THE NASTY STYLE: WHY POLITICIANS USE VIOLENT RHETORIC
Oleh Lyashko's Facebook page (December 2015) Donald Trump's Twitter feed (July 2017)
Preliminary Draft of the Analysis (click here)
Book Prospectus (click here)
Summary of the Argument
Why do politicians endorse violence against domestic political opponents? Which politicians choose to ‘get nasty,’ and when is the public receptive to these appeals? These questions are puzzling, because survey data suggests the public reacts negatively to the use of violent rhetoric and incivility in politics. So why do politicians still use it? I study this question looking at the behavior of voters and politicians in the U.S. and Ukraine. The central argument of my book is that politicians use violent rhetoric because it draws outsized media and voter attention, and it signals to voters their steadfastness on policy positions. Thus politicians may be willing to pay the reputational cost for using violent rhetoric in exchange for greater attention and coverage, as well as coalescing core supporters.
Chapter List
Chapter 1 An Introduction to Nasty Politics
Chapter 2 Why Do Politicians Say Nasty Things?
Chapter 3 How Does the Public Respond to Nastiness?
Chapter 4 Which Politicians Choose to get Nasty and When?
Chapter 5 What do the Experts Think About Violent Rhetoric?
Chapter 6 Profiles in Nastiness: Case Studies of Oleh Lyashko and Donald Trump
Chapter 7 Conclusion
Overview
Why do politicians endorse violence against domestic political opponents? Which politicians choose to ‘get nasty,’ and when is the public receptive to these appeals? These questions are puzzling, because survey data suggests the public reacts negatively to the use of violent rhetoric and incivility in politics. So why do politicians still use it? The central argument of my book is that politicians use violent rhetoric because it draws outsized media and voter attention, and it signals to voters their steadfastness on policy positions. Some politicians are willing to pay the price of being nasty in order to receive more attention and consolidate support from their base.
It is important to understand the puzzle of violent rhetoric for two reasons. First, there has been a resurgence of populist, nationalist parties and politicians worldwide, many of which have embraced violent political rhetoric. Second, many point to social media as a tool that allows politicians to exploit and upend the traditional norms and means of political communication, and as a cause of worsening political discourse, there is pressing need to understand the strategy behind violent political language.
The conventional wisdom about politicians’ use of violent language is that it polarizes the populace, exacerbates existing ethnic and political tensions, and paves the way for future violence. Politicians use these kinds of appeals for both ideological purposes and to strategically consolidate their power. Yet this conventional wisdom is incomplete. First, violent rhetoric takes many forms. Much of the research conflates populist appeals and violent appeals, and does not differentiate between explicit calls (“beat them up”) for violence versus more implicit violent appeals (“they’re animals”). Second, violent rhetoric tends to increase during periods of violent conflict or intense polarization, thus it is hard to know if violence is a side effect of the violence and polarization or a direct contributor to it. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, media pundits and campaign strategists assume that violent rhetoric ‘works’—yet survey and polling show that the public negatively responds to it.
This is the main puzzle of my book—why do politicians employ violent rhetoric if the public dislikes it so much? I develop a theory of what I dub “nasty politics” that answers this question. While the public may state their aversion to it, violent rhetoric still captivates and receives outsized attention. It also allows politicians to signal their steadfastness to voters on policy positions and that they will not ‘sell out’ the ingroup. Thus politicians may be willing to pay the reputational cost for being nasty and using violent rhetoric in exchange for greater attention and coverage, as well as coalescing core supporters.
In this book I investigate the strategy and public reaction to nasty politics in Ukraine and the U.S. Both countries represent important contexts to explore the dynamics of violent rhetoric. Ukraine recently emerged from a political revolution, and its political environment reflects this. Frequent fights in the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada, or Rada for short) between politicians, and personality-driven political parties characterize politics in Ukraine. Ukrainian has recently entered a new era with the election of comedian and novice politician Volodymyr Zelensky as president in 2019. In contrast the U.S. is an established democracy increasingly polarized by partisanship that has worsened since the 2016 election of Donald Trump as president. The choice of two very different contexts is intentional. By showing that politicians are using a similar strategy in both Ukraine and the U.S.—to attract attention and to solidify core supporters—I provide a strong test of the generalization of the theory.
As part of the book, I will use a series of surveys and survey experiments in the U.S. and Ukraine to show that the public in general reacts negatively to politicians who use violent rhetoric. Yet certain types of voters—those higher in trait aggression and authoritarianism—are more receptive and do not punish politicians who use it. I also show that voters are more likely to pay attention to politicians who engage in nasty politics, and more likely to consider ingroup partisan politicians who use it more trustworthy and “tougher.” Using elite surveys in both countries I further show that politicians and elites are aware of this trade-off involved in using violent rhetoric. To see which politicians engage in nasty politics, I will construct a dataset from media sources of Ukrainian and U.S. politicians’ use of different types of violent rhetoric (name-calling, threats, and in the case of Ukraine, fights) from 2016-2019. I will use text analysis via supervised machine learning to measure the kind (implicit vs. explicit) and level of violent rhetoric used in each of these incidents. I will show that challengers—those from more extreme parties—and those in the midst of elections are more likely to use violent rhetoric. To better understand nuances and strategies behind violent rhetoric, I will include in-depth interviews from campaign strategists in both the U.S. and Ukraine and two case studies of politicians who are known to purveyors of violent rhetoric—Oleh Lyashko in Ukraine, and President Trump in the U.S.
Book Prospectus (click here)
Summary of the Argument
Why do politicians endorse violence against domestic political opponents? Which politicians choose to ‘get nasty,’ and when is the public receptive to these appeals? These questions are puzzling, because survey data suggests the public reacts negatively to the use of violent rhetoric and incivility in politics. So why do politicians still use it? I study this question looking at the behavior of voters and politicians in the U.S. and Ukraine. The central argument of my book is that politicians use violent rhetoric because it draws outsized media and voter attention, and it signals to voters their steadfastness on policy positions. Thus politicians may be willing to pay the reputational cost for using violent rhetoric in exchange for greater attention and coverage, as well as coalescing core supporters.
Chapter List
Chapter 1 An Introduction to Nasty Politics
Chapter 2 Why Do Politicians Say Nasty Things?
Chapter 3 How Does the Public Respond to Nastiness?
Chapter 4 Which Politicians Choose to get Nasty and When?
Chapter 5 What do the Experts Think About Violent Rhetoric?
Chapter 6 Profiles in Nastiness: Case Studies of Oleh Lyashko and Donald Trump
Chapter 7 Conclusion
Overview
Why do politicians endorse violence against domestic political opponents? Which politicians choose to ‘get nasty,’ and when is the public receptive to these appeals? These questions are puzzling, because survey data suggests the public reacts negatively to the use of violent rhetoric and incivility in politics. So why do politicians still use it? The central argument of my book is that politicians use violent rhetoric because it draws outsized media and voter attention, and it signals to voters their steadfastness on policy positions. Some politicians are willing to pay the price of being nasty in order to receive more attention and consolidate support from their base.
It is important to understand the puzzle of violent rhetoric for two reasons. First, there has been a resurgence of populist, nationalist parties and politicians worldwide, many of which have embraced violent political rhetoric. Second, many point to social media as a tool that allows politicians to exploit and upend the traditional norms and means of political communication, and as a cause of worsening political discourse, there is pressing need to understand the strategy behind violent political language.
The conventional wisdom about politicians’ use of violent language is that it polarizes the populace, exacerbates existing ethnic and political tensions, and paves the way for future violence. Politicians use these kinds of appeals for both ideological purposes and to strategically consolidate their power. Yet this conventional wisdom is incomplete. First, violent rhetoric takes many forms. Much of the research conflates populist appeals and violent appeals, and does not differentiate between explicit calls (“beat them up”) for violence versus more implicit violent appeals (“they’re animals”). Second, violent rhetoric tends to increase during periods of violent conflict or intense polarization, thus it is hard to know if violence is a side effect of the violence and polarization or a direct contributor to it. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, media pundits and campaign strategists assume that violent rhetoric ‘works’—yet survey and polling show that the public negatively responds to it.
This is the main puzzle of my book—why do politicians employ violent rhetoric if the public dislikes it so much? I develop a theory of what I dub “nasty politics” that answers this question. While the public may state their aversion to it, violent rhetoric still captivates and receives outsized attention. It also allows politicians to signal their steadfastness to voters on policy positions and that they will not ‘sell out’ the ingroup. Thus politicians may be willing to pay the reputational cost for being nasty and using violent rhetoric in exchange for greater attention and coverage, as well as coalescing core supporters.
In this book I investigate the strategy and public reaction to nasty politics in Ukraine and the U.S. Both countries represent important contexts to explore the dynamics of violent rhetoric. Ukraine recently emerged from a political revolution, and its political environment reflects this. Frequent fights in the Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada, or Rada for short) between politicians, and personality-driven political parties characterize politics in Ukraine. Ukrainian has recently entered a new era with the election of comedian and novice politician Volodymyr Zelensky as president in 2019. In contrast the U.S. is an established democracy increasingly polarized by partisanship that has worsened since the 2016 election of Donald Trump as president. The choice of two very different contexts is intentional. By showing that politicians are using a similar strategy in both Ukraine and the U.S.—to attract attention and to solidify core supporters—I provide a strong test of the generalization of the theory.
As part of the book, I will use a series of surveys and survey experiments in the U.S. and Ukraine to show that the public in general reacts negatively to politicians who use violent rhetoric. Yet certain types of voters—those higher in trait aggression and authoritarianism—are more receptive and do not punish politicians who use it. I also show that voters are more likely to pay attention to politicians who engage in nasty politics, and more likely to consider ingroup partisan politicians who use it more trustworthy and “tougher.” Using elite surveys in both countries I further show that politicians and elites are aware of this trade-off involved in using violent rhetoric. To see which politicians engage in nasty politics, I will construct a dataset from media sources of Ukrainian and U.S. politicians’ use of different types of violent rhetoric (name-calling, threats, and in the case of Ukraine, fights) from 2016-2019. I will use text analysis via supervised machine learning to measure the kind (implicit vs. explicit) and level of violent rhetoric used in each of these incidents. I will show that challengers—those from more extreme parties—and those in the midst of elections are more likely to use violent rhetoric. To better understand nuances and strategies behind violent rhetoric, I will include in-depth interviews from campaign strategists in both the U.S. and Ukraine and two case studies of politicians who are known to purveyors of violent rhetoric—Oleh Lyashko in Ukraine, and President Trump in the U.S.