ONLINE APPENDIX

Anger, Legacies of Violence, and Group Conflict: An Experiment in Post-Riot Acre, Israel

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OA.1 Recruitment

The demographic characteristics of each neighborhood are presented in Table 1.

Characteristic	*Shuknah Burla*	*HaMerkaz*	*Old City*
% Jewish	93.8	51.9	3.5
% of Jews Born in Israel	63.7	54.6	—
Population in Thousands	3.8	5.4	3.6
Households in Thousands	1.2	1.8	0.9
Median Male Age	29.0	29.0	28.0
% Matriculation (Educ.)	50.5	38.8	34.2
% Labor Force Participation	69.6	60.5	39.9

Table 1: **Neighborhood Characteristics Based on the 2008 Census**

Subjects were sampled proportional to population and ethnic group percentage in each of the three neighborhoods demarcated on the map in Figure 1 (main text).[1] Each neighborhood was divided into three geographical enumeration areas of roughly equal population size. Survey assistants

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[1]In discussions with local representatives, I avoided sampling Jews from the Old City and PCIs from Shuknah Burla. This was done for three reasons. (1) The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics only presents the dominant percentage of each religious group. (2) Following the riots, several PCI families have moved out of Shuknah Burla (The Mossawa Center, December 2008; Peraino, 2009). so the percentage of Jews is higher than the 2008 census statistics (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). would suggest in Table 1. (3) Finally, the very small minority of Jews

(SAs) were then given a map of each enumeration area and sampled proportional to population, selecting every fourth household. SAs only surveyed households of their given ethnicity. For instance, Jewish SAs surveyed the Jewish households and PCI SAs surveyed the PCI households. Mixed survey teams (one Jewish SA and one PCI SA) surveyed the HaMerkaz.[2] Surveys were given in Arabic to PCIs and Hebrew to Jewish residents of Acre. There were difficulties with low response rates among Jews living in the HaMerkaz and Jewish immigrants with Hebrew difficulties. A survey company, the Mahshov Institute, was hired to contact remaining Jewish households from a landline sampling frame to schedule appointments and provide translators where needed. The experimental protocol proceeded in exactly the same way as in the door-to-door sample, with subjects being surveyed in their home face-to-face; the only difference was the mode of contact.[3]

Eligible respondents had to be males between the age of 22-65.[4] All selected households were visited between 5:00PM-10:00PM, to avoid skewing the sample towards unemployed individuals. Selected households were approached twice more if no one was home on the first visit, for three total visits. Within selected households, eligible males were randomly chosen via a Kish grid (Kish, 1949). Prospective respondents were asked if they would like to participate in a study on community relations in Acre where they could earn between 20 and 76 Shekels (approximately 5 to 20 USD). If they assented, then the experimental protocol began. If they did not, the next household was substituted using the same randomization procedure. The response rate broken down by ethnicity and mode is presented in Table 2 below.

As Table 2 shows, the response rate was significantly higher for PCIs as compared to Jews. This is partially due to opportunity cost: on average, Jewish residents of Acre are wealthier than PCI

and PCIs that live in outgroup-dominated neighborhoods are likely to be different than Jews or PCIs who reside in the other neighborhoods.

[2]Only the SA of a given ethnicity knocked on the door in HaMerkaz. Ex ante, SAs were able to correctly identify the vast majority of apartments and homes in HaMerkaz (using surname or other religious characteristics).

[3]There can be problems with collecting a sample using multiple modes (i.e. door-to-door vs. a landline sampling frame).

[4]The minimum age of 22 was put in place to insure that Jews included in the survey would have finished their compulsory military service at the time of the survey. I also did not restrict the sample to men ages 18-35, or even younger for two reasons. (1) The current study is about the broader political impact of anger over past ethnic violence, not who is most likely to participate in ethnic violence (i.e. younger men). (2) I am able to compare how the most aggressive men—those who are hypothesized to be most likely to participate— compare to the less aggressive men. In Section 5.4 in the main text, I do precisely this and find the results are largely driven by the most aggressive men.

Neighborhood	**PCI**		**Jews**		
	# Subjects	***Response Rate*** (Door-to-Door)	***#Subjects***	***Response Rate*** (Door-to-Door)	(Phone)
Burla	—	—	89	23.9%	16.2%
Merkaz	63	67.7%	61	18.9%	14.5%
Old City	84	77.8%	—	—	—
Total	147		150		

Table 2: **Number of Subjects Recruited (by Neighborhood and Ethnicity) and Response Rate (by Mode)**

residents (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). One concern may be that any difference in experimental behavior between Jews and PCIs may be due to group economic differences in respondents rather than ethnicity, so I also include controls for employment status. Additionally, I construct post-stratification weights for Jews to correct for low response among immigrants.

OA.2 In-depth Experimental Protocol

The experiment lasted about 20-30 minutes. During the experiment subjects were asked to go to a quiet corner of their household where they would be free to answer questions without interference. The survey was self-administered. The protocol began with a short background demographic survey. Following the background survey, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two emotional manipulations: an *Anger Treatment* or a *Neutral Condition*.[5] The manipulation is derived from Ekman (1992), and has been used extensively in political psychology (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small and Fischhoff, 2003; Myers and Tingley, 2011; Zeitzoff, 2014). The manipulations showed subjects a picture and asked them to write about what makes them angry about the riots in the *Anger Condition*, or write about tourism in the *Neutral Condition*. In the *Anger Treatment* subjects were presented with the following information:

Brief Background Statistics on the 2008 Acre Riots

**Began on Yom Kippur Eve (Kol Nidre).*

[5]Figure 3 presents the randomization check for the *Anger Treatment*. It shows that the treatment was orthogonal to demographic characteristics (age, neighborhood of residence, post-stratification weights). All sensitive questions (riot exposure and intergroup attitudes) were asked post-treatment to avoid priming the riots before the behavioral experiment. Figure 3 shows that the *Anger Treatment* does not influence responses on these sensitive questions.

**Lasted four nights (October 8th-11th)*

**700 extra police officers were deployed*

**Between 60-70 people were arrested*

**The estimated damage from the riots was about 10 million shekels (NIS)*

They were also shown the picture of a rioter being restrained in Figure 1.[6] They were then asked to complete the following:

Figure 1: A rioter being restrained after confronting Acre police
Photo by Uriel Sinai/Getty Images

The 2008 Acre Riots caused people to feel a lot of emotions. We are interested in what made and continues to make you most ANGRY about the riots. Please describe in detail the one thing that made and still makes you most ANGRY about these riots. Write as detailed a description of that one thing (that made you most angry) as possible. If you can, write your description so that someone reading it might even get ANGRY from learning about the riots.[7]

In the *Neutral Condition*, subjects were asked to write about their thoughts and feelings on a more neutral topic, tourism, and presented with the picture in Figure 2.

Background on the City of Acres attractions

[6]There may be a concern that the picture of the rioter in Figure 1 was easily identified as being Jewish or PCI. Interviews with local residents suggested this was not the case, as answers varied on his ethnicity (Jewish/PCI). Given the large Mizrahi Jewish population in Acre, it is not easy to visually distinguish between secular PCIs and Jews.

[7]The *Anger Treatment* is intentionally agnostic of the target of the anger in order to get a baseline measure of the effect of anger on intergroup conflict. Looking at calls to action or emotional endorsements by politicians (such as Bullock, Imai and Shapiro (2011)) represent an important future avenue of research.

**Recognized by the United Nations as a "World Heritage Site" for its great significance to the World's cultural heritage*

**Over 444,000 tourists visit the city each year*

**Beautiful beaches for fishing, swimming, and relaxing*

**Internationally famous fish and traditional hummus restaurants*

Figure 2: **View of Acre**
Photo by `http://www.crown-tours.com/city.html`

Acre has a lot to offer visitors and tourists, including wonderful beaches, restaurants and historical sites. Tourism to Acre helps everybody and brings a lot of money to the city and local businesses. We are interested in what you think the City of Acre could do to make the city even more attractive to tourists. Improve the beaches? Better conservation of historical sites? Better advertising for the restaurants? More museums? Please write what you think below.

The *Neutral Condition* and *Anger Treatment* were carefully designed to provide a comparison between priming anger over the riots and a neutral stimulus that was orthogonal to the riots.[8] In comparing decisions under the *Anger Treatment* versus *Neutral Condition*, I am adhering to extant theories of ethnic conflict (Petersen, 2002; Horowitz, 2001). These theories do not argue that it

[8]I pre-tested a variety of different primes including a *Riot Only* condition—which only mentioned the riots, but did not attempt to manipulate anger as in the *Anger Treatment*. However, the *Riot Only* treatment also elevated anger comparable to the *Anger Treatment*.

is simply anger that drives ethnic conflict, rather *anger in the context of past ethnic violence* (i.e. the *Anger Treatment*). I then test this against a treatment orthogonal to the riot (the *Neutral Condition*) and that is salient to both Jews and PCIs—tourism in Acre.[9]

After subjects completed the emotional manipulation, they were given a brief manipulation check of questions asking how angry/afraid (other emotions as well) they felt at that moment. They then were confronted with a monetary decision on how to divide income between themselves and other subjects designated as their partners.[10] This decision was framed as a one-shot interaction: they were told that their partner had no input to the decision, and would not influence how much money they received. Subjects were told nothing more about their three potential partners, other than that they were males, aged 22-65 from the three different neighborhoods also participating in the game. Subjects were given two forms. One was a neighborhood form that contained a list of the three neighborhoods (Old City, HaMerkaz, Burla) in randomized order (1,2,3) to prevent order effects. Each neighborhood was assigned a number (*Neighborhood 1, Neighborhood 2...etc.*). To prevent experimenter bias, SAs never saw the neighborhood form, only the form that contained the subjects' choices and the neighborhood numbers (the subjects were aware of this as well).[11]

Subjects were also given a separate sheet of paper that contained three decision tables as shown in Table 3 (one for each neighborhood). They were informed that each row represented a choice of how many shekels they wanted to take away from their partner and add to their own income. Subjects made three choices: one for each neighborhood. They were told that they would randomly be paid for one of these choices. This random payoff was used to increase the salience of the choices subjects made by increasing their monetary value.[12] Subjects started with 20 shekels and their

[9]See `http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/when-acre-goes-boutique-1.421651`. Furthermore, the prime was designed to elicit anger over the riots in an ethical way by not using deception or inflammatory language that could potentially exacerbate intergroup tensions in Acre.

[10]They were told that there was "some chance that your decision will go to another subject from the specified neighborhood in the game." The words "some chance" were used as opposed to "certainty" to avoid deception. Each subjects' decisions were put into bags that had a chance of being drawn by future participants (hence the the use of "some chance"). All decisions actually had chances of being drawn by individuals. The last participants choices were included in a bag and drawn by males 22-65 from the assigned neighborhoods. It is true that this introduces uncertainty into subjects' decisions. Yet, logistically and ethically this was the preferable way to conduct this experiment.

[11]This meant that subjects were aware that the SA would see their decisions, but not how they allocated the money to each neighborhood (i.e. how much they gave to the ingroup versus outgroup), thereby reducing experimenter bias.

[12]Morton and Williams 2010, p. 279.

potential partner with 40 shekels. For every 5 shekels they took away from their partner they were able to keep 2 shekels and 3 were 'lost.' Taking away shekels not only imposed a cost on the partner, but also on social welfare, as 60% of the shekels taken were destroyed. Subjects faced a trade-off between maximizing their own income, take 36 shekels for themselves and giving their partner nothing, or maximizing social welfare, give 40 shekels to their partner and 20 shekels for themselves. For each row, they kept the amount in the column that says "My final income" and their partner got the income in the far right column ("My partner's final income"). For each of their three partners from the three neighborhoods, they placed an "X" in the row next to their choice in the choice column as shown in Table 3.

The key question is how does the *Anger Treatment* influence how much subjects allocate to each of their partners? Previous research in social psychology and political science[13] would suggest that in the absence of group identity, a slightly more than a 50-50 split in favor of the subject making the decision would be the average strategy (26, 25 split in Table 3). Deviations from this strategy, where subjects allocate higher amounts to partners from ingroup neighborhoods and lower amounts to those from outgroup neighborhoods, would suggest norms of discrimination and high levels of intergroup conflict (Brewer, 1999). I argue that a greater willingness to take income from an anonymous partner is an aggressive act (Burnham, 2007; Millet and Dewitte, 2009; McDermott, Tingley, Cowden, Frazzetto and Johnson, 2009), albeit at a much lower level than participation in ethnic violence. Moreover, a key difference from other behavioral economics games is that the more money taken in the game, the more the total amount of income shrinks. The increasing social costs in the game further highlights the aggressive nature of the decision to take money (Bosman and Van Winden, 2002).

After filling out the decision tables, subjects completed a survey that gauged their perceptions about their potential partners from the three different neighborhoods, their political attitudes, and their exposure to the 2008 riots. After a subject filled out the survey, he randomly drew one set of numbers each from two separate bags. The first bags contained the numbers 1-3 on small sheets of paper. Whichever number (N) they drew from the first bag they were paid the amount

[13] Brewer 1979; Whitt and Wilson 2007.

Choice for Neighborhood 1	**How much I take from my partner**	**How much I add to my own income**	**My final income**	**My partners final income**
	0 shekels	0 shekels	20 shekels	40 shekels
	5 shekels	2 shekels	22 shekels	35 shekels
	10 shekels	4 shekels	24 shekels	30 shekels
	15 shekels	6 shekels	26 shekels	25 shekels
	20 shekels	8 shekels	28 shekels	20 shekels
	25 shekels	10 shekels	30 shekels	15 shekels
	30 shekels	12 shekels	32 shekels	10 shekels
	35 shekels	14 shekels	34 shekels	5 shekels
	40 shekels	16 shekels	36 shekels	0 shekels

Table 3: **Monetary Choices**

that corresponded to the division of income they made for neighborhood N. The second bag they drew from contained allocations from subjects who had previously made decisions for subjects their neighborhood. Subjects drew a number from this bag also. They were paid the sum of these two amounts: their decision for neighborhood N and someone who had previously played the game.[14] The average payoff to a subject was 52.7 shekels (NIS).[15]

OA.3 Randomization Checks, and Contribution Distributions

[14]To avoid cuing concerns about reciprocity, subjects were not informed about receiving income from someone who had previously played the experiment until after they completed the final survey.

[15]This was equal to $15.28 USD at an exchange rate of 3.45 NIS to $1 USD.



Figure 3: **Randomization Check for Anger Treatment** Two-tailed t-test with unequal variance. T-test for post-stratification weights are calculated only for Jews. Dashed red lines represent $p = 0.10$ and solid red lines represent $p = 0.05$.



Figure 4: **Distribution of Contributions across Ethnicities and Neighborhoods**

OA.4 Pooled Tobit and Disaggregated Results With and Without Controls

OA.4.1 Pooled Results

Given that the dependent variable (contribution decisions) is truncated between 0 NIS and 40 NIS, a Tobit model is used to model subjects' erase decision to each neighborhood (Greene, 2008). Table 4 presents the pooled model for subjects' contributions to the various neighborhoods: ingroup, mixed, outgroup, along with discrimination (difference between ingroup and outgroup). For each of the four quantities of interest I present two models. The first model contains only the principle variables of interest (bold above the horizontal line). A second model includes the additional controls (below the horizontal line). I also include post-stratification weights for Jewish respondents to correct for the potential threats to inference from the low response rate among Jewish immigrants. These weights were constructed using marginals from 2008 Israel Census (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011) for the percentage of Jews in the *Labor Force*, *Born in Israel*, and those that have a matriculation certificate *Education* for each neighborhood with Jews (HaMerkaz and Shuknah Burla).[16]

The *Anger Treatment* decreases subjects' contributions across the different neighborhoods. However, it has the greatest magnitude and highest significance at an ingroup-level. Priming anger over the riots does not seem to increase ingroup contributions or discrimination against the outgroup. Jews also contribute less to their ingroup neighborhood than PCIs do—and this is also reflected in their lower levels of discrimination (negative signs on *Jewish* in Columns 1, 2, 7, and 8). The effect of *Riot Exposure*—whether an individual or their friends and family were injured or had property damaged in the riots—increases allocations to individuals from an ingroup and increased discrimination towards the outgroup.[17]

[16]The results are robust to using the unweighted data. See ***Supplementary Information***.

[17]It would be naive to assume that riot exposure is completely exogenous. I use matching to explore the robustness of the findings for the *Anger Treatment* and *Riot Exposure*. The findings are robust, and match those in Table 4.

	Dep. Variable: Contribution by Neighborhood							
Variable	**Ingroup** (1)	**Ingroup** (2)	**Mixed** (3)	**Mixed** (4)	**Outgroup** (5)	**Outgroup** (6)	**Discrim.** (7)	**Discrim.** (8)
Anger Treatment	**-4.54****	**-4.04****	**-2.86***	**-3.19****	**-3.04**	**-4.03+**	**-1.26**	**-0.43**
	(1.89)	**(1.81)**	**(1.64)**	**(1.61)**	**(2.73)**	**(2.67)**	**(1.84)**	**(1.77)**
HaMerkaz	**-7.73*****	**-6.10*****	**-2.39**	**-0.98**	**-5.68****	**-3.99**	**-2.26**	**-2.47**
	(1.99)	**(1.79)**	**(1.70)**	**(1.67)**	**(2.83)**	**(2.84)**	**(1.82)**	**(1.80)**
Jewish	**-7.41*****	**-7.55*****	**0.23**	**0.095**	**0.79**	**1.37**	**-5.74*****	**-6.58*****
	(1.93)	**(2.12)**	**(1.66)**	**(1.94)**	**(2.73)**	**(2.92)**	**(1.84)**	**(2.12)**
Riot Exposure	**1.53****	**1.72*****	**0.30**	**0.57**	**-0.56**	**-0.35**	**1.35****	**1.37****
	(0.60)	**(0.55)**	**(0.49)**	**(0.46)**	**(0.84)**	**(0.82)**	**(0.53)**	**(0.53)**
Age		0.063		0.35		0.62		-0.34
		(0.36)		(0.32)		(0.53)		(0.37)
Labor Force		-1.13		-1.34		-4.68+		3.17+
		(2.04)		(1.82)		(3.02)		(1.93)
Bagrut		1.67		-1.47		-1.01		1.77
		(1.79)		(1.72)		(2.77)		(1.76)
Political Ingroup		0.48***		0.26+		0.31		0.12
		(0.17)		(0.16)		(0.27)		(0.16)
Outgroup Favors Coex.		0.93***		0.54*		0.93*		0.099
		(0.29)		(0.30)		(0.49)		(0.33)
Physical Aggression		0.56		0.29		-0.69		0.72+
		(0.45)		(0.43)		(0.65)		(0.44)
Contact		-0.065		0.024		0.32***		-0.26***
		(0.070)		(0.067)		(0.10)		(0.072)
Constant	38.2***	28.1***	24.2***	18.0***	14.3***	5.29	17.4***	16.3***
	(2.27)	(4.38)	(1.82)	(3.57)	(3.04)	(6.56)	(2.12)	(4.24)
σ	14.8***	13.6***	13.6***	13.0***	21.7***	20.7***	15.5***	14.7***
	(1.05)	(1.00)	(0.88)	(0.87)	(1.49)	(1.44)	(0.72)	(0.74)
N	294	285	294	285	294	285	294	285
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	11	9	26	24	98	93	2	2
Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$)	94	91	38	37	30	30	31	29
$+\ p < 0.15$, $^{*}\ p < 0.10, ^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{***}\ p < 0.01$								

Table 4: **Pooled Contributions (Weighted Tobit Model)**

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed using data from Central Bureau of Statistics (2011).

Another concern may be that the Yom Kippur Riots led certain individuals (i.e. those in the mixed HaMerkaz) to leave their neighborhood and move to another one. This type of sorting behavior would be correlated with riot exposure and may bias results. The findings for the *Anger Treatment* and *Riot Exposure* are robust to only including subjects who have lived in their neighborhood since before the riot (see Table 16).

OA.4.2 Disaggregated Results

Jews and PCIs hold very different positions within Israeli and Acre society. Jews hold more positions of power in politics and civil society, and on average, have higher levels of education and income. PCIs—as a minority in a Jewish state—are more marginalized (Smooha, 1990). Given these group-based differences, it is useful to see if PCIs and Jews responded differently to the *Anger Treatment*. Therefore, I disaggregate Jewish and PCI contributions and analyze them separately.

	Dep. Variable: Jewish Contribution by Neighborhood							
Variable	**Ingroup** (1)	**Ingroup** (2)	**Mixed** (3)	**Mixed** (4)	**Outgroup** (5)	**Outgroup** (6)	**Discrim.** (7)	**Discrim.** (8)
Anger Treatment	**-4.25***	**-3.18+**	**-2.68**	**-1.57**	**-1.02**	**0.033**	**-2.53**	**-2.58**
	(2.30)	**(2.06)**	**(2.16)**	**(2.07)**	**(3.70)**	**(3.39)**	**(2.37)**	**(2.29)**
HaMerkaz	**-4.48***	**-2.79**	**1.89**	**2.65**	**6.76***	**6.72***	**-8.01*****	**-6.73*****
	(2.40)	**(2.22)**	**(2.14)**	**(1.94)**	**(3.79)**	**(3.42)**	**(2.22)**	**(2.27)**
Riot Exposure	**0.33**	**1.06**	**-0.17**	**0.83**	**-0.45**	**0.83**	**0.50**	**0.32**
	(0.91)	**(0.81)**	**(0.80)**	**(0.73)**	**(1.29)**	**(1.13)**	**(0.68)**	**(0.77)**
Born in Israel		2.82		0.96		6.85*		-2.29
		(2.65)		(2.49)		(3.99)		(2.66)
Age		0.33		0.53		2.21***		-1.06**
		(0.47)		(0.43)		(0.69)		(0.49)
Labor Force		5.01**		4.64*		7.99**		-1.17
		(2.51)		(2.36)		(3.75)		(2.54)
Education		1.44		0.50		2.07		-0.21
		(1.98)		(2.13)		(3.60)		(2.18)
Political Ingroup		0.41**		0.39**		0.32		0.14
		(0.20)		(0.19)		(0.36)		(0.24)
Outgroup Favors Coex.		0.65*		0.90***		1.17*		-0.24
		(0.33)		(0.34)		(0.62)		(0.49)
Physical Aggression		0.39		-0.50		-1.11		1.06+
		(0.59)		(0.58)		(0.85)		(0.66)
Contact		0.0091		-0.13+		0.30**		-0.22**
		(0.095)		(0.085)		(0.13)		(0.11)
Constant	30.2***	13.6***	23.1***	10.2**	9.03**	-22.7**	15.4***	22.5***
	(2.02)	(4.69)	(1.94)	(4.81)	(3.48)	(9.61)	(2.30)	(6.23)
σ	12.5***	11.2***	12.3***	11.1***	20.7***	18.2***	14.0***	13.3***
	(1.28)	(1.16)	(1.16)	(1.02)	(1.85)	(1.61)	(0.93)	(0.92)
N	148	145	148	145	148	145	148	145
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	6	4	13	11	49	47	1	1
Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$)	28	28	14	14	12	12	10	10
$+\ p < 0.15$, $^{*}\ p < 0.10, ^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{***}\ p < 0.01$								

Table 5: **Jewish Contributions (Weighted Tobit Model)**
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed from Central Bureau of Statistics (2011).

	Dep. Variable: PCI Contribution by Neighborhood							
Variable	**Ingroup**	**Ingroup**	**Mixed**	**Mixed**	**Outgroup**	**Outgroup**	**Discrim.**	**Discrim.**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Anger Treatment	**-4.67**	**-6.29****	**-2.64**	**-3.60**	**-4.00**	**-6.67***	**-0.58**	**0.46**
	(3.23)	**(3.09)**	**(2.47)**	**(2.49)**	**(3.71)**	**(3.72)**	**(2.74)**	**(2.73)**
HaMerkaz	**-11.4*****	**-7.28****	**-6.88****	**-3.38**	**-19.1*****	**-13.2****	**4.38+**	**1.97**
	(3.36)	**(3.58)**	**(2.71)**	**(3.79)**	**(4.17)**	**(5.16)**	**(2.90)**	**(3.57)**
Riot Exposure	**2.48*****	**2.15****	**0.34**	**0.60**	**-1.22**	**-1.00**	**2.27*****	**1.92****
	(0.87)	**(0.88)**	**(0.66)**	**(0.69)**	**(1.18)**	**(1.09)**	**(0.78)**	**(0.74)**
Age		-0.041		0.21		-0.85		0.39
		(0.66)		(0.52)		(0.80)		(0.62)
Labor Force		-10.5***		-7.68**		-17.2***		7.24**
		(3.92)		(3.00)		(4.44)		(3.07)
Education		2.57		-2.56		-1.07		2.00
		(3.11)		(2.93)		(4.31)		(2.98)
Political Ingroup		0.40+		0.020		0.025		0.19
		(0.27)		(0.23)		(0.33)		(0.23)
Outgroup Favors Coex.		1.02*		-0.11		-0.047		0.64
		(0.59)		(0.54)		(0.76)		(0.51)
Physical Aggression		0.48		0.70		-1.15		0.79
		(0.66)		(0.57)		(0.81)		(0.58)
Contact		-0.13		0.099		0.24*		-0.25***
		(0.10)		(0.090)		(0.13)		(0.091)
Constant	40.1***	38.8***	26.0***	26.2***	21.1***	35.1***	13.2***	4.55
	(3.25)	(6.97)	(2.38)	(5.11)	(3.85)	(7.69)	(2.73)	(5.01)
sigma	17.6***	15.6***	14.6***	13.6***	20.9***	18.9***	16.3***	15.3***
	(1.72)	(1.53)	(1.32)	(1.26)	(2.22)	(2.08)	(1.10)	(1.15)
N	146	140	146	140	146	140	146	140
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	5	5	13	13	49	46	1	1
Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$)	66	63	24	23	18	18	21	19
$+\ p < 0.15$, $^{*}\ p < 0.10$, $^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{***}\ p < 0.01$								

Table 6: **PCI Contributions (Unweighted Tobit Model)**
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses.

In Tables 5 (Jewish) and 6 (PCI), I examine how the *Anger Treatment* and *Riot Exposure* influence Jews' and PCIs' contributions. Each table estimates the effect for ingroup, mixed, outgroup, and discrimination in contributions both without and with controls. For Jewish contributions I use post-stratification weights and also control for *Born in Israel*.

The results from Table 5 and 6 also show the negative effect of the *Anger Treatment*, particularly at an ingroup-level. While not significant in all specifications, the *Anger Treatment* appears to play a stronger role in PCI contributions than Jewish contributions (the larger coefficients and the fact that it also reduces outgroup contributions). A noticeable difference between the Jewish and PCI tables is the fact that *Riot Exposure* only increases ingroup contributions and discrimination for PCIs. *Riot Exposure* does not significantly influence Jewish contributions.

OA.5 Riot Exposure

OA.5.1 Distribution of Riot Exposure

Figure 5: **Distribution of Riot Exposure Across Ethnicity and Neighborhood**

OA.5.2 Correlates of Riot Exposure

	Dep. Variable: Level of Riot Exposure	
Variable	**Jews**	**PCIs**
	(1)	(2)
Born in Israel	-0.16	—
	(0.54)	—
Time in Neighborhood	-0.0066	0.31
	(0.14)	(0.32)
HaMerkaz	-0.42	-1.06*
	(0.41)	(0.63)
Age	-0.11	-0.11
	(0.085)	(0.10)
Labor Force	-0.14	0.42
	(0.40)	(0.46)
Education	-0.53	0.31
	(0.39)	(0.47)
Political Ingroup	0.062***	0.033
	(0.024)	(0.032)
Outgroup Favors Coex.	-0.16**	0.072
	(0.064)	(0.076)
Physical Aggression	0.068	-0.036
	(0.094)	(0.080)
Contact	0.029*	-0.00015
	(0.016)	(0.013)
N	144	140
Likelihood Ratio χ^2	22.6	20.4
$+\ p < 0.15$, $^{*}\ p < 0.10, ^{**}\ p < 0.05,\ ^{***}\ p < 0.01$		

Table 7: **Correlates of Riot Exposure (Weighted Ordered Logistic Regression)** Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed from Central Bureau of Statistics (2011).

OA.5.3 Different Measures of Riot Exposure

	Dep. Variable: Contribution by Neighborhood							
Variable	**Ingroup**	**Ingroup**	**Outgroup**	**Outgroup**	**Ingroup**	**Ingroup**	**Outgroup**	**Outgroup**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Anger Treatment	-4.61**	-4.12**	-3.04	-4.07+	-4.23**	-3.67**	-3.08	-4.04+
	(1.90)	(1.83)	(2.73)	(2.68)	(1.90)	(1.82)	(2.72)	(2.67)
HaMerkaz	-7.94***	-6.52***	-5.55*	-3.79	-7.95***	-6.11***	-5.59**	-4.04+
	(1.98)	(1.84)	(2.83)	(2.82)	(1.99)	(1.81)	(2.77)	(2.80)
Jewish	-6.87***	-6.90***	0.66	1.42	-8.16***	-8.31***	1.08	1.69
	(1.99)	(2.17)	(2.76)	(2.93)	(1.92)	(2.13)	(2.74)	(2.93)
Physical Riot Exposure	2.28**	2.08**	-0.61	0.070	—	—	—	—
	(1.00)	(0.97)	(1.36)	(1.29)	—	—	—	—
Property Riot Exposure	—	—	—	—	1.81**	2.39***	-0.88	-0.95
	—	—	—	—	(0.86)	(0.82)	(1.34)	(1.35)
Controls		✓		✓		✓		✓
N	294	285	294	285	295	286	295	286
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	11	9	98	93	11	9	98	93
Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$)	94	91	30	30	94	91	30	30
$+\ p < 0.15$, $^{*}\ p < 0.10, ^{**}\ p < 0.05,\ ^{***}\ p < 0.01$								

Table 8: **Pooled Contributions Looking at Alternate Riot Measures (Weighted Tobit Model)** Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed using data from Central Bureau of Statistics (2011).

	Dep. Variable: Contributions			
Variable	**Ingroup**	**Ingroup**	**Outgroup**	**Outgroup**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anger Treatment	-3.58+	-4.28**	-2.77	-4.88
	(2.32)	(2.13)	(3.59)	(3.49)
HaMerkaz	-3.60+	-2.39	1.04	2.71
	(2.47)	(2.26)	(3.98)	(3.81)
Jewish	-8.93***	-9.30***	-6.92*	-3.44
	(2.60)	(2.81)	(3.72)	(4.17)
Riot Exposure	0.96+	1.32**	0.0060	0.34
	(0.62)	(0.59)	(0.95)	(0.92)
Controls		✓		✓
N	221	214	221	214
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	7	5	78	73
Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$)	75	73	22	22
Matching Summary	Anger (N)	Neutral (N)		
All	198	99		
Matched	130	94		
Unmatched	68	5		
$+\ p < 0.15$, $*\ p < 0.10$, $**\ p < 0.05$, $***\ p < 0.01$				

Table 9: **Pooled Contributions Robustness to Matching (Matched Tobit Model)** Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using matching weights constructed from Coarsened Exact Matching (Iacus, King and Porro, 2012). Variables matched on include *Jewish*, *HaMerkaz*, *Age*, and *Anger Treatment* with respect to a binary measure of whether or not an individual had any *Riot Exposure*.

OA.5.4 Moderating Riot Exposure

	Dep. Variable: Contribution by Neighborhood							
Variable	**Ingroup**	**Ingroup**	**Mixed**	**Mixed**	**Outgroup**	**Outgroup**	**Discrim.**	**Discrim.**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Anger Treatment	-5.05**	-4.46**	-3.39*	-3.40*	-5.89*	-6.20**	0.41	0.89
	(2.16)	(2.07)	(1.90)	(1.86)	(3.14)	(3.00)	(2.08)	(1.97)
HaMerkaz	-7.77***	-6.14***	-2.43	-1.00	-5.97**	-4.24+	-2.11	-2.35
	(1.99)	(1.79)	(1.69)	(1.66)	(2.82)	(2.84)	(1.80)	(1.79)
Jewish	-7.41***	-7.51***	0.23	0.12	0.84	1.60	-5.77***	-6.71***
	(1.93)	(2.11)	(1.66)	(1.93)	(2.72)	(2.92)	(1.83)	(2.12)
Riot Exposure	1.25+	1.49*	0.036	0.46	-2.01*	-1.48	2.20***	2.06***
	(0.82)	(0.81)	(0.56)	(0.57)	(1.12)	(1.05)	(0.76)	(0.74)
Riot Exposure X Anger Treatment	0.51	0.44	0.49	0.20	2.66*	2.10	-1.55+	-1.29
	(1.17)	(1.08)	(0.92)	(0.86)	(1.59)	(1.53)	(1.01)	(0.99)
Controls		✓		✓		✓		✓
N	294	285	294	285	294	285	294	285
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	11	9	26	24	98	93	2	2
Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$)	94	91	38	37	30	30	31	29
$+\ p < 0.15$, $^{*}\ p < 0.10, ^{**}\ p < 0.05, ^{***}\ p < 0.01$								

Table 10: **Pooled Contributions with Riot Exposure Moderating Anger Treatment (Weighted Tobit Model)**
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed using data from Central Bureau of Statistics (2011).

OA.6 Perception

	Dep. Variable: Contributions			
Variable	**Ingroup**	**Ingroup**	**Outgroup**	**Outgroup**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anger Treatment	-4.56**	-4.14**	-3.00	-4.16+
	(1.90)	(1.82)	(2.73)	(2.67)
HaMerkaz	-7.72***	-6.03***	-4.91*	-3.57
	(2.02)	(1.81)	(2.84)	(2.85)
Jewish	-7.45***	-7.70***	0.73	1.07
	(1.96)	(2.14)	(2.74)	(2.93)
Riot Exposure	1.54**	1.77***	-0.30	-0.26
	(0.61)	(0.56)	(0.83)	(0.81)
Perception % Ingroup	-0.0025	-0.011	-0.058	-0.051
	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.054)	(0.052)
Controls		✓		✓
N	293	284	292	284
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	11	9	96	92
Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$)	94	91	30	30
$+\ p < 0.15$, $^{*}\ p < 0.10, ^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{***}\ p < 0.01$				

Table 11: **Pooled Contributions Controlling for Perception Ingroup (Weighted Tobit Model)**
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed using data from Central Bureau of Statistics (2011).

OA.7 Mode of Contact/Sample Issues

	2008 Census		**Sample**	
	HaMerkaz	*Shuknah Burla*	*HaMerkaz*	*Shuknah Burla*
% Labor Force	60.5%	69.6%	62.3%	73.0%
% Born in Israel	52.5%	63.7%	68.9%	69.7%
% Matriculation Cert.	50.3%	50.5%	41.0%	55.1%

Table 12: **Difference for Jews between Sample and 2008 Census**

	Dep. Variable: Contribution by Neighborhood							
Variable	**Ingroup** (1)	**Ingroup** (2)	**Mixed** (3)	**Mixed** (4)	**Outgroup** (5)	**Outgroup** (6)	**Discrim.** (7)	**Discrim.** (8)
Anger Treatment	-3.65**	-3.29*	-2.07	-2.49+	-1.21	-2.28	-1.76	-1.00
	(1.80)	(1.70)	(1.62)	(1.60)	(2.73)	(2.68)	(1.84)	(1.77)
HaMerkaz	-7.38***	-5.71***	-1.96	-0.58	-5.07*	-3.24	-2.45	-2.70+
	(1.88)	(1.69)	(1.68)	(1.64)	(2.83)	(2.82)	(1.83)	(1.81)
Jewish	-6.92***	-6.97***	0.59	0.76	1.45	2.33	-5.93***	-6.83***
	(1.85)	(1.95)	(1.64)	(1.88)	(2.74)	(2.87)	(1.84)	(2.13)
Riot Exposure	1.42**	1.60***	0.31	0.56	-0.55	-0.32	1.31**	1.30**
	(0.56)	(0.52)	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.83)	(0.81)	(0.52)	(0.52)
Controls		✓		✓		✓		✓
N	294	285	294	285	294	285	294	285
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	11	9	26	24	98	93	2	2
Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$)	94	91	38	37	30	30	31	29
$+\ p < 0.15$, $^{*}\ p < 0.10, ^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{***}\ p < 0.01$								

Table 13: **Pooled Contributions (Unweighted Tobit Model)**

A concern from Table 2 is the low response rate and multiple modes of contact among Jewish residents of Acre. The easiest to reach Jewish subjects were sampled using door-to-door methods. However, the difficulty of contacting certain subjects led me to use landline-based sampling frame with a professional survey company to collect part of the sample. The survey company repeatedly called eligible subjects on the frame. Subjects who were surveyed after the first night of phone calls (Day 1) only had to be contacted once, whereas subjects who were surveyed later on had to be called multiple times.[18] I use this information about the mode, and when subjects were contacted to examine Jewish subjects were particularly difficult to contact. I construct a variable *Difficulty to Contact*. The variable assigns a 0 to subjects contacted by door-to-door sampling. Given the fact that that there is an increasing relationship between the day surveyed and how many times a subject was contacted, I use the day they were surveyed to instrument for difficulty in terms of contact. Subjects who were contacted via telephone by the survey company are assigned a 1 through 16 for *Difficulty to Contact* depending on the day they were surveyed.

I then model the *Difficulty to Contact* using a Tobit model with left censoring ($Y=0$) in Table 14 below. Subjects who were harder to contact do not appear to differ on *Political Ingroup* attitudes, their trait-level *Physical Aggression*, their *Age*, feelings toward the outgroup *Outgroup Favors Coex.*, *Contact* with PCIs, or *Riot Exposure*. However, subjects participating in the *Labor Force*, living in the *HaMerkaz* neighborhood and not (*Born in Israel*) were harder to contact and surveyed later.

[18] Those contacted on Day 16 had to be called nine times on average before they assented to the survey.

Dep. Variable: Mode/Day Surveyed	
Variable	**Difficulty to Contact**
Born in Israel	-3.27***
	(1.24)
HaMerkaz	3.46***
	(1.01)
Riot Exposure	0.29
	(0.35)
Age	-0.099
	(0.23)
Labor Force	1.76+
	(1.18)
Education	-0.071
	(1.08)
Political Ingroup	0.012
	(0.085)
Outgroup Favors Coex.	-0.11
	(0.20)
Physical Aggression	-0.23
	(0.24)
Contact	0.050
	(0.047)
Constant	5.56**
	(2.77)
σ	5.83***
	(0.38)
N	145
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	38
$+\ p < 0.15$, $*\ p < 0.10, **\ p < 0.05,\ ***\ p < 0.01$	

Table 14: **Prediction of Mode/Day Surveyed (Unweighted Tobit)**
(Robust standard Errors in parentheses)

Finally, it may be that the mode of contact influenced the way Jewish subjects allocated their contributions, and that this may be partially driving ingroup results. However, as Table 14 above shows, the Jews contacted earlier (door-to-door) are different than those surveyed later (via telephone). So if there are differences between those contacted by telephone versus door-to-door, I cannot determine whether it is due to baseline differences between the subjects, or whether the mode of contact changed the way they made decisions. I can partially correct for this by including separate dummies for Jews contacted via telephone (*Jewish Phone*) versus (*Jewish Door-to-Door*). The results are presented in Table 15 below. The results confirm those from Figure 3 (in the main

text).

	Dep. Variable: Contributions			
Variable	**Ingroup**	**Ingroup**	**Outgroup**	**Outgroup**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anger Treatment	-4.42**	-3.96**	-2.46	-3.42
	(1.89)	(1.81)	(2.66)	(2.62)
HaMerkaz	-8.14***	-6.42***	-7.57***	-5.80**
	(2.03)	(1.81)	(2.79)	(2.84)
Jewish Door-to-Door	-10.1***	-9.46**	-14.4***	-12.4**
	(3.66)	(3.71)	(5.31)	(5.23)
Jewish Phone	-6.51***	-6.95***	5.18*	5.25*
	(1.89)	(2.06)	(2.70)	(2.93)
Riot Exposure	1.52**	1.69***	-0.59	-0.47
	(0.59)	(0.54)	(0.82)	(0.80)
Controls		✓		✓
N	294	285	294	285
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	11	9	98	93
Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$)	94	91	30	30
$*+\ p < 0.15$, $*\ p < 0.10, **\ p < 0.05,\ ***\ p < 0.01$				

Table 15: **Looking Whether Mode of Contact Influenced Responses (Weighted Tobit Model)**

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed using data from Central Bureau of Statistics (2011).

OA.8 Neighborhood Sorting

	Dep. Variable: Contributions			
Variable	**Ingroup**	**Ingroup**	**Outgroup**	**Outgroup**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Anger Treatment	-5.28**	-4.90**	-2.77	-3.63
	(2.08)	(2.02)	(2.92)	(2.87)
HaMerkaz	-6.80***	-4.72**	-6.88**	-4.72+
	(2.15)	(1.94)	(3.02)	(3.05)
Jewish	-7.41***	-7.45***	1.16	2.31
	(2.09)	(2.28)	(2.91)	(3.09)
Riot Exposure	1.55**	1.78***	-0.53	-0.29
	(0.65)	(0.58)	(0.87)	(0.84)
Controls		✓		✓
N	254	248	254	248
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	9	8	79	76
Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$)	82	80	28	28
$+\ p < 0.15$, $^{*}\ p < 0.10$, $^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{***}\ p < 0.01$				

Table 16: **Pooled Contributions of Subjects Lived in Neighborhood for Greater than Three Years (Weighted Tobit Model)**
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed using data from Central Bureau of Statistics (2011).

OA.9 High vs. Low Aggression

OA.9.1 Correlates of High Aggression

	Dep. Variable: High Aggression
Variable	
	(1)
Riot Exposure	0.019
	(0.070)
Jewish	-0.70**
	(0.29)
Time Lived in Neighborhood	0.14
	(0.12)
HaMerkaz	-0.46*
	(0.28)
Age	-0.083*
	(0.050)
Labor Force	-0.079
	(0.28)
Education	0.10
	(0.27)
Political Ingroup	0.032
	(0.023)
Outgroup Favors Coex.	0.047
	(0.044)
Contact	-0.0031
	(0.0097)
Constant	-0.0086
	(0.64)
N	289
Pseudo R^2	0.061
$+\ p < 0.15$, $^{*}\ p < 0.10, ^{**}\ p < 0.05,\ ^{***}\ p < 0.01$	

Table 17: **Correlates of High Aggression (Weighted Logit Model)**
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed using data from Central Bureau of Statistics (2011).

OA.9.2 Alternate Measure of High-Risk for Ethnic Conflict

Horowitz (2001) and Scacco (2009) suggest that certain individuals are more likely to participate in ethnic conflict. Namely young, aggressive men with lower opportunity costs (i.e. unemployed). As a robustness check to the findings in Table 4 in Section 4.2 (in the main text) about "High Aggression" types, I create an alternative measure of individuals I label as "High-Risk" for ethnic conflict. I operationalize "High-Risk" by transforming the variable *Age* to a [0,1] scale (I call *Youth*) the youngest individuals assigned a score of 1, the oldest 0, and others assigned intermediate values. I also created a dummy variable *Unemployed*, that reverse coded *Labor Force*. I added the *Youth*, *Unemployed*, and *High Aggression* variables together to create a *Propensity for Ethnic Violence* variable. I then empirically divided this *Propensity for Ethnic Violence* variable. Those who were in the top 50% in their *Propensity for Ethnic Violence* were assumed to be "High-Risk", and those in the bottom 50% were assumed to be "Low-Risk". I then run a series of Tobit regressions similar to Table 4 Panel C (main text) excluding *Labor Force* and *Age*, since these were by design correlated with "High-Risk". The results in Table 18 support those in the main text (Table 4 Panel C): the "High-Risk"/"High Aggression" types drive the reduction in altruism, particularly towards the ingroup.

	Dep. Variable: Contributions					
	Ingroup		**Outgroup**		**Discrim.**	
Variable	**High Risk.**	**Low Risk.**	**High Risk**	**Low Risk**	**High Risk.**	**Low Risk**
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anger Treatment	-4.92*	-2.62	-4.92	-1.09	-0.82	-1.16
	(2.85)	(2.09)	(4.38)	(2.88)	(2.69)	(2.29)
HaMerkaz	-7.62**	-5.48***	-13.0**	2.33	2.01	-6.35***
	(3.10)	(2.07)	(5.54)	(3.14)	(3.11)	(2.42)
Jewish	-13.3***	-5.44**	-11.7**	11.9***	-1.92	-12.7***
	(3.46)	(2.52)	(5.03)	(3.29)	(3.18)	(2.76)
Riot Exposure	0.51	3.04***	-3.28***	1.34	2.44***	0.93
	(0.72)	(0.72)	(1.11)	(1.08)	(0.72)	(0.74)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	143	147	143	147	143	147
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	4	5	56	39	1	1
Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$)	54	39	17	13	17	13
$+\ p < 0.15$, $^{*}\ p < 0.10$, $^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{***}\ p < 0.01$						

Table 18: **High-Risk for Ethnic Violence vs. Low-Risk for Ethnic Violence Contributions (Weighted Tobit Model)**

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed using data from Central Bureau of Statistics (2011).

OA.9.3 Marginal Effects

To better unpack the effect of *Riot Exposure* and *Anger Treatment*, I plot their marginal effect on contributions for the pooled, Jewish, and PCIs samples. For Tobit models Greene (2008) recommends reporting the marginal effect $E[y]$, or the effect of the *Anger Treatment* and *Riot Exposure* on the expected value of the observed contributions.

Given the small sample size and possible presence of outliers, bootstrapping is one method to build up confidence intervals on marginal effects using the observed data (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). For each estimated quantity (γ), I sample with replacement from the data (the empirical distribution) stratifying on the treatment and neighborhood of residency—*Anger Treatment* and *HaMerkaz* (as well as *Jewish* for the pooled model). I then estimate a Tobit model and the marginal effects for the specifications including controls from (Columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 in Tables 4, 5, and 6). I repeat this 500 times and obtain a bootstrapped estimate of the distribution of γ, and use this to calculate confidence intervals on the marginal effects.[19] In Figure 6 I plot the marginal effect of the *Anger Treatment* and of one standard deviation increase in *Riot Exposure* from 500 bootstrapped stratified samples.[20]

[19] (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) typically suggest that 100-300 bootstraps are sufficient to build a confidence interval.
[20] The standard deviations for Jews is 1.63 and for PCIs 2.11.



Figure 6: **Jewish and PCI Tobit Marginal Effects (95 %CI) of Anger and Riot Exposure**
Marginal effect estimates are from the models in Tables 4, 5, and 6 that include controls. *Riot Exposure* measures one standard deviation increases for each sample: 1.88 for pooled, 1.63 for Jews, and 2.11 for PCIs. Estimates for the effect of the *Anger Treatment* are black circles with solid black lines for confidence intervals. Estimates for the effect of *Riot Exposure* are red rectangles with dashed red lines for confidence intervals. For Jews, post-stratification weights are used.

The pooled marginal effects (top plot) show that the *Anger Treatment* led individuals to contribute $\approx$ 3 NIS less on average to their ingroup and a one standard deviation increase in *Riot Exposure* had the opposite effect ($\approx$ 2.5 NIS more). The effect of the *Anger Treatment* is similar across the ingroup, mixed, and outgroup neighborhoods, but most significant at the ingroup-level for the pooled effects. When the results are disaggregated (bottom plots), the *Anger Treatment* is negative for both Jews (bottom left) and PCIs (bottom right) at the ingroup level. Yet the effect of *Anger Treatment* is only significant for PCIs. The *Anger Treatment* has a larger effect for PCIs at the mixed and ingroup levels as well—even though the confidence intervals slightly straddle 0. It also appears that pooled effect of *Riot Exposure* (increasing ingroup cohesion and discrimination) is largely driven by the effect on PCIs. A one standard deviation increase *Riot Exposure* is not significant effect for Jews. The plots reinforce the finding that *Riot Exposure* influenced PCI contributions, but did not have an effect on Jewish contributions.

OA.10 Mediation Effects

It may be the case the *Anger Treatment* primes both the riots and anger. Therefore, it is useful to decompose the differing effects of the treatment using mediation analysis. I assume that the *Anger Treatment* influences subjects' decisions in two ways: one path that travels through *Reported Levels of Anger* (indirect effect) and the other path that includes everything else that treatment primes (direct effect)—which I assume is the riot prime effect.[21] To tease apart what effects are mediated via *Reported Levels of Anger* and what are due to the riot prime, I use mediation analysis developed by Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto (2010). For the pooled data and the Jewish and PCI disaggregated data, I estimate two equations. The first equation linearly estimates the effect of the mediator (*Reported Levels of Anger*), using the same controls founds in Columns 2 and 6 in Tables 4, 5, and 6. I then run a Tobit model with controls for ingroup and outgroup (Columns 2 and 6 in Tables 4, 5, and 6) interacting the *Anger Treatment* and *Reported Levels of Anger*. I interact the two to allow for the fact that anger in the absence of priming the riots may have had a different effect than anger coupled with the riot prime. I conduct the mediation analysis using

[21] It is always possible that the *Anger Treatment* could be priming something other than anger and the riots. However, I treat direct effect in the subsequent mediation analysis as the effect of priming the riot.

the **mediation** package in the **R** statistical software program to see how *Reported Levels of Anger* mediate the treatment. I plot the results in Figure 7 below.



Figure 7: **Mediation effect (95 %CI) of Anger** Mediation analysis for Pooled (top row), Jews (middle row), and PCIs (bottom row) for both ingroup (left column) and outgroup (right column) was constructed using the **mediation** package in **R** (Imai, Keele, Tingley and Yamamoto, 2010). Each plot shows the direct and mediation effects in the Neutral Condition (black) and Anger Treatment (red), as well as the total effect. For Jews and pooled anlysis, post-stratification weights are used.

The mediation plots suggest two key things about the *Anger Treatment*. (1) The negative effect of the *Anger Treatment* seems to be driven largely by the riot prime and the mediation effect of anger moves in the opposite direction of the direct effect (priming riots). (2) Furthermore, this mediating effect of anger is lower in the *Anger Treatment* (red dashed lines), than in the *Neutral Condition* (black solid lines), and for PCI contributions to the ingroup (lower left) it flips signs. This results shows that the context of anger matters. Anger against the backdrop of the riots does not have nearly the same cohesive effect as generalized anger, particularly at an ingroup-level.

OA.11 Effects of Income

One worry about the effect of manipulating the partner's identity via neighborhood, is that neighborhood is correlated with other things besides ethnic identity. For instance, the neighborhoods vary in their level of income and labor force participation rate. A concern may be that the identity manipulation is actually manipulating income perceptions. In Table 19 I control for income perceptions across the different neighborhood. Subjects were asked in the post-experiment survey how much money each of their partners from the different made:

1. Less than 3,000 NIS
2. 3,000-5,000 NIS
3. 5,001-8,000 NIS
4. 8,001-11,000 NIS
5. 11,001-15,000 NIS
6. 15,001-20,000 NIS
7. More than 20,000 NIS

The results do not change.

	Dep. Variable: Contributions							
	Jews				*PCIs*			
	Ingroup	**Mixed**	**Outgroup**	**Discrim.**	**Ingroup**	**Mixed**	**Outgroup**	**Discrim.**
Anger Treatment	-3.27+	-1.74	-0.24	-2.79	-6.23**	-3.65+	-6.05+	-0.23
	(2.01)	(2.04)	(3.38)	(2.29)	(3.07)	(2.47)	(3.66)	(2.71)
HaMerkaz	-3.37+	2.59	6.03*	-7.07***	-7.30**	-3.33	-14.3***	3.16
	(2.18)	(1.92)	(3.60)	(2.29)	(3.56)	(3.78)	(4.94)	(3.52)
Riot Exposure	0.85	0.62	0.60	0.32	2.15**	0.60	-0.71	1.63**
	(0.79)	(0.71)	(1.14)	(0.79)	(0.88)	(0.69)	(1.06)	(0.75)
Income Perceptions	-2.22**	-2.36**	-0.72	0.53	0.53	0.53	-2.44**	0.53
	(0.99)	(1.15)	(1.55)	(1.28)	(1.28)	(1.28)	(1.12)	(1.28)
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
N	143	144	144	143	140	140	140	140
Left Cens. ($Y \leq 0$)	4	11	47	1	5	13	46	1
Right Cens. ($Y \geq 40$)	27	13	11	10	63	23	18	19
$+\ p < 0.15$, $^{*}\ p < 0.10, ^{**}\ p < 0.05$, $^{***}\ p < 0.01$								

Table 19: **Controlling for Perceptions of Income on Contributions (Weighted Tobit Model)**

Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. Jewish data is weighted using post-stratification weights constructed using data from Central Bureau of Statistics (2011). All regressions contain all the controls used in Columns 2, 6, and 8 from Table 5 and 6.

One important question raised in Table 19 is whether income perceptions can be separated from ethnicity concerns–i.e. did PCIs discriminate against partners from Shuknah Burla because it was richer, or because it is largely Jewish. However, as Table 20 shows, its difficult to separate income from ethnicity concerns. Jewish subjects were significantly more likely to view the Jewish neighborhood of Shuknah Burla as poorer than PCIs, and conversely more likely to view the PCI dominant Old City as richer than PCIs (top panel). In the bottom panel of Table 20, we show this is true even for those who live in the HaMerkaz. Thus this finding is not simply driven by Jews who live in Shuknah Burla and PCIs who live in the Old City (i.e. think their own neighborhood is poorer). This suggests that it is difficult to disentangle the effect of income perceptions from ethnicity.

	Perception of Income		
	Income Burla	**Income HaMerkaz**	**Income Old City**
Anger Treatment	0.18	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Jewish	-0.88***	-0.31***	0.67***
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.10)
HaMerkaz	-0.32**	0.11	-0.24
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)
N	294	295	294
	Perception of Income (HaMerkaz Only)		
	Income Burla	**Income HaMerkaz**	**Income Old City**
Anger Treatment	0.33+	—	-0.11
	(0.20)	—	(0.16)
Jewish	-0.69***	—	0.47***
	(0.20)	—	(0.16)
N	122	—	121

$+ p < 0.15$, $* p < 0.10$, $** p < 0.05$, $*** p < 0.01$

Table 20: **Determinants Perceptions of Income on Contributions (OLS Model)**

Another concern raised, is that perhaps the sample is biased by towards individuals (those who received a matriculation certificate). However, as shown in Table 21, there is little, to no significant difference between those who matriculated and those that did not. Additionally, post-stratification weights also correct for potential biases in the sample.

	Diff. in Contrib. by Education		
Residence	**Ingroup**	**Mixed**	**Outgroup**
Burla	1.65	2.30	2.20
HaMerkaz Jews	0.91	-1.52	2.15
HaMerkaz PCIs	5.10	1.12	-1.60
Old City	-1.46	-4.48*	0.22
$+ p < 0.15$, $* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01$			

Table 21: **Difference in Mean Contribution by Education (T-test)**

The cell values above look at the difference in mean contributions (using a t-test) between those who received a matriculation certificate versus those that do not.

OA.12 Disaggregated Treatment Means

Ethnicity	**Neighborhood**	**Anger**	**Neutral**	**Difference**
Jews	Ingroup (Burla)	24.94 (22.71, 27.16)	26.78 (24.47, 29.09)	-1.84
PCIs	Ingroup (Old City)	28.33 (25.57, 31.10)	30.83 (28.27, 33.40)	-2.5
Jews	Mixed (HaMerkaz)	21.95 (19.53, 24.37)	23.22 (20.85, 25.59)	-1.27
PCIs	Mixed (HaMerkaz)	20.53 (17.66, 23.41)	22.57 (20.07, 25.07)	-2.04
Jews	Outgroup (Old City)	15.46 (12.36, 18.55)	14.60 (11.49, 17.69)	0.86
PCIs	Outgroup (Burla)	11.93 (9.06, 14.81)	14.58 (11.10, 18.07)	-2.65
Jews	Discrimination (Ingroup-Outgroup)	9.48 (6.53, 12.43)	12.19 (8.71, 15.67)	-2.71
PCIs	Discrimination (Ingroup-Outgroup)	16.40 (13.17, 19.62)	16.25 (12.62, 19.88)	0.15

Table 22: **Mean Contributions in NIS by Ethnicity, Neighborhood, and Anger Treatment** 95% confidence intervals in parentheses, and statistically significant differences are based on T-tests with unequal variance. $+ p < 0.15$, $* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01$

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