus	0.071*** (0.016)	0.033 (0.035)	0.044 (0.030)	0.063*** (0.015)	0.113*** (0.032)	0.111*** (0.031)
Group Endorse	0.015 (0.018)	−0.007 (0.030)	−0.008 (0.025)	0.043*** (0.017)	0.066** (0.027)	0.066** (0.027)
Group Oppose	−0.098*** (0.018)	−0.138*** (0.030)	−0.134*** (0.025)	−0.069*** (0.017)	−0.027 (0.027)	−0.031 (0.026)
Order	−0.013 (0.013)	−0.012 (0.013)	−0.017 (0.011)	0.010 (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)	0.005 (0.012)
Military Assertiveness			0.683*** (0.030)			−0.016 (0.031)
Internationalism			0.133*** (0.032)			0.307*** (0.033)
Party ID			0.051** (0.024)			−0.002 (0.026)
Male			0.024** (0.011)			−0.014 (0.012)
Age			0.0003 (0.001)			−0.0003 (0.001)
Education			0.001 (0.004)			0.001 (0.004)
Divided × Endorse		0.045 (0.045)	0.013 (0.038)		−0.031 (0.042)	−0.033 (0.041)
Divided × Oppose		0.061 (0.045)	0.033 (0.038)		−0.049 (0.041)	−0.048 (0.040)
Consensus × Endorse		0.028 (0.044)	0.023 (0.037)		−0.041 (0.039)	−0.040 (0.038)
Consensus × Oppose		0.067 (0.044)	0.072* (0.037)		−0.086** (0.040)	−0.086** (0.039)
Constant	0.491*** (0.019)	0.515*** (0.025)	0.107*** (0.038)	0.512*** (0.017)	0.486*** (0.023)	0.330*** (0.041)
N	1,837	1,837	1,835	1,758	1,758	1,755
R <sup>2</sup>	0.057	0.058	0.332	0.069	0.071	0.123

\*p &lt; .1; \*\*p &lt; .05; \*\*\*p &lt; .01

### 2.3.2 Explaining variation in the efficacy of elite cues

As the discussion in the main text indicates, although social cues display the strongest results across all five studies, the effects of elite cues are inconsistent, with weak or non-significant effects in Experiments 1-3, and stronger effects in Experiments 4-5. That we find such inconsistent effects for elite cues is not unusual: Bullock (2011), for example, laments that the magnitude of variation across experimental studies of the effects of elite cues “makes generalization difficult.”

Guisinger and Saunders (2017) offer a pair of mechanisms that might be able to account for this variation, suggesting that the effect of elite cues depends on two characteristics of the pre-existing distribution of opinion. The first concerns ceiling effects: if a high proportion of the sample already agrees with the policy, there is less room for elite endorsements to bolster support.<sup>3</sup> Of course, there’s no reason why ceiling effects should implicate elite cues in particular: if social cues can exert a significant effect in Experiment 3 but elite cues cannot, ceiling effects are unlikely to blame. The second concerns underlying polarization: partisan cues should exert stronger effects on issues where the underlying level of polarization is high.

We can test both of these hypotheses here. Following Guisinger and Saunders (2017), we first calculated the baseline level of support for each policy in Experiments 3-5 (as measured by the mean level of support of respondents in the elite control x group control condition).<sup>4</sup> As shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 9, contrary to their findings, Experiments 4-5, where elite cues have stronger effects, actually feature a *higher* level of baseline support, rather than a lower level; if anything, the green and blue distributions for Experiments 4-5 are to the *right* of the red distribution for Experiment 3, though the magnitudes are small. In this sense, there is little reason to suspect ceiling effects are artificially dampening the effect of elite cues in Experiment 3.


In the right-hand panel of Figure 9, we calculate the baseline level of polarization among participants in the group and elite control conditions for Experiments 3-5, dropping the independents from each sample, and calculating the difference between the average level of support for each policy among Republicans, minus the average level of support for each policy among Democrats, the distributions of which are calculated here using  $B = 1500$  bootstraps. Positive values thus indicate policies more popular among Republicans than Democrats, and values further away from 0 indicate greater degrees of polarization. Here, we find that the green and blue distributions representing Experiments 4 and 5 show significantly more partisan polarization among respondents than the red distribution representing Experiment 3. Consistent with Guisinger and Saunders (2017), then, this

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<sup>3</sup>Guisinger and Saunders (2017) frame the mechanism as “the share of the population not already in alignment with elite opinion”, but since elite opinion in their study reflects the content of the elite cue being manipulated, the two are functionally equivalent.

<sup>4</sup>We focus on Experiments 3-5, because Experiments 1-2 do not have an elite control condition, precluding the possibility of obtaining a baseline measurement free of cues.

Figure 9: Experiments 4-5 display a higher level of polarization, but not a lower level of baseline support



Following Guisinger and Saunders (2017), the two panels in this figure test two different explanations for why the effect of elite cues is stronger in Experiments 4-5 than Experiment 3. The left-hand panel plots the baseline level of support among participants in the group and elite control, in Experiment 3 (a China experiment, shown in red), Experiment 4 (a revised China experiment, shown in green), and Experiment 5 (the ICSID experiment, shown in blue); the three density distributions are shown along with vertical lines denoting the mean of each distribution. The plot shows that if anything, there is a higher baseline level of support in Experiments 4-5, such that the weaker results in Experiment 3 cannot be due to a ceiling effect. The right-hand panel plots the baseline level of partisan polarization for each of the three studies (with Experiment 3 in red, Experiment 4 in green, and Experiment 5 in blue, as before; the further each distribution is from the black dashed vertical line in the center of the figure, the higher the levels of polarization). The figure thus shows that Experiments 4-5 display significantly higher levels of polarization than Experiment 3, suggesting why elite cues display stronger effects in the final two experiments.



higher degree of polarization suggests one reason why elite cues display stronger effects in these two experiments, which were fielded at the end of September during a highly polarizing Presidential election. Indeed, at the end of the survey, one of our participants remarked how unusual it was for Democrats and Republicans to be united on any given issue, rendering the elite consensus treatment more costly than it would have been had the study been fielded further away from election day.

### 2.3.3 Subgroup analysis by trust and vote choice

Finally, Experiments 4-5 also allow us to offer further evidence in favor of our theoretical mechanisms. One of our central critiques of top-down models of public opinion in foreign policy are that cues are the most persuasive when they come from cuegivers you trust, and in an era when more Americans are turning away from party politics (Krupnikov and Klar, 2016), trust in government is abysmally low (Keele, 2007), and the most notable political events of the past year consist of populist anger against the political establishment (whether manifested by Brexit, Donald Trump steamrolling his way to the Republican nomination over the ardent objections of GOP elites, and so on), it seems plausible that people might take cues from actors other than partisan political elites.

To seek additional evidence exploring our theoretical mechanisms, in Experiments 4-5 we included a standard measure of trust in government borrowed from the American National Election Survey (a sample item: “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington do do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?”). Given that we were fielding our study a month out from a rather hotly contested Presidential election whose contours have been shaped by anti-establishment sentiment, we also included a standard measure of vote choice borrowed from a Bloomberg Politics poll (“If the general election were held today, and the candidates were Hillary Clinton for the Democrats, Donald Trump for the Republicans, Gary Johnson for the Libertarian Party, or Jill Stein for the Green Party, for whom would you vote?”). If our theoretical story is correct, we should expect (i) respondents with less trust in government to be less swayed by the elite cues in our experiment, and (ii) Donald Trump supporters to be less swayed by the elite cues in our experiment, given the anger many of them tend to report about established politicians on both sides in Washington.

Table 21 presents the results from a set of linear regression models estimating the effects of our elite and social cue treatments for both the China and ICSID experiments, while also controlling for the order in which the experiments were fielded to account for any potential order effects. The first four columns in the table subset the sample by median-splitting the respondents into those who express a low level of trust in government, compared to those who report a high level of trust in government. The last four columns in the table subset the sample into those who reported

Table 21: Elite cues are three times stronger for Clinton supporters than Trump supporters

	China		ICSID		China		ICSID	
	Low trust	High trust	Low trust	High trust	Clinton	Trump	Clinton	Trump
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Elite division	-0.024 (0.019)	-0.047* (0.027)	-0.037** (0.016)	-0.068** (0.026)	-0.071*** (0.020)	0.041 (0.031)	-0.090*** (0.018)	0.057** (0.029)
Elite consensus	0.056*** (0.018)	0.112*** (0.029)	0.060*** (0.016)	0.003 (0.027)	0.088*** (0.020)	0.044 (0.031)	0.061*** (0.018)	0.056* (0.029)
Group endorse	0.004 (0.021)	0.058* (0.030)	0.036** (0.018)	0.074*** (0.029)	0.015 (0.023)	0.059* (0.034)	0.050** (0.020)	0.014 (0.032)
Group oppose	-0.096*** (0.021)	-0.065** (0.031)	-0.085*** (0.018)	-0.019 (0.028)	-0.089*** (0.023)	-0.062* (0.034)	-0.052*** (0.020)	-0.114*** (0.032)
Order	-0.014 (0.015)	0.0001 (0.023)	0.016 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.022)	-0.011 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.025)	0.001 (0.015)	0.006 (0.023)
Constant	0.478*** (0.022)	0.502*** (0.031)	0.493*** (0.019)	0.572*** (0.030)	0.464*** (0.024)	0.568*** (0.035)	0.549*** (0.021)	0.463*** (0.033)
N	1,512	481	1,512	481	1,003	543	1,003	543
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.036	0.097	0.066	0.043	0.087	0.028	0.099	0.048
Max elite cue	+8.0%	+15.9%	+9.7%	+7.1%	+15.8%	+4.4%	+15.1%	+5.6%

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

an intention to vote for Hillary Clinton, and those who reported an intention to vote for Donald Trump.<sup>5</sup> For the China experiment, respondents with high levels of trust in government appear to be more sensitive to elite cues than individuals with low trust in government; comparing the elite consensus condition to the control, individuals who are high in trust in government display a treatment effect roughly two times larger than individuals who are low in trust in government, a statistically significant difference ( $p < 0.037$ ). For the ICSID experiment, the differences in treatment effects displayed between individuals with low and high trust are not statistically significant. When we subset the results by vote choice, we find even more striking results. Here, a direct comparison of the coefficients is somewhat more complex, because the treatment effects have different meanings based on the subsample (e.g. for Trump supporters, the elite division treatment involves their party being in favor and the outparty being opposed, while for Clinton supporters, the elite division treatment involves their party being opposed and the outparty being in favor). Thus, we instead calculate the maximum effect of elite cues within each subsample, by estimating the largest contrast for each (thus, for Clinton supporters, the max elite cue effect is between elite division and elite consensus; for Trump supporters, the max elite cue effect is between the elite control condition and the elite consensus condition). Here, we find that elite cues display a maximum effect 3.6 times bigger in the China experiment for Clinton supporters than for Trump supporters, and 2.7 times bigger in the ICSID experiment for Clinton supporters than for Trump supporters.<sup>6</sup> These results

<sup>5</sup>Johnson and Stein supporters are dropped from the analysis due to their small cell sizes.

<sup>6</sup>Although it is plausible we would see larger cues for Trump supporters if we had a condition where elite Republicans were explicitly opposed to the policy, given the magnitude of the other effect sizes, it is unlikely such a treatment would sufficiently narrow the gap; in the China experiment, for example, in order for elite cues to exert as large an

thus offer additional evidence in favor of the theoretical account we present here.

## 2.4 Salience of foreign policy during survey periods

A possible concern about our study is perhaps voters are not necessarily ignorant of foreign affairs, but simply that these issues are less central to most citizens' daily lives. To measure how salient foreign policy issues were during the period of our survey we turn to the polling aggregator website [PollingReport](http://www.pollingreport.com).<sup>7</sup> Going back to July of 2015–November 2016, terrorism or national security consistently ranked among the most important issues facing Americans, behind only the economy.<sup>8</sup>

- CNN/ORC poll from July 22–25, 2015 ranked terrorism 3rd (12%) and foreign policy 5th (10%)
- Quinnipiac University. July 23–28, 2015 ranked terrorism 3rd (12%) and foreign policy 4th (9%)
- ABC News/Washington Post Poll. November 16–19, 2015 ranked terrorism 2nd (29%)
- CBS News Poll. April 8–12, 2016 ranked terrorism/Islamic extremism/ISIS 2nd (9%)
- NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll May 15–19, 2016 ranked 2nd (21%)
- ABC News/Washington Post Poll. Sept. 5–8, 2016 terrorism/national security ranked 2nd (19%)
- CBS News/New York Times Poll. Sept. 9–13, 2016 national security, terrorism ranked 2nd (29%)
- CBS News/New York Times Poll. Oct. 28–Nov. 1, 2016 national security, terrorism ranked 2nd (28%)

Furthermore, a Gallup poll from January 21–25 2016, showed that both Democrats (82%) and Republicans (92%) ranked terrorism and national security as “extremely” or “very important.”<sup>9</sup> In this sense, although foreign policy issues may not be the sole concern of the mass public, it nonetheless looms larger than some of the more pessimistic takes of public opinion in foreign policy would allege.

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effect for Trump supporters as they do for Clinton supporters, the effect of the Republican oppose/Democrats support treatment compared to the elite control would have to be at least  $-11.4\%$ ; in comparison, the effect of elite division compared to the elite control is  $+4.1\%$ , and the effect of elite consensus compared to the elite control is  $+4.4\%$ .

<sup>7</sup>See <http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm>.

<sup>8</sup>These contain every poll where national security or terrorism were mentioned.

<sup>9</sup>See <http://www.gallup.com/poll/188918/democrats-republicans-agree-four-top-issues-campaign.aspx>

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